Friday, June 19, 2026

You Said 2028. You Won't Sign 2032. | Thomas Lamb
Notes on Alaska Energy & Public Policy
Thomas Lamb
Alaska LNG · Glenfarne · Construction Deadline · Special Session II

You Said 2028.
You Won't Sign 2032.

Glenfarne told Alaska gas would flow by 2029. Construction complete by 2028. Tonight they rejected a legislative deadline of 2032 — four years later than their own public claim. That single fact tells you everything you need to know about the 2029 promise.

Breaking — Final Hours, Special Session I, June 19, 2026

The Alaska Landmine reports that the hard construction completion deadline of 2032 — inserted by the Senate Finance Committee into its committee substitute — is "unacceptable to Glenfarne." Reasons cited: investor issues with a hard deadline and potential union issues they can't control.

The first special session ends at midnight. Governor Dunleavy has already called a second special session starting Saturday. The Senate Finance substitute passed committee 7-0. Glenfarne now says the bill the Senate wrote to protect Alaska is one they cannot accept.

Let that land for a moment.

Glenfarne told FERC — in a formal federal filing — that the pipeline would be mechanically complete in 2028. First gas to Alaskans in 2029. They told the legislature the same thing in testimony, in press releases, and in the communications that justified the urgency of this special session. Act now. 2029 is coming. Alaska needs gas. The window is closing.

Tonight, on the last hours of the last day of the special session they demanded, Glenfarne rejected a hard completion deadline of 2032. Not 2028. Not 2029. 2032 — four full years beyond their own publicly stated completion date.

If Glenfarne genuinely believed the pipeline would be complete by 2028, a 2032 deadline would cost them nothing. You don't reject a deadline that gives you four years of buffer beyond your own completion target unless you know — privately, from the Worley estimate you won't release — that 2028 was never real.

A developer who rejects a 2032 deadline for a project they claim will be complete by 2028 is not protecting their timeline. They are revealing it.

The Contradiction in Plain Numbers

What Glenfarne Said vs. What Glenfarne Did — Tonight
What Glenfarne Told Alaska
What Glenfarne Did Tonight
FERC Filing — February 2026 Pipeline mechanically complete 2028. First in-state gas delivery 2029. Exports to Asian buyers beginning 2031.
Senate Floor — June 19, 2026 Rejected hard completion deadline of 2032 as "unacceptable." Cited investor issues and union issues they "can't control."
Legislative Testimony — 2026 "Act now. The window of Asian LNG demand is open. Alaska needs this pipeline. 2029 gas delivery is achievable."
Tonight Cannot commit to construction completion four years after their own claimed delivery date. Investors apparently will not accept a deadline the developer publicly promised was achievable by 2028.
Press Release — June 19, 2026 "Alaska is on the verge of the largest capital raise initiative for energy infrastructure in U.S. history."
Tonight The investors behind that capital raise apparently cannot commit to a construction deadline four years beyond the developer's own public promise. What does that tell you about what those investors actually believe?
Non-Binding Pledge — June 11, 2026 Signed commitment to prioritize Alaska workers in construction hiring.
Tonight Cited "potential union issues they can't control" as a reason to reject a construction deadline. Eight days after signing the Alaska worker pledge.

The Investor Argument That Exposes Everything

Glenfarne's cited reason for rejecting the 2032 deadline is "investor issues with a hard deadline." This argument deserves to be examined with care — because it reveals far more than it intends to.

Project finance investors are sophisticated parties. They underwrite construction timelines. They model completion risk. They price delay scenarios. A project finance investor who will not accept a 2032 hard deadline for a project the developer publicly claims will be complete by 2028 is telling you — through their silence on the commitment — that they do not believe the 2028 timeline.

If the project's own investors — the people whose capital is actually at risk — won't commit to a 2032 deadline, the 2029 gas delivery promise was never a project finance commitment. It was a political talking point. The investors knew it. Glenfarne knew it. The Worley estimate — which tells the real story — has never been released.

And here is the deeper problem the investor argument creates. Glenfarne has spent months telling the Alaska legislature that tax certainty is essential to attract investors. That the property tax bill will unlock project financing. That investor confidence depends on legislative action tonight.

But the investors Glenfarne is citing tonight — as justification for rejecting the 2032 deadline — are apparently not confident enough in the construction timeline to accept a deadline the developer publicly committed to. Tax certainty didn't fix that. The property tax bill didn't fix that. Because the problem isn't the tax structure. The problem is the timeline was never real.

The Union Argument That Contradicts Last Week

The second reason Glenfarne cited for rejecting the 2032 deadline is "potential union issues they can't control." This argument has a specific problem. Eight days ago — June 11, 2026 — Glenfarne signed a non-binding pledge with Alaska labor unions committing to prioritize Alaska workers in construction hiring.

That pledge was announced with considerable fanfare. It was presented as evidence of the project's commitment to Alaska workforce development. It was cited in legislative debate as a reason to support the tax bill.

Tonight Glenfarne cited union issues as a reason they cannot accept a construction deadline. The same workforce relationship they promoted as a project strength eight days ago has become a risk they cannot control eight days later — on the same day they need to explain why they're rejecting the Senate Finance substitute.

These two positions cannot both be true. Either Glenfarne has a constructive relationship with Alaska labor that supports the project — as they claimed June 11 — or they face union uncertainties so significant that they cannot commit to a 2032 construction deadline — as they claim tonight. One of these is accurate. The other was said because it was useful at the time.

What the Senate Finance Committee Got Right

The 2032 deadline in the Senate Finance substitute is not obstruction. It is exactly the kind of accountability provision this series has argued for since May 19. A tax concession without a performance obligation is a gift. A tax concession tied to a construction deadline is a contract.

Senate Finance Committee Substitute — What It Got Right
1
Hard construction deadline of 2032. If the project does not achieve mechanical completion by end of 2032 — six years from now, four years beyond Glenfarne's own claimed completion date — the tax break is lost. Alaska retains leverage. The tax concession is earned, not given.
2
Higher tax rates that double after 10 years. The Senate Finance rates are more favorable to Alaska than the House bill. As the project matures and de-risks, Alaska's share increases. That is appropriate — early project risk warrants early tax relief; long-term production warrants market-rate taxation.
3
Passed committee 7-0. Unanimous. The Senate Finance Committee — the body with the expertise to evaluate fiscal impacts — reached unanimous agreement on a version of the bill that Glenfarne finds unacceptable. That tells you the committee did its job.
4
Tied to Enstar's 2032 gas supply cliff. The deadline is not arbitrary. Enstar's contract with Hilcorp for Cook Inlet gas expires shortly before 2032. If the pipeline isn't built by then, Southcentral Alaska faces a gas supply crisis. The deadline is calibrated to the actual urgency Alaska faces — not the urgency Glenfarne manufactures.

The Questions Glenfarne Must Now Answer

Four Questions — The Second Special Session Must Demand Answers
If you believe the pipeline will be complete by 2028, why can't you accept a 2032 deadline? This is not a rhetorical question. It has a specific answer — and that answer is in the Worley estimate Glenfarne has withheld from the legislature for a year. The second special session should make release of that estimate the condition of any further discussion.
What specifically do your investors say about a 2032 hard deadline? If project finance investors will not commit to a 2032 deadline for a project claiming 2028 completion, that is a material fact about the project's financial viability. It belongs in the legislative record. The second special session should require Glenfarne to produce written investor feedback on the deadline provision.
What union issues make a 2032 deadline unacceptable — eight days after signing a pledge with Alaska labor? The non-binding pledge was presented as evidence of project strength. If union relationships are now a risk that prevents timeline commitment, that risk existed eight days ago. What changed between June 11 and June 19?
Is the 2029 gas delivery promise still operative? Glenfarne cannot reject a 2032 deadline and simultaneously maintain that 2029 gas delivery is achievable. The second special session should require Glenfarne to either reaffirm the 2029 commitment in writing — as a contractual obligation tied to the tax break — or withdraw it as a public claim.

The Second Special Session Starts Saturday

Dunleavy called the second special session before the first one ended. The pressure campaign continues. The message is the same — act now, trust Glenfarne, the window is closing.

But tonight the window changed. Glenfarne rejected a 2032 deadline for a project they claim will be done by 2028. That single act — more than any argument in this series — reveals what the Worley estimate almost certainly shows. The timeline was never real. The 2029 promise was political. And the tax concession being demanded was never calibrated against verified costs or a verified construction schedule.

The second special session begins with one simple fact established beyond argument: Glenfarne's investors will not accept a 2032 hard deadline for a project Glenfarne publicly claimed would be complete by 2028. Everything the legislature does from Saturday forward should start from that fact.

What the Second Special Session Must Demand

The Senate Finance Committee's substitute was the right bill. The 2032 deadline was the right provision. A unanimous committee reached that conclusion independently. Glenfarne's rejection of it is not a reason to remove it. It is a reason to hold firm.

The second special session must begin where the first one failed to — with the Worley cost estimate on the table. No timeline commitment can be evaluated without verified costs. No tax structure can be set without verified costs. No construction deadline can be negotiated without the number that determines whether the project is financially viable at any deadline.

Glenfarne said 2028. They won't sign 2032. The Worley estimate explains the gap. Release it — and the second special session will have something real to negotiate. Withhold it — and Alaska will spend another 30 days being pressured to sign a check whose amount is still unknown.

The Senate Finance Committee did its job tonight. The second special session should let them finish it.

Piggybacking: How One Press Release Protects Two Private Companies | Thomas Lamb
Notes on Alaska Energy & Public Policy
Thomas Lamb
Alaska LNG · S Corp Tax · Hilcorp · Glenfarne · Final Day

Piggybacking

On the last day of the special session, Glenfarne issued a press release opposing the S Corp tax. Read it carefully. It isn't just protecting Glenfarne's financing structure. It's protecting Hilcorp's tax exemption — and Hilcorp signed a gas supply agreement with Glenfarne. One press release. Two private pass-through entities. Both winners if it works.

