Saturday, May 23, 2026

Dark Money in the Last Frontier: Alaska's 2026 Senate Race

Dark Money in the
Last Frontier

Outside groups, hidden donors, and the race for Alaska's Senate seat

May 2026
Dark Money Dan Sullivan Mary Peltola

Alaska's 2026 U.S. Senate race has become one of the most closely watched contests in the country — and with that attention has come an influx of outside money from organizations that are not required to disclose where their funding comes from. Two 501(c)(4) nonprofits, one on each side of the aisle, are now shaping the airwaves of the Last Frontier while keeping their donor lists hidden from the public.

On the Republican side, Last Frontier Action is running six-figure ad campaigns boosting incumbent Sen. Dan Sullivan. On the Democratic side, Majority Forward, linked to Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, is spending heavily to weaken Sullivan ahead of the November election. Neither group is legally required to tell Alaskans who is paying for the ads.

"No Lower 48 special interest group should be telling Alaskans how to vote."

— Mary Peltola, Democratic challenger, while benefiting from Majority Forward's spending

The irony runs deep on both sides. Peltola is actively campaigning against dark money while outside groups spend on her behalf. Sullivan, meanwhile, has used the phrase "dark money" to attack his opponents — while accepting the support of a group with no donor transparency whatsoever.

✦ ✦ ✦

Two Groups, Same Playbook

The structure is nearly identical on both sides: a 501(c)(4) "social welfare" nonprofit that can raise unlimited, anonymous funds, paired with a super PAC that can spend more aggressively but must disclose donors. The result is a layered system designed to maximize political impact while minimizing transparency.

Detail Last Frontier Action Majority Forward
Type 501(c)(4) nonprofit + companion super PAC 501(c)(4) nonprofit
Side Pro-Sullivan (Republican) Pro-Peltola (Democratic)
Key figure Brock Lowrance, former NRSC senior advisor Linked to Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY)
Registered Mountain Brook, Alabama Washington, D.C.
Known spending Six-figure digital & TV ad buy (exact total undisclosed) $1M+ on ACA/health care ads (Nov. 2025); mid-six-figure buy on gas prices (Mar. 2026); Senate Majority PAC (affiliated) reserving $10.6M in TV time
Donor disclosure None required None required
Founding ties Former Sullivan staffers; Hilcorp PR, cruise industry PR Senate Democratic leadership network

Last Frontier Action: A Closer Look

Despite its Alaska-first branding — a mountain logo, a star, the tagline "pro-America, pro-Alaska" — Last Frontier Action is not an Alaskan organization in any meaningful sense. It was incorporated in Alabama, is led by a Virginia-based Montana operative, and was founded by former Sullivan staffers with ties to industries that have direct financial interests in Sullivan's reelection.

The group's leader, Brock Lowrance, is one of the Republican Party's most prominent Senate campaign strategists. At the NRSC in 2024, he designed and executed a $100 million paid media effort that helped Republicans retake the Senate. He was later named a Resident Fellow at Harvard's Institute of Politics. In early 2025, he co-founded S2R Public Affairs, a DC-based firm, with two other former NRSC colleagues.

By the Numbers
$100M NRSC media spend led by Lowrance in 2024
$10.6M Senate Majority PAC TV ad reservation supporting Peltola
$8.9M Peltola Q1 2026 fundraising — a state record
$2.1M Sullivan Q1 2026 fundraising
$15M Senate Leadership Fund committed for Sullivan
$1M+ Majority Forward health care ad buy targeting Sullivan (Nov. 2025)
✦ ✦ ✦

Where Each Candidate Stands

The two candidates have taken sharply different public positions on campaign finance — even as both benefit from outside spending they cannot legally control.

Republican

Dan Sullivan

Incumbent U.S. Senator · Seeking third term
  • Publicly attacked Democratic outside groups running ads against him as "far-left-wing affiliated Democrat groups" running "blatantly false attack ads" — but framed as partisan attacks, not a principled stand against dark money
  • Used "dark money" specifically to attack Alaska's ranked-choice voting system, calling it something dark money "installed" in Alaska
  • In 2014, refused to sign a campaign disclosure pledge, with his spokesman calling it "disingenuous" — an early signal of his position on transparency
  • Now supports a 2026 ballot measure to repeal RCV that would also eliminate Alaska's donor disclosure requirements passed by voters in 2020
  • Benefits from Last Frontier Action's anonymous ad campaigns without calling for any transparency
  • Outside group founded by former Sullivan staffers with oil and cruise industry ties
Democrat

Mary Peltola

Former U.S. Representative · Challenger
  • Actively campaigns against dark money as a central platform plank
  • Supports the DISCLOSE Act — requiring disclosure of donations over $10,000
  • Backs a constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens United
  • Benefits from Majority Forward's anonymous spending while criticizing the system
  • Raised $8.9M in Q1 2026, with 95% of donations under $100

"Sullivan has never been in the ranked-choice voting scenario — which he characterized as something dark money installed in Alaska."

— Must Read Alaska, on Sullivan's announcement speech

Sullivan's "Dark Money" Attack — On Ranked-Choice Voting

Sullivan's use of the dark money label deserves closer scrutiny. When he announced his reelection bid in March 2025, the framing around his campaign noted that this would be his first race under ranked-choice voting — a system Sullivan has characterized as one installed by dark money. The 2020 ballot measure that enacted ranked-choice voting in Alaska also included tougher campaign finance disclosure requirements, which Sullivan and his allies now seek to repeal.

In April 2026, President Trump called Alaska's ranked-choice voting system "disastrous" and "very fraudulent" — without evidence — and specifically named Sullivan among the Alaska Republicans he praised for working to repeal it. Sullivan responded on social media, saying he was "proud to stand on principle for free and fair elections in Alaska." If the 2026 repeal ballot measure passes, it would eliminate not just ranked-choice voting and open primaries, but also the campaign finance disclosure requirements voters approved in 2020 — the very transparency rules that would make outside spending like Last Frontier Action's more visible to the public.

"A ballot initiative would repeal requirements to disclose the true source of contributions, as well as the state's top-four ranked-choice voting system — both approved by voters in 2020."

— OpenSecrets, on the 2026 Alaska repeal ballot measure

In other words: Sullivan invokes dark money to attack the voting system, while simultaneously supporting a ballot measure that would strip away donor disclosure rules — making dark money harder to track, not easier.

The Hypocrisy Problem — For Both Sides

The Alaska Senate race offers a textbook illustration of why campaign finance reform stalls in Washington: both parties use the same tools they publicly denounce, because unilaterally disarming is seen as political suicide.

Sullivan's silence on dark money is the simpler case. He has never advocated for transparency in outside spending, and his campaign benefits directly from a group built by his own former staffers. There is no contradiction between his stated positions and his actions — because he has stated no position at all.

Peltola's situation is more complex and politically riskier. She has made campaign finance reform a central campaign message, calling on voters to reject the influence of "Lