Russian Br(sp)ide: Anna Chapman

The Brouhaha Continues Over Gov. Sean Parnell's Job Offer to Nancy Dahlstrom

It is always interesting to see two political opposites in the media come together - in what amounts to be nothing more than a political temper tantrum. Well the Anchorage Daily News (ADN) editors joined the big brouhaha that was started by radio talk host and most-of-the-time whiner, Dan Fagan.

As was recently written in my commentary on Red County here and here, I stated that Parnell did not break the law. But barrister-wannabe Fagan made his legal decision that Governor Parnell broke the law and now the irrelevant editors at the Anchoarge Daily News have decided to throw their two cents in on the matter.

According to the editors at the ADN, in effect, Parnell broke the spirit of the law.

You have to ask, what the hell is the spirit of the law? You either broke the law or you didn't. There are no spirits in the law.


Read more at Red County

Smolensk Radio Beacon: Automated NDB PAR-10

Here is the link that talks about the Automated NDB PAR-10 that is the marker beacon at Smolensk.

Complete set of PAR-10 and PAR-10S radio stations:
Homing transmitter P200 2
Automatic equipment rack P300 1
Power distribution device P501 1
Linear lead-in P502C 1
Control device for fire-extinguishing system P504 1
Mains filter P700 1
Voltage stabilizer CTC-10/0.5C 1
Marker beacon E615.5 1
USW radio station P-853 B1 1
Operating terminal of telecommand and teleindication equipment 1
Operations control terminal of telecommand and teleindication equipment 1
Stand-by electric power supply system:
- automatic control rack 1
- Diesel electric or petrol-fired power unit 2
- Remote control panel P707 1
Radio station ADU 1
Phone set TA-57 1
Fire-extinguisher OSU-5 4
Electric heater 4
Fan 2
Check-out and measuring devices:
- oscilloscope C1-125 1
- electric measuring device 1
- frequency meter ChZ-63/1 1
20m T-shaped antenna or 5m antenna (on request) 1
Device P506 for matching with telecommand and teleindication equipment 1
Mains lead-in panel P702 1
Signalling panel P704 1
Signalling panel P705 1
Spare parts kit UZ 1.240.006 ZIP

Emphasis added.



The ZIL 131





The Gaz-66




Military vehicle and mast antennas at radio beacon at Smolensk.






Lantern being used with PAR-10 at a different location.



Link

Link

The same type of light is on top of a building that has the same type of antennas that are at Smolensk in the link below.






Link

Link

There is a reason why the lantern is made from neon and it is the color red. You can read why here.

At the Crash Site In Smolensk, Who Did the Russians Shoot at?

With all of the focus that has been placed on the crash of the Polish president's plane, the international press has not focused much on the fact that the Polish press had landed at Smolensk.

And given the Polish press in the Yak-40 had landed, you would have thought that the press would have been waiting for the president's plane to land. And when the president's plane crashed, you would think that the press would have rushed to the scene of the tragic crash.

Well some in the Polish press are now starting to come forward with first-hand accounts of what happened at the crash site in Smolensk.

It was a terrible sight: the smoking remains of the aircraft, scattered bodies of the victims and the things belonging to them. Despite this tragedy, Smolensk place from the first minute after the fall of the aircraft attracted the curious and human hyena who wanted to get rich on the misery.

I find the use of the word "hyena" by one of the Polish press interesting because,
in a video taken by a Russian who was one of the first people to witness the crash site, you can here gunshots, laughter and both Poles and Russians yelling.

Some had thought that because you could hear Polish people yelling, survivors were being shot.

That was never proven.

But in the video that was authenticated by the Polish military, you can hear a Russian talking about finding booze, an indication that there was looting going on.

In the words of the Polish newsman who witnessed what was going on:

I heard someone praise that has the counter. Another spoke of the watch.
Then things taken away from the place of tragedy, you could buy - Slawomir
Wisniewski confirms the worst assumptions that in addition to credit cards
stolen from the victims of the disaster other valuable things.

(google translation)

In the story about the videographer, you can tell the Russians allowed the videographer to go public by the comments he made:

I saw this tragedy up close It was Saturday 10 April. Just working in his garage. It is no more than about 200 meters from a military airport "Siewiernyj. I was engrossed in work, when my attention turned to the approaching roar of landing aircraft. I raised my head. Suddenly, no more like 65 meters from my shop, I saw a flash of breaking and trees as matches. I immediately ran in that direction.

Nobody called for assistance At the crash site could get anyone, I was one of the first. I grabbed the cell phone and decided to record what I had before my eyes ... I tried to approach as close to the wreck, I almost succeeded. But I felt a fuel smell in the air and I realized that in a moment everything can explode.

I was surprised that the burning wreckage, scattered among things, broken trees can not see at all the people. Even thought it crashed machine or military transport, and not the passenger. No bodies, no wounded, and we do not hear anyone calling assistance. I was close enough and believe me that if I heard a cry for help, I would not hesitate for a second.

I heard the explosions of ammunition From the airport immediately began podbiegać militiamen. They could not prevail over all. I only heard their cries in Russian. Nobody said a word in Polish, after all I recognized. Certainly no one spoke, nor did he shouted in Polish.

At the crash site there was a terrible chaos, a sudden roar pierced the silence. It was louder than the shot with a pistol, I'm sure. I once lived near the training ground and I know the sound of gunfire, so there could be no question of any mistake. Now, when I think about it, I am sure it must have the ammunition of the weapons that belonged to the presidential protection. Exploded in the fire and hence the noise.

The militiamen ran and chased onlookers When I arrived at the crash site of militia, tried to drive the gathering of onlookers and forbade touching any of the things from the wrecked plane. It was evident, however, that officers shall not prevail over the situation. They were nervous and did not know what to do. I saw an older man who was walking the forest path. You can go see him on film, who dialed the cell. Suddenly, the policeman ran up to him and shouted: - Go away old man!

Then turned the lens on your camera toward the ground, I did not want to burn the policeman's face. Therefore, only heard his voice. Do not realized that the video recording. He looked panicked and terrified. He said to me a word, just ran toward the plane.

(google translation)

Having read what was said by the Russian videographer, here is what the Polish newsman said:

The soldiers who arrived on the spot, focused on pulling the Polish journalists, rather than guarding the area. So anyone can enter, so these primitive thieves could be a lot more - he says.

Wisniewski threw himself over the scene as soon as he heard the roar of aircraft into the earth. They ran the locals there too. But only stopped his Russian uniform, he had a camera. The Russians did not want someone filmed what was happening at the scene.

(google translation)

It is clear that the Russian who took the video of the crash site is lying. There were both Poles and Russians yelling. There was looting and there were dead bodies at the scene. And they were right in the area that he was standing.

So, aside from the fact that Russian soldiers were looting the crash site, you now have to wonder about the story that was written by Bill Gertz for the Washington Times on NATO codes being found at the crash site.

The recent crash of a Polish military transport that killed most of Warsaw's senior civilian and military leaders was not only a human catastrophe for a key U.S. ally. NATO sources said that, in addition to the loss of nearly 100 pro-U.S. Polish leaders, the crash provided Moscow with a windfall of secrets.

And the timing of Germany and Russia tying the economic knot.

According to the strategy paper that was leaked by the Russian Foreign Ministry, Russia will need at least €1 billion until 2013 to upgrade its infrastructure as part of its modernization program, but also substantial technological assistance and investments from abroad.

The paper, which was published in Russian Newsweek, called for a “modernization alliance” with Germany that would go beyond the support given already by German industry and government for several major infrastructure projects.

These include the building of the Nord Stream gas pipeline that will bring Russian gas directly to Germany via a pipeline under the Baltic Sea; cooperation between the German and Russian railway companies; the involvement by Siemens, the electronics company, in building high-speed trains; and investments by Volkswagen, Daimler and BMW in the Russian automobile sector.

While NATO Turkey develops its ties with Iran.

The tragedy of Katyn is repeating itself but with a different military tact.

Hopefully Eastern Europe and Poland will not take the same course as history has shown.

The Poles would do well to remember to not make the same mistake and depend on Germany or the E.U. to be their ally, because the Russians, for a reason, were shooting at them on that tragic day on April 10th.

Why Did the Russian Controller and the Polish Crew on the Ground at Smolensk Lie? (Updated)

Just recently, in a news article found here in the Polish press, it is now stated that the Russian controller lied to the crew on PLF 101.