Final Day — Special Session, June 19, 2026

The special session ends today. The Senate has still not reached the 11 votes needed from its 14-member majority coalition to pass the LNG tax bill. The confidential AGDC-Glenfarne agreement landed in senators' hands yesterday, halting the floor session. And this morning Glenfarne issued a press release threatening that the S Corp tax amendment kills the project's financing.

On the last day of a session called to pass a tax bill built on unverified costs, Glenfarne is protecting not just its own structure — but the tax position of one of its own gas supply partners.

Glenfarne's press release this morning is brief. Four sentences. It warns that an S Corp pass-through entity tax would introduce "major hurdles" for Alaska LNG financing, "increase financial burdens on the project," and "signal uncertainty to investors." It closes with a warning that a "poorly constructed pass-through entity tax change would be shortsighted when the State is on the verge of the largest capital raise initiative for energy infrastructure in U.S. history."

Read at face value it is a developer protecting its financing structure on the last day of the session. Read carefully it is something else entirely — a single press release that simultaneously protects two private pass-through entities, one of which signed a gas supply agreement with the other, both of which benefit from the same tax exemption, and neither of which has told Alaska's legislature what this project actually costs to build.

That is not coincidence. That is piggybacking.

Glenfarne Alaska LNG, LLC — For Immediate Release, June 19, 2026

"If the Senate passes a bill with the proposed S Corp tax, it will introduce major hurdles for Alaska LNG to secure the right financing to build the project. The S Corp tax increases financial burdens on the project and signals uncertainty to investors."

"A broad tax on all pass-through entities would have unintended consequences that would negatively impact new investment in Alaska including renewables, data centers, and other energy infrastructure projects. A poorly constructed pass-through entity tax change would be shortsighted when the State is on the verge of the largest capital raise initiative for energy infrastructure in U.S. history."

Two Private Companies. Same Tax Structure. One Press Release.

To understand why this press release protects two entities simultaneously, you need to understand what the S Corp tax actually is and who it hits.

Alaska's corporate income tax applies to C corporations — the standard corporate structure used by publicly traded companies like ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, and BP. It does not apply to pass-through entities — S corporations, LLCs, and partnerships — whose profits pass through to owners without triggering Alaska corporate income tax at the entity level.

The Senate's S Corp amendment, championed by Senator Forrest Dunbar, would close that loophole for oil and gas companies. It has been modeled to generate over $100 million per year in new state revenue. The largest single company affected is Hilcorp — the privately held Texas company that operates Prudhoe Bay and most Cook Inlet oil and gas production — which pays no Alaska corporate income tax because it is structured as an S corporation.

Glenfarne Alaska LNG LLC is a pass-through LLC. It too would be caught by the same provision.

Two Pass-Through Entities — Same Tax Exposure, Same Interest in Today's Vote
Glenfarne Alaska LNG LLC
Hilcorp Alaska LLC
Entity Type LLC — pass-through entity. Does not pay Alaska corporate income tax at entity level under current law.
Entity Type S Corporation — pass-through entity. Does not pay Alaska corporate income tax under current law. Largest single company affected by S Corp amendment.
Ownership Privately held. Glenfarne Group LLC, New York. Total corporate fundraising: $48.5 million. No public shareholders. No SEC disclosure obligations.
Ownership Privately held. Texas-based. Operates Prudhoe Bay — Alaska's largest oil field. No public shareholders. No SEC disclosure obligations.
S Corp Tax Impact Direct. Glenfarne's LLC financing structure for Alaska LNG depends on pass-through tax treatment for project finance investors.
S Corp Tax Impact Direct. Hilcorp pays zero Alaska corporate income tax under current law. S Corp amendment estimated to cost Hilcorp a significant share of the $100M+ annual revenue estimate.
Alaska LNG Connection Majority developer. Controls 75% of 8 Star Alaska. Controls the Worley cost estimate. Issued today's press release.
Alaska LNG Connection Signed gas sales precedent agreement with Glenfarne. North Slope gas supplier for the project. Benefits from project proceeding AND from S Corp exemption remaining intact.

The Relationship That Makes This Piggybacking

Hilcorp signed a gas sales precedent agreement with Glenfarne. That agreement commits Hilcorp's North Slope associated gas to the Alaska LNG project — conditionally, as this series has documented, structured as a safety net rather than a binding commitment. The agreement requires FID. FID requires financing. Financing requires the tax bill. And the tax bill — in Glenfarne's preferred form — excludes the S Corp amendment that would cost Hilcorp over $100 million per year.

So Hilcorp's gas supply agreement with Glenfarne and Hilcorp's S Corp tax exemption are now linked through the same piece of legislation on the last day of the same special session. If Glenfarne's press release succeeds — if the Senate drops the S Corp amendment to pass the tax bill — Hilcorp wins twice simultaneously. The project that will monetize its stranded gas advances. And its annual tax exemption worth over $100 million is preserved.