Inspectors falsified data on the visibility of the Smolensk airport and they then gave false information to the crew Polish Tupolev. As prosecutors and testified against the Russians, would thus discourage the Poles to land. The fact came to the content of these testimonies. They are shocking. Because they show that people who should give the parameters necessary for the safe planting machine at the airport runway, in its sole discretion ming them.

Russian investigators and Victor Paul Pliusnin Ryzenko prosecutors testified that, although the visibility at the airport Siewiernyj was then 800 meters, they deliberately gave the Polish pilots, another value - 400 meters, which, moreover, was recorded on the recording of black boxes.

The reasons stated by the Russians for giving out the lower visibility was they wanted to discourage the president from landing.

In previous threads titled: How to Kill a Polish President and Use Bad Weather as an Accomplice, I stated the following before the transcripts where released:

In a sensationalized video released on the internet by an amateur videographer, you can look toward the end where the shallow valley sets and see the visibility is poor but not 200 meters as was stated by Russian authorities. Also, through the smoke you can make out the height of the obscuration of the fog and see blue sky.

By looking at the video on the previous thread, you could see the visibility was better than the 200 meters which according to the transcripts, was the visibility given to the president's pilot by the Polish crew from the Yak-40.

This idea that a lower visibility was given to deter the pilots from landing is nonsense.

Here is why.

10:24:49,2:
KVS: Temperature and air pressure, please.
044: We greet you
warmly. You know what, speaking honestly, it's a bitch down here. Visibility is
about 400 metres and in our view the bases are below 50 metres, thick.
D:
The temperature (incomp.), air pressure 7-45. 7-4-5, the landing conditions are
nonexistent.
KVS: Thank you, if it's possible we'll try to approach, but if
not, if the weather's bad, we'll circle around.
2P: Have you landed yet?
044: Yeah, we managed to land at the last minute. But speaking frankly, you
can definitely try. There are two APMs, they made a gate, so you can try, but...
If you're unable by the second attempt, I advise you to try, for example Moscow,
or somewhere [else].

The Polish crew, even though the weather was a "bitch", told the president's crew "Yeah, we managed to land at the last minute. But speaking frankly, you can definitely try. There are two APMs, they made a gate, so you can try..."

The Polish crew said "But speaking frankly, you can definitely try."

This is not an act of trying to convince the pilot to not land, it is an invitation to try an approach, an approach that ended in a tragedy. Moreover, the APMs that the Polish crew spoke about are runway lights that are left and right and form a gate on the approach end of the runway.

They were never there and if they had been, the crew on the president's plane would have known this during their prefight.

So not only do you have the Polish crew and the Russians on the ground lying about the actual weather conditions while suggesting that there are runway lights when there aren't any, the question is now raised on what about the Russian Il-76 that was carrying the president's security team?

They supposedly made two attempts.

Now logic does not follow -- if the weather was bad and the Russian controllers were trying to discourage the president's plane from landing, why did they not offer the same advice to the Russian pilots on the Russian Il-76.

Two missed approaches by the Russian Il-76? And the visibility was at least 800 meters or better.

So again, why the two attempts and two missed approaches? In a thread titled: Somlensk: In the Norm at 100 Meters, I pointed to an article that state:

The radio tower at Smolensk airport may have been dysfunctional on the fateful
morning of April 10, and contributed to the Polish presidential airplane
disaster.

Signals from the radio tower were problematic to the Polish
crew of a Yak-40, which landed in Smolensk about an hour before the presidential
Tu-154. It was the last airplane to successfully land at the airport that day.

Just minutes prior to the crash, a Russian Il-76 diverted to Moscow
after it was unable to stabilize its approach to landing. The Yak's
Polish crew saw it veer to the left of the runway, a mistake that
should not occur when a constant radio signal is present, according to sources
close to Rzeczpospolita.

(emphasis added)

The crew on the Yak-40 stated that they could see from the ground, the Russian Il-76 veer left of the runway.

Now given the Polish crew on the ground could see the Russian Il-76, there is no doubt that the pilots could see the runway because as now admitted, the visibility wasn't 400 meters or 200 meters and the ceiling was definitely not 50 meters or 100 meters because the Yak-40 crew could see the aircraft from the ground.

So why didn't the plane carrying the president's security detail land?

Moreover, how is it that you have a certified airport with mins of 100/1000 and aircraft veering left of the runway?

As pointed out on previous threads, there was indication that a mobile radar unit was sent to accept the VIP landing of Tusk.

The following photos are of radar units at Smolensk.

The first photo is what looks to be the RSP 6 radar. The second photo shows it was moved a few weeks after the crash and is with another radar platform in among a group of trees.

As stated before, the one radar is believed to be a РСП-6М2, РСП-10МН1.

The photos of the radar platform below match the one that was taken at Smolensk.

The radar is certified to ceilings down to only 150 meters and you can find here how the RSP7, a close platform to the RSP 6m2, operates.

However, on April 5th, Smolensk was certified to accept VIP planes with ceilings down to 100 meters and a minimum visibility of 1000 meters.

And that raises the topic of a radar unit that has the following vehicle that was seen at the radio beacon with two military green antennas setting left of the runway radio beacon mast.

First photo shows the military vehicle at the beacon. The second photo shows the two antennas left of the beacon.

The chassis design of the military vehicle fits the chassis design of support vehicles for the Nebo/ L13/117/119 mobile radars.

The second vehicle in the photo below fits the chassis profile.

Interior of the vehicle of the 117 mobile radar that is housed in the same chassis profile.

It is not known at this time what mobile radar unit was at Smolensk.

But to get an idea on how an older radar console looks, the following pictures below show the 2D images of the console.






What is known is that Smolensk has an ATC radar that can guide an aircraft along its glideslope.

And the president's pilot was lied to by both the Polish crew and the Russian ATC when it came to actual weather conditions at the airport.

There will be more coming out as this investigation moves along.


Update:

I came across this website that has a Russian living in Smolensk who has been keeping tabs on the crash in Smolensk. The pictures above are on his website and the others below, show more interesting evidence on Smolensk.

These are photos of the radio beacon on the approach to Runway 26.

As you can see, the two military antennas, a closeup of the vehicle and it is not known what is inside

From a distance it has the same appearance as the vehicle that supports newer mobile radar systems. The chassis is similar but not the same.






In the picture below, left of the antenna, a pointer is showing the vehicle that may support the newer radars.

Originally, the vehicle in the picture below was the one thought to be the vehicle at the radio beacon. The side panels of the vehicle are not squared at the top like the one at the radio beacon and is closer in design to the newer vehicles.




But this vehicle looks to be a support vehicle for the Nebo class of radar. Here is one possibility with the truck on the right.

NITEL modernised P-18 Spoon Rest D/E variant (NITEL).


The P-12NA was sufficiently different from the baseline P-12, to be redesignated as the P-18 Spoon Rest D, and entered service during the early 1970s. While retaining the general arrangement of the earlier Spoon Rests, the P-18 has more gain with an array of 16 Yagis, while retaining the two van packaging of the late model P-12s. The P-18 was deployed primarily with PVO-SV (Army air defence troops), and also widely exported to Soviet client states and Warsaw Pact nations, with over 3,000 units built according to NNIIRT.

Or part of the Nebo 1L13 class. Truck in the center. The angle of the photo is blocking the front end.



As for the weather on April 10th, I found the Russian's statements below, interesting:

This fog weather forecasters warned in advance. The fog appeared in all the weather report to 10 April (see this possible in the archives of weather
forecasts, available online). But the fog was expected to be only a morning,
afternoon, weather forecasters promised good weather.

If this is indeed the case, then as reported by the Polish press earlier, why did the Polish dispatch not brief the president's plane on fog before the plane's take-off?

Did the Russians not provide the forecasts to the president's crew or did the Polish dispatch have the forecasts and didn't brief the president's crew?

And why the one hour delay? As was stated on a previous thread, the Yak-40 landed when the president was to arrive.

However, in new updates, the Russians are now stating that they told the pilots of the Yak-40 that they were not to land because of bad weather.

Russian controllers ordered Jakowi-40, which landed in Smolensk just before the presidential machine, interrupting the approach to landing. However, the plane ignored the command. Pilot claims that it is not heard - learned TVN24. In turn, according to the Polish pilots presidential Tupolev had final approval for landing in Smolensk.