The Piggybacking Chain — How One Press Release Protects Two Entities
1
Hilcorp signs gas sales precedent agreement with Glenfarne. North Slope associated gas committed — conditionally — to Alaska LNG project. Agreement requires FID to become binding.
2
FID requires financing. Financing requires tax certainty. Glenfarne tells the legislature the property tax bill is essential to securing project finance. S Corp amendment attached to tax bill as revenue offset.
3
S Corp amendment threatens both entities simultaneously. Glenfarne's LLC financing structure depends on pass-through tax treatment. Hilcorp's existing exemption from Alaska corporate income tax — worth over $100 million per year — is caught by the same provision.
4
Glenfarne issues press release opposing S Corp tax. Framed as protecting Alaska LNG financing. Effect: simultaneously protects Glenfarne's financing structure AND Hilcorp's annual tax exemption. Hilcorp says nothing publicly. Glenfarne does the work.
5
If the Senate drops the S Corp amendment to pass the bill: Glenfarne gets its property tax relief. Hilcorp keeps its income tax exemption. Both private pass-through entities protected. Alaska gives up $100 million per year in revenue that would have come from Hilcorp alone — in addition to the 90% property tax reduction already being granted to Glenfarne.

Hilcorp Wins Either Way

This series has documented how the North Slope producers — including Hilcorp — structured their gas supply agreements as safety nets. If the project fails, the agreements expire with no loss. If the project succeeds, the gas gets monetized. The producers built optionality, not commitment.

Today's S Corp fight adds a third dimension to Hilcorp's position. It now wins in three distinct scenarios on the same day.

Hilcorp — Three Winning Scenarios, One Day
Scenario A
Scenario B
Scenario C — Alaska
Project Fails Gas supply precedent agreement expires. No binding commitment triggered. No loss to Hilcorp. North Slope gas reinjected as before. S Corp exemption irrelevant to failed project.
Project Succeeds, No S Corp Tax Gas supply agreement converts to binding contract. Hilcorp monetizes decades of stranded North Slope gas. AND keeps income tax exemption worth $100M+ per year. Wins on both the gas and the tax.
Alaska Loses Regardless If project fails — stranded gas, no revenue, tax concessions already made. If project succeeds without S Corp tax — 90% property tax reduction to Glenfarne PLUS Hilcorp income tax exemption preserved. $100M+ per year foregone.

The Largest Capital Raise in U.S. History

Glenfarne's press release closes with a remarkable claim — that Alaska is "on the verge of the largest capital raise initiative for energy infrastructure in U.S. history." That claim deserves to be examined on the last day of the session.

Glenfarne Group has raised $48.5 million in its entire corporate history. It has no binding buyer contracts — all offtake agreements are letters of intent. It has no confirmed project financing. It missed its own FID deadline by at least six months. It acknowledges that verified project costs won't be available until mid-2027. Its publicly traded partners — Danaos, Baker Hughes, TotalEnergies — have made strategic commitments, not binding financing commitments.

The largest capital raise in U.S. history has not been arranged. It has been announced — on a press release — on the last day of a special session — by a company with $48.5 million in total fundraising — to pressure the Alaska Senate into dropping a revenue measure that would protect state services and close a tax loophole that benefits one of Glenfarne's own gas supply partners.

That is not a financing announcement. That is a political statement. And it is doing double duty — protecting Glenfarne's LLC structure and Hilcorp's S Corp exemption simultaneously with four sentences and a logo.

What the Senate Should See Clearly

The S Corp amendment raises over $100 million per year. The property tax bill it is attached to gives Glenfarne a 90% property tax reduction worth hundreds of millions more over 30 years. The Senate is being asked to drop the $100 million annual revenue measure — framed as protecting Alaska LNG financing — on the last day of a session in which the confidential AGDC-Glenfarne agreement just landed in senators' hands and the floor session had to be halted.

The $100 million per year the S Corp tax would generate is not coming from Glenfarne alone. The largest share comes from Hilcorp — Prudhoe Bay's operator, Cook Inlet's dominant producer, and Glenfarne's gas supply partner. Hilcorp has said nothing publicly about the S Corp tax today. It doesn't need to. Glenfarne's press release is doing the work.

On the last day of the session, a $48.5 million private developer is asking Alaska to simultaneously give it a 90% property tax reduction and preserve a $100 million annual income tax exemption for one of its own gas supply partners. Both companies are privately held pass-through entities. Neither has told Alaska what this project costs to build. That is not a financing argument. That is piggybacking.

The Bill Alaska Is Being Asked to Sign

This series began with a simple observation in May 2007 — tax certainty requires known project costs. Nineteen years later, on the last day of a special session called to force that tax certainty through before costs are verified, the argument is the same.

The bill Alaska is being asked to sign today gives Glenfarne a 90% property tax reduction — based on unverified costs. It preserves Hilcorp's income tax exemption — worth over $100 million per year — as a byproduct of Glenfarne's press release. It locks in generational tax concessions built on arithmetic nobody has been allowed to check. And it does all of this on the same day senators finally got their hands on the confidential agreement that explains why nobody could check the arithmetic.

Two private pass-through entities. One press release. Zero verified costs. Nineteen years after I first wrote that tax certainty requires known project costs — Alaska is still being asked to set the tax before knowing the number.

That is what piggybacking looks like when it succeeds.

The question is whether the Alaska Senate lets it.

The Wrong Coat of Paint
Investigative Report · Public Procurement · National Landmarks

The Wrong Coat of Paint

How America's most iconic reflecting pool got a $14.7 million product mismatch — the wrong material, the wrong contractor, and the wrong questions asked.

Contract total $14,700,000 and climbing ↑

The Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool stretches 2,028 feet between the Lincoln Memorial and the Washington Monument — one of the most photographed landmarks in the United States, the backdrop to Martin Luther King Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech, and the site of some of the most consequential public gatherings in American history. It is now coated in "American flag blue" industrial lining. And the more you examine what was used, who applied it, and what it cost, the harder it becomes to explain any of it on purely technical grounds.

01 —

The Product: Built for Pipes, Not Pools

The coating applied to the reflecting pool is Rhino Pipeliner 5000 — a product manufactured by Rhino Linings Corporation, a company better known for spray-on truck bed liners. Pipeliner 5000 was not designed for open-air decorative basins. It was specifically formulated for a water pipeline rehabilitation project in Tacoma, Washington, where a half-mile section of 78-year-old steel drinking water pipe needed repair without excavation.

Its defining credential is NSF/ANSI 61 certification — a standard that certifies a product won't leach harmful substances into drinking water flowing through an enclosed pipe. That certification is meaningless for a reflecting pool. Nobody is drinking the water. The pool is not pressurized. It is not enclosed.

"I proposed it in a whole bunch of pool groups. I said, 'Has anybody used this? Has anybody seen anybody use it?' I kind of got crickets."

— Industry expert, Pool Magazine, June 2026

The certification says nothing about how the product performs under conditions the reflecting pool actually faces: continuous UV exposure, freeze-thaw cycles, open-air chemical treatments, and adhesion to granite — a substrate the product was never specifically tested on.

NSF/ANSI 61 Certifies
No leaching into
drinking water
Relevant for enclosed pipes. Irrelevant for an open decorative basin.
UV Resistance Rating
Undocumented
Pipeliner 5000 has no published UV stability data for outdoor exposure.
Granite Adhesion Testing
None found
The pool basin is granite. No peer-reviewed data on adhesion to this substrate.
Aquatic Use Cases Found
Zero
Industry professionals surveyed found no known large aquatic applications.
02 —

The Right Product Was Available — From the Same Manufacturer

Rhino Linings makes products that would have been far better suited to this application. Their own lineup includes options engineered precisely for outdoor, UV-exposed, chemically treated water environments. The material cost difference is negligible against a contract of this size.

Product Price / lb Per Set Fit for Reflecting Pool? Key Strength
Pipeliner 5000 $5.30 $5,035 ✗ No — drinking water pipes NSF/ANSI 61 potable water cert
SolarMax 11-60 $8.08 $7,353 ✓ Yes — UV-stable outdoor color Maximum color stability, UV protection, outdoor applications
HiChem 11-70 PW $5.80 $5,278 ✓ Yes — chemical resistant immersion Most chemical-resistant Rhino product; rated for immersion
RhinoChem 2170 Quote ✓ Yes — H₂O₂ rated to 10% Explicit chemical resistance including peroxides and bleach
Rhino Extreme HP 11-70 $5.80 $5,278 ✓ Yes — outdoor + chemical Weatherproof, UV and chemical resistant, extreme conditions

SolarMax — the product designed for color-stable outdoor applications — costs $8.08/lb versus $5.30/lb for Pipeliner 5000. Against a $14.7 million contract, the premium for using the correct product would have been a rounding error. The wrong product was not chosen because it was meaningfully cheaper. It was simply the wrong choice.


03 —

The Contract: No Bid, No Experience, No Agreed Price

The contractor selected is Atlantic Industrial Coatings, a Virginia firm based in New Canton — described by one outlet as operating out of three small buildings in the middle of an expanse of grass. This was their first federal contract. Ever. It was awarded without competitive bidding, under an "urgent" procurement exemption. The administration allowed the company to begin work before a price had even been agreed upon.

Trump initially said he personally selected the contractor — someone who had worked on swimming pools at his golf club in Sterling, Virginia. He later stated on Truth Social he "did not know" the contractor and had "never used them before."

— PolitiFact, May 2026

The White House told PolitiFact that Trump did not have a personal relationship with the contractor but was familiar with the company's work. The contradiction between these accounts has never been fully resolved.

04 —

The Cost: Seven Times the Promise

The contract has reached $14.7 million and is still climbing — more than seven times Trump's original public estimate of $1.8 million. The contract is funded not by a congressional appropriation but by the Recreation Enhancement Fee Program — money collected from park visitor entrance fees intended for urgent maintenance needs across the national park system.

Trump's Original Estimate
$1.8M
Announced publicly in the Oval Office, April 2026.
Current Contract Total
$14.7M+
As of June 15, 2026. Still rising with unexplained additions.
Profit Margin Charged
20%
Federal standard is 6–12%. Park Service flagged this as "excessive."
Excess Profit Extracted
$850K+
Above what a standard contract would have cost at normal margins.