As-40 landed on April 10 before the presidential Tupolev. What the crew over the radio warned colleagues to fatal conditions, but did not mention that the control tower ordered them to stop the landing.

As the reporter learned TVN24, to issue a stop command, testified before the landing, Russian prosecutors investigators. When the plane was in kilometers from the belt, figured out that he can not see. For the crew of the airplane was not asked them for permission to land, and gave no information about its height. Then the controller issued the command to leave the second circle, but despite this there was no response to commands. The crew decided to land. Polish captain, in turn, testified that he did not hear the command.

(google translated)

Now I have to question the turn of events with regard to the Yak-40 landing as stated by the Russians, given the Russian Il-76 made two attempts to try and land.

Did the Russian controllers tell their own pilots to not land while the Russian Il-76 made two attempts. Or where the Russians just "testing" out the radar system to see if it would make them veer left as was stated by the Polish crew in a report.

Just minutes prior to the crash, a Russian Il-76 diverted to Moscow after it was
unable to stabilize its approach to landing. The Yak's Polish crew saw it veer
to the left of the runway, a mistake that should not occur when a constant radio
signal is present, according to sources close to Rzeczpospolita.

The Russian stories are certainly falling apart because as the Polish crew stated, 15-20 minutes before PLF101 tried to land, the Polish crew stated they could see the Russian IL-76 veer left, indicating that visibility wasn't 200 and a ceiling height was at 50 meters.

And if the Russian IL-76 was told to not land under airport mins, then the following would have occurred with the Russian crew:

Pilots agree that this land should not be. In such conditions, the aircraft should stop at 100 meters and did not go down below. If the lands at the airport when the conditions below the minimum, the local office of the air comes, he says, "Captain, your license please" and take a license - explains Capt. Polanski

(google translated)

It seems odd that they would attempt to land knowing that their license could be yanked.

Now knowing that if the Russians were trying to land below weather mins, some Russians seem to be having second thoughts on what the actual weather was at the airport.

According to the story at the bgining of this thread, the Russians deliberately told the pilots that the weather was worse so they wouldn't land.

I find it odd they would do that, since it did not deter the Russian pilots carrying the president's security detail on the Russian IL-76 from trying two times to land and knowing that if they landed, it would mean "give me your licenses".

And on top of this add the fact that the pilots flying the president asked that a Russian navigator be onboard.

Pilots responsible for transporting Prime Minister Donald Tusk and President Lech Kaczyński to Smolensk had requested the assistance of a Russian navigator as early as March 18.

In the same letter, the pilots asked for technical data regarding the Smolensk airport.
The documents were sent out to the Polish embassy in Moscow as well as Poland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

But no Russian navigator flew with PM Tusk on April 7 or Mr Kaczyński on April 10.

Reczpospolita journalists have yet to get answers as to why that was the case. They want to know whether Russia declined the request, whether Poland made the request too late, or whether the pilots' requests were sent to Moscow at all.

To date, the paper has received no answers from the authorities.

I'm sure the Russians will find an excuse and a good story on no Russian navigator being selected to be onboard the president's plane.

I have my own thoughts on the matter; the Russian navigators knew better than to fly with the president on that tragic day.

Somlensk: In the Norm at 100 meters

Here are the so-called APM's (gates) the Polish crew on the Yak 40 spoke about and the Russian ATC told the pilots were turned on. The photos above were taken after the crash. The approach plate for Runway 26 does not show "gates" but Runway 08 does.

There is no proof that there were "gates" turned on. In fact, the Russians shown in the photos, are correcting the faulty approach lights.

Military vehicle and two military antennas at radio beacon.



Close up of clam shell antenna at Smolensk.

A photo taken later and the unit is moved into a group of trees at Smolensk.

The Russians denied that Smolensk had updated radar for a PAR. That was until photos turned up and the Russians forgot that Tusk arrived three days earlier. This is a mobile system that has ATC and JAMMING capabilities.

The radar platform has a control center housed in a vehicle like the one that is located at the radio beacon, 1200 meters from the runway.

Proof that ATC was watching the aircraft and calling out glidepath below.

The above graphs show the glideslope and where the plane was. The plane was well below the glideslope when the Russian ATC was telling the pilot it was on course. And I question why the difference between the two plotted points (one in blue and one in red) at 100 meters elevation.