A National Park Service analysis prepared by a contracting specialist found that the typical profit margin for federal construction contracts of this type is 6% to 12%. Atlantic Industrial Coatings charged 20% profit on top of 20% overhead — a combined markup the Park Service's own analyst described as "appears excessive." By the time that analysis was completed on May 7, the contractor had already been working at the pool for a month. The President had already praised the work publicly. The government was not in a position to drive a hard bargain.


05 —

The Performance: Failed Twice to Seal the Pool

Beyond the product choice and the contract terms, there is the question of whether the work has actually been done correctly. Documents reviewed by the New York Times show that Atlantic Industrial Coatings failed to properly seal the gaps between the concrete slabs on the pool floor — not once, but twice. Whether an adequate fix has since been found has not been confirmed by the Interior Department.

The pool's most persistent problems have historically been leaks and algae. A $34 million rehabilitation completed in 2010 — conducted through proper competitive procurement, using engineered waterproofing systems from specialist manufacturers with documented track records — failed to resolve those problems permanently. The current intervention is a coating applied by a first-time federal contractor using a product designed for drinking water pipes, at a cost now exceeding $14.7 million.

What This Reveals

No single element of this story is, on its own, necessarily disqualifying. Urgent procurements happen. Costs overrun. Products get specified outside their primary use cases.

But the combination is harder to dismiss. A no-bid contract. A contractor with no federal experience and disputed ties to the President. A product chosen from the cheapest tier of an inappropriate category. A profit margin flagged as excessive by the government's own analysts. Work that began before a price was set. A cost that ballooned sevenfold. And repeated failures to perform the most basic structural task — sealing the pool's joints.

The reflecting pool will be filled with water in time for the nation's 250th anniversary on July 4th. Whether it will still be blue, sealed, and algae-free by July 5th is a different question entirely.

Sources

New York Times · Pool Magazine · Rhino Linings technical documentation (rhinolinings.com) · Federal contracting records (usaspending.gov) · PolitiFact · The Hill · Senator Blumenthal's office (blumenthal.senate.gov) · Artnet News · National Park Service contracting analysis · Sika USA (2010 rehabilitation)

Thursday, June 18, 2026

The Confidentiality That Wasn't: How Glenfarne May Have Waived Its Own Protection | Thomas Lamb
Notes on Alaska Energy & Public Policy
Thomas Lamb
Alaska LNG · Confidentiality Waiver · Public Records Law · Breaking

The Confidentiality That Wasn't

Glenfarne spent a year hiding behind a confidentiality agreement. This morning the draft AGDC-Glenfarne contract landed in the hands of Alaska senators — and two legal arguments suggest the confidentiality may never have been as airtight as claimed.

Breaking — Senate Floor Session Halted, June 18, 2026

The Alaska Landmine reports that several senators are now in possession of a draft of the confidential agreement between AGDC and Glenfarne. The 11 AM Senate floor session has been delayed to a call of the chair. The document that AGDC told the legislature it could not share — the document that has driven every transparency dispute in this series — is now in the building.

The question is no longer whether senators can see it. They have it. The question is what it means legally that they do — and whether the confidentiality Glenfarne has claimed for a year was ever as enforceable as it appeared.

For more than a year, the confidentiality agreement between AGDC and Glenfarne has been the wall that blocked every legislative demand for transparency. AGDC told the Senate Resources Committee it could not share governance documents without Glenfarne's permission. AGDC told legislators it could not reveal the operating agreement, the clawback conditions, the minority protections, or the cost information. The confidentiality agreement was the answer to every question the legislature asked.

This morning, that wall developed two large cracks. The first opened months ago and has gone largely unnoticed. The second opened this morning on the Senate floor.

Both deserve to be examined carefully — because together they suggest the confidentiality Glenfarne has used to prevent legislative oversight may have been legally compromised long before today.

Two Legal Arguments — The Confidentiality That May Not Have Held
1
Indirect Waiver Through Public Legislative Testimony
When Glenfarne voluntarily testified before the Alaska Legislature in open public sessions — presenting cost information, project economics, and governance details — it may have waived confidentiality over that subject matter. You cannot disclose information publicly and then claim it remains confidential. The label on the slide does not survive the public forum.
2
The AGDC Agreement Under Alaska Public Records Law
AGDC is a public corporation of the State of Alaska. Its agreements are public records under AS 40.25.110. A private confidentiality clause in a contract between a public body and a private developer does not override Alaska's public records statute. Courts have consistently held that administrative decisions to keep records confidential cannot override the legislature's explicit public disclosure requirements.

Point One: The Testimony That May Have Waived It All

Confidentiality is not a label. It is a legal status. And under well-established contract and evidentiary law, voluntary public disclosure of confidential information destroys the confidentiality of that information — regardless of what is written on the document or in the agreement.

The legal doctrine is called subject matter waiver. When a party voluntarily discloses part of a protected communication in a public forum, the protection over the entire subject matter may be waived. The rationale is straightforward — you cannot selectively use confidential information to your advantage in a public proceeding and then invoke confidentiality to prevent the other side from examining it fully.