One takes into account the valley (-57) and the other doesn't account for terrain.

Why is one taking the terrain into consideration and the other is based off of the elevation of the airport?

10:40:04,7:

TAWS:TERRAIN AHEAD.

D: 4 and on course. (Russian ATC)

10:40:32,4:

TAWS:TERRAIN AHEAD.

ST: 200.

KVS: Turned on.

ST: 150.

D: 2 and on course, on glideslope. (Russian ATC)

TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.

A: 100 metres.

ST: 100.

TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP. (Here is where the plane is over the valley)

TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.

TAWS:TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.

ST: 100. (The radio altimeter shows no descent because the combination of the natural descent of the aircraft is offset with the terrain falling away from the plane.

(2P): In the norm.

ST: 90. (The plane is closing in on the up slope of the ridge in the valley.)

TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.

ST: 80.

2P: Go around. (call to abort)

Signal at F=400 Hz. (Decision height). (The plane is closing in on the up slope of the ridge and the descent looks as it is increasing. )

TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.

ST: 60. (The plane continues closing in on the up slope of the ridge)

ST: 50.

D: Horizon 101. (Russian ATC level off)

ST: 40.

TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.

ST: 30.

D: Height control, horizon. (Russian ATC level off)

ST: 20.

Signal at F=400 Hz. Autopilot disconnect.

Signal at F=800 Hz. Inner marker.

Signal at F=400 Hz. Autothrottle disconnect.

TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.

TAWS:Signal at F=400 Hz. ABSU.

TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.

TAWS:Sound of hitting trees.

2P: F*cking hell!

TAWS:PULL UP, PULL

D: Abort to second approach! (Russian ATC abort approach)

A: Screaming F*ckkkkkkkkkkkk.....

END OF TRANSMISSION

How To Kill a Polish President and Use Bad Weather as an Accomplice (CVR Transcripts)

This is a continuation of an earlier thread with the same title.

In the previous thread I pointed out to photos that indicated that there was a mobile radar unit at Smolensk that had air traffic control capabilities (ATC). I also pointed out how the runway the president's plane landed on was not the main runway at Smolensk.

The thread was posted prior to the release of the transcripts of the voice recordings between the crew on the president's plane and other individuals who had spoken to the crew.

It is interesting to see how the press is still focused on how the "pilot ignored comments that the weather was bad" or the pilot ignored warnings that the aircraft was too low.

I would say it is embarrasing to see how the media was duped by the Russians.

In the previous thread before the transcripts were released, I had stated:

In addition to the GPWS alarm going off 30 seconds from when the plane hit the first tree that was 1200 meters from the runway, Russian officials stated that they told the pilot he was below the glide slope.

The Russian ATC told the pilot he was below his glide slope 1500 meters from the runway, well after the GPWS alarm sounded and just a few seconds before the pilot hit the trees 1200 meters from the runway.

So why would the GPWS warning go off 30 seconds before hitting tree tops at 1200 meters before the end of Runway 26?

Did the pilot have the wrong barometric pressure given to him by the Russian ATC which caused him to think he was higher than he actually was?

Or was the GPWS being disrupted by signals?

And it is from the previous thread I will show through the transcripts, the tragic crash was not pilot error.

The transcripts are linked here.

10:24:49,2:
KVS: Temperature and air pressure, please.
044: We greet you warmly. You know what, speaking honestly, it's a bitch down here. Visibility is about 400 metres and in our view the bases are below 50 metres, thick.
D: The temperature (incomp.), air pressure 7-45. 7-4-5, the landing conditions are nonexistent.
KVS: Thank you, if it's possible we'll try to approach, but if not, if the weather's bad, we'll circle around.
2P: Have you landed yet?
044: Yeah, we managed to land at the last minute. But speaking frankly, you can definitely try. There are two APMs, they made a gate, so you can try, but... If you're unable by the second attempt, I advise you to try, for example Moscow, or somewhere [else].

In the transcripts, 044 is the crew that flew the Yak-40 and landed about one hour before the president's plane crashed.

The crew from the Yak-40 tells the crew on the president's plane the weather is bad, but after stating this, they tell the crew they managed to land and then tell them they can definitely try.