Now apply that to what Glenfarne and AGDC did in open legislative testimony throughout this session.

Public Legislative Testimony — Confidential Information Disclosed Voluntarily
Adam Prestidge, Glenfarne Alaska President — Senate Resources Committee, May 2026 "The company can share financial details with lawmakers if the state takes a stake in the project, under confidentiality agreements or confidential executive sessions. Publicly releasing the project's cost estimate would put the project at a competitive disadvantage."
Significance: Prestidge publicly disclosed that a cost estimate exists, that Glenfarne controls it, and described its commercial sensitivity — in an open public hearing. The existence and nature of the withheld information was itself disclosed publicly.
Glenfarne — Senate Finance Committee, June 16-17, 2026 Glenfarne publicly stated the project costs "as much as $54.5 billion" in Senate Finance Committee testimony — the first public cost figure ever released by Glenfarne. Cost slides were presented to the committee marked confidential.
Significance: A cost figure presented in open legislative testimony — even on a slide marked confidential — is a public disclosure. The $54.5 billion figure is now in the public record of a legislative hearing. Glenfarne cannot simultaneously disclose a cost figure in public testimony and claim cost information remains confidential.
Matt Kissinger, AGDC Commercial Director — Senate Resources Committee, February 2026 "There are usually some provisions that require unanimous consent and there are provisions that rely on the minority member to approve. We have all of those in there." When asked to produce the document: "We're unable to share those agreements. Those agreements are confidential and we'd need the permission of Glenfarne to do that."
Significance: AGDC publicly described the content and structure of the confidential governance provisions — unanimous consent requirements, minority member approvals — in open testimony. Having described what the document contains publicly, AGDC's claim that the document itself cannot be disclosed is legally weakened.
Adam Prestidge, Glenfarne Alaska President — Senate Finance Committee, June 17, 2026 "If Glenfarne were to determine the project had failed, or if Glenfarne were to decide to abandon the project, we wouldn't have any way to seek any recourse or any reimbursement for what we have done."
Significance: Prestidge publicly described the clawback conditions — or more precisely, the absence of meaningful ones — in open testimony. The substance of the confidential clawback provisions was characterized publicly by Glenfarne's own president.

Each of those disclosures — made voluntarily, in open public legislative hearings, by parties to the confidentiality agreement — potentially constitutes a waiver of the confidentiality over the subject matter disclosed. The cumulative effect of months of open testimony about the governance structure, the cost information, the clawback conditions, and the commercial sensitivity of the withheld data is that Glenfarne and AGDC have been selectively disclosing the parts of the confidential information that support their argument — while invoking confidentiality to prevent examination of the parts that might not.

That is precisely the conduct subject matter waiver is designed to prevent. You cannot use a sword and a shield simultaneously. If you disclose the existence, nature, and partial content of confidential information to advance your position in a public proceeding, you cannot then claim the full document remains protected.

Glenfarne disclosed enough to make its argument. It invoked confidentiality to prevent the legislature from checking the argument. That is not how confidentiality works. That is how a shell game works.

Point Two: The Agreement Under Alaska Public Records Law

The second argument is grounded not in contract law but in Alaska statute. And it may be the more powerful of the two.

AGDC is not a private company. It is a public corporation of the State of Alaska, created by statute, funded by the state, and charged with serving the public interest. Its records are public records.

AS 40.25.110 — Alaska Public Records Act

Every person has a right to inspect a public record in the state, including public records in recorders' offices, unless the record is expressly exempted from public inspection by statute. The right to inspect includes the right to copy or obtain a copy of the public record.

Alaska Court Precedent on Confidentiality vs. Public Disclosure

Alaska courts have consistently held that administrative decisions to keep records confidential cannot override the legislature's explicit public disclosure requirements. By not allowing an exception to the public disclosure requirement based on state administrative regulations alone, Alaska courts have refused to deny access to records on the basis of administrative regulations purporting to make them confidential.

The AGDC-Glenfarne agreement is a contract entered into by a public corporation. It governs the disposition of public assets — assets that AGDC's own president acknowledged represent over $1 billion in public investment since 2014. Under AS 40.25.110, that contract is presumptively a public record subject to inspection.

AGDC has been treating the confidentiality clause in its private agreement with Glenfarne as though it overrides Alaska's Public Records Act. It does not. A private contractual clause cannot exempt a public record from Alaska's statutory public disclosure requirements. The legislature did not authorize AGDC to enter agreements that place its records beyond the reach of public inspection law. That authorization was never sought and never given.

What the Public Records Argument Means in Practice
The AGDC-Glenfarne operating agreement is a record of a public corporation. Any Alaskan — not just a senator — has a right to request it under AS 40.25.110.
AGDC's refusal to produce the document is not protected by the confidentiality clause. The clause binds AGDC contractually to Glenfarne — it does not create a statutory exemption from Alaska's public records law.
If AGDC refuses a properly submitted public records request for the agreement, that refusal is subject to challenge in Alaska Superior Court. The burden falls on AGDC to identify a specific statutory exemption — not a contractual confidentiality clause — justifying the denial.
The Worley cost estimate — if it was produced under AGDC's oversight, using AGDC resources, or delivered to AGDC as a party to the project — may itself be a public record subject to the same analysis.
Alaska law makes no distinction as to who may request public records. A journalist, a legislator, an advocacy organization, or any private citizen has the same right of access.