They did not warn them to not try, they told them they could definitely try. Now in the previous thread, there is a story linked where the crew on the Yak-40 had stated that they had problems with Runway 26 and the radio beacon being disrupted:

The radio tower at Smolensk airport may have been dysfunctional on the fateful morning of April 10, and contributed to the Polish presidential airplane disaster.

Signals from the radio tower were problematic to the Polish crew of a Yak-40, which landed in Smolensk about an hour before the presidential Tu-154. It was the last airplane to successfully land at the airport that day.

Just minutes prior to the crash, a Russian Il-76 diverted to Moscow after it was unable to stabilize its approach to landing. The Yak's Polish crew saw it veer to the left of the runway, a mistake that should not occur when a constant radio signal is present, according to sources close to Rzeczpospolita.

I find it odd that the crew on the Yak-40 would tell the crew on the president's plane that they could definitely try to land given that the crew on the Yak-40 had problems with the radio tower. That information was never told to the president's crew.

Instead they made it seem that the APM's would help them.

10:27:45,9:
KVS: Ask Artur, if the clouds are thick.
2P: I don't know if they'll be there, that... If they're still there.
2P: Ok, I'll transfer.
2P: Artur, are you there?
A: (incomprehensible)
044: I'm Remek.
2P: Oh, Remuś, ask Artur, whether... Or maybe you know, are those clouds thick?
A: (incomprehensible)
A: (incomprehensible)
2P: How many?
KVS: 9-9, hold.
2P: 9-9.
A: (incomprehensible)
044: About 400-500 metres.
ST: Stay on course?
KVS: No.
ST: About 400-500 metres.
2P: But is that the thickness?
A: Visible.
044: Are you there?
2P: But is the thickness of the clouds 400-500 metres??
044: As far as I remember, at 500 metres we were still above the clouds.
2P: Ah... At 500 metres [you were] above the clouds... Good, good, thanks.
044: Ah... One more thing... The APMs are about 200 metres from the edge of the runway.
2P: Thanks.
2P: The APMs are there.
2P: 200 metres from the edge of the runway.
KVS: Ask if the Russians have landed yet.
2P: Have the Russians landed yet?
A: (incomprehensible)
022: They approached twice and I think they flew somewhere else.
2P: Ok, I understand, thanks.
2P: Did you hear that?
KVS: Great.

No mention of problems with the radio tower. Why? Now enter the director of the Russian ATC and the barometric pressure given to the president's pilot.

ATC.
10:24:49,2:
KVS: Temperature and air pressure, please.
044: We greet you warmly. You know what, speaking honestly, it's a bitch
down here. Visibility is about 400 metres and in our view the bases are below 50
metres, thick.
D: The temperature (incomp.), air pressure 7-45.
7-4-5, the landing conditions are nonexistent.
KVS: Thank you, if
it's possible we'll try to approach, but if not, if the weather's bad, we'll
circle around.

(emphasis added)

The pressure given to the pilots was 745mm Hg, and accordingly the pressure would be 29.33inches Hg. The actual observation at Smolensk for the time was 30.29 inches.

Moreover, considering this is a transcript of a copy of the original recording, I find it odd that there is no pilot readback because in an actual leaked recording that is posted on the previous thread, the pilot gives a readback of a visibility of 8km haze and a barometric pressure of 744mm Hg, which is 29.29 inches Hg.

That actual recording is missing from these transcripts. Moreover, it is not known if the barometric pressure was given in QFE or QNH. And there are problems with this information if it is not known.

Some airports around the world still operate under the practice of atmospheric pressure at field elevation (QFE). At QFE airports, Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) or a similar outputted system outputs a barometric pressure setting value. This value is one that when an aircraft is positioned on the ground at the airport the barometric altimeter reading in the aircraft will read zero regardless of the altitude of the airport. Therefore, as shown in FIG. 1, if an aircraft is flying to a QFE airport that is at the elevation of 1000 feet, the barometric altimeter indicates that the aircraft is 1000 feet lower than it actually is. This does not become a problem if the aircrew informs all systems within the aircraft that use barometric pressure that it is based on a QFE setting. However, if the aircrew fails to make sure the other aircraft systems understand that the barometric altimeter is based on QFE operation, then the other aircraft systems will produce false alerts. For example, as the aircraft is descending towards the airport, a Terrain Awareness System (TAWS) produces caution and warning alerts as the aircraft is on approach to the airport because the TAWS believes that the aircraft is 1000 feet closer than it actually is to the ground. Since the aircraft is actually flying 1000 feet higher, this alert is a nuisance alert. Because of the number of tasks performed on an approach to landing, the flight crew may be overloaded and not want to bother with figuring out the cause of the alert and thus just deactivate the TAWS. Deactivation of the TAWS leaves the aircraft vulnerable to controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)

.

Here again, the incorrect barometric reading is given out by the Russian ATC.

10:30:10,2:
KVS: Korsaz, Polish 101, holding 1500.
D: Ahh... Polish 1-0-1, according to pressure 7-4-5, descend 500.
KVS: According to pressure 7-4-5, descending 500.

There is the question if the TAWS was set to that barometric pressure reading given by the ATC.

Now as the pilot descends to 500 meters, an odd exchange takes place between ATC and the crew.

10:34:45,2:
Signal at F=500 Hz.
A: 6.
D: PLF (incomp.) 500 copy?
KVS: We've descended 500 metres.
D: 500 metres, have you landed at a military airport before?KVS: Flaps 15.
A: Lit.
KVS: Yes, of course.
D: Lights on the left, on the right, at the start of the runway.
KVS: Understood.
B/P: Captain, board ready for landing.
KVS: Thank you.

The director asks the pilot if he has landed at a military airport before.

The pilot landed at Smolensk three days prior.

Moreover, as pointed out in photos in the previous thread, the approach runway lights on Runway 26 were faulty and didn't work, but the director states, "lights on the left, on the right, at the start of the runway."

The comments made by the Russian ATC to the crew should be investigated.

Throughout the news cycle, the stories published by the news media stated how the Russian ATC warned the pilot on not to land and to divert.

That never happened till the end. And there is the question on why the pilot ignored the TAWS.

Here is why.

ATC was following the plane down on radar and was calling out the glideslope.

At 4km, the Russian ATC tells the pilot he is on course. However, the TAWS is indicating a potential problem.

Between 150 meters in height and 100 meters in height and 2 km from the approach end, the TAWS is sending out a warning, but the Russian ATC tells the pilot he is still on course with his glideslope.

The crew at the decision height aborts which is what they are supposed to do, but it is too late.

The pilot is lower than he thinks he is and he is in the shallow valley that is on the approach end of Runway 26.

Even when the Pull up Pull up warning is going off, the director is telling the pilot to level off.

The pilot was heading straight into the other side of the valley and this is why you see the plane getting closer to the ground.

The pilot didn't know the valley was there, because it is not on the approach plate for Smolensk.

And he had no chance to recover.


10:40:04,7:
TAWS:TERRAIN AHEAD.
D: 4 and on course.
10:40:32,4:
TAWS:TERRAIN AHEAD.
ST: 200.
KVS: Turned on.
ST: 150.
D: 2 and on course, on glideslope.
TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
A: 100 metres.
ST: 100.
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
TAWS:TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
ST: 100.
(2P): In the norm.
ST: 90.
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
ST: 80.
2P: Go around.
Signal at F=400 Hz. (Decision height).
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
ST: 60.
ST: 50.
D: Horizon 101.
ST: 40.
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
ST: 30.
D: Height control, horizon.
ST: 20.
Signal at F=400 Hz. Autopilot disconnect.
Signal at F=800 Hz. Inner marker.
Signal at F=400 Hz. Autothrottle disconnect.
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
TAWS:Signal at F=400 Hz. ABSU.
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
TAWS:Sound of hitting trees.
2P: F*cking hell!
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL
D: Abort to second approach!
A: Screaming F*ckkkkkkkkkkkk.....
END OF TRANSMISSION

Moreover, not one time did the Russian ATC warn the pilot it was too low until it was too late.

This was not pilot error. This was an accident designed by the Russians and there are certain Poles who participated in setting up the accident.

The Russian ATC gave out the wrong baro reading and was giving false information on the glideslope.

The Polish pilot did everything right for one approach, the Russian ATC was watching and driving that plane into the other side of the valley.