The Document in Senators' Hands — What It Means

The draft AGDC-Glenfarne agreement is now in the possession of several Alaska senators. The floor session has been stopped. The immediate legal question is not whether senators can read it — they have it. The question is what they can do with it.

Senators are not parties to the confidentiality agreement between AGDC and Glenfarne. They never signed it. A confidentiality agreement binds only the parties who agreed to it. Alaska senators are under no legal obligation arising from a private contract between two other entities to treat that document as confidential.

The more important question is how the document reached them. If it was sent by AGDC — a party to the confidentiality agreement — that transmission is itself a voluntary disclosure that may constitute a breach of the agreement by AGDC and a waiver of the confidentiality protection. If it was leaked by a whistleblower or insider, the confidentiality agreement between AGDC and Glenfarne remains intact between those two parties — but senators who received it are not bound by it.

Either way, the document is now in the legislative process. And the confidentiality wall that prevented legislative oversight for over a year is no longer standing.

The Waiver Chain — How It Accumulated

How Confidentiality Was Progressively Compromised
1
February 2026 — Open hearing disclosure. AGDC's Kissinger publicly described the governance structure — unanimous consent provisions, minority protections — in open Senate Resources testimony. Subject matter of the confidential agreement disclosed publicly.
2
May 2026 — Cost existence disclosed. Prestidge publicly acknowledged in open hearing that a cost estimate exists, that Glenfarne controls it, and described its commercial sensitivity. The existence and nature of withheld cost information disclosed publicly.
3
June 16-17, 2026 — Cost figure disclosed. Glenfarne presented cost slides to Senate Finance Committee in open session — including a figure of up to $54.5 billion. First public cost figure ever released by Glenfarne. Presented on slides marked confidential in a public legislative hearing.
4
June 17, 2026 — Clawback conditions disclosed. Prestidge publicly characterized the clawback provisions — describing the absence of meaningful state recourse — in open Senate Finance testimony. Substance of confidential clawback terms disclosed publicly by Glenfarne's own president.
5
June 18, 2026 — Draft agreement in senators' hands. The confidential document itself now in possession of multiple legislators. Floor session halted. Confidentiality wall no longer standing regardless of how the document was transmitted.

That is not a single breach. It is a progressive, cumulative erosion of the confidentiality protection — driven largely by Glenfarne and AGDC's own voluntary public disclosures in legislative testimony. Each disclosure reduced the legal defensibility of the confidentiality claim. By the time the draft agreement reached senators this morning, the legal foundation for maintaining confidentiality had already been substantially undermined by the parties who were supposed to be protecting it.

What the Legislature Should Do Right Now

The Senate floor session has been halted while lawyers presumably assess what senators can do with the document they now have. Here is what the law suggests they can do.

First — any senator can submit a public records request to AGDC for the full AGDC-Glenfarne operating agreement under AS 40.25.110. Today. Before the session ends Friday. A denial of that request triggers a right of action in Alaska Superior Court. The clock starts running on AGDC's response obligation the moment the request is filed.

Second — any senator who received the draft agreement is not bound by a confidentiality agreement they never signed. They may read it, discuss it in caucus, and use its contents to inform their vote. They may not be able to read it into the public record without legal risk to whoever transmitted it — but their own conduct in reading and using it is not constrained by a private contract between two other parties.

Third — the subject matter waiver argument means that Glenfarne's own public testimony has already opened the door to examination of the cost information, governance structure, and clawback provisions they described publicly. A legislator who asks Glenfarne in open hearing to confirm or deny the cost figure it presented on a confidential slide is not breaching any confidentiality. Glenfarne already disclosed it publicly.

The Wall Built on Sand

The confidentiality agreement between AGDC and Glenfarne was presented to the Alaska Legislature as an impenetrable legal barrier — the reason why every question about costs, governance, and clawback conditions had to go unanswered. Legislators were told repeatedly that AGDC could not share documents it was legally bound to keep confidential.

This morning, the document is in the building. And the legal arguments that were always available — subject matter waiver through voluntary public disclosure, and the primacy of Alaska's public records law over a private contractual confidentiality clause — suggest the wall may have been built on sand from the beginning.

AGDC never had the legal authority to enter a confidentiality agreement that placed its public records beyond the reach of Alaska's Public Records Act. And Glenfarne waived whatever protection it had by voluntarily disclosing the subject matter of the protected information in months of open legislative testimony.

The legislature has two days left in this special session. It has the document. It has the legal arguments. The confidentiality that stopped every question for over a year may not have been as unassailable as everyone was told.

Alaska deserved to know that a year ago.

Note: This post discusses legal concepts in the context of public policy analysis. It is not legal advice. The author is an Alaska energy policy analyst, not an attorney. Readers seeking legal guidance should consult qualified Alaska counsel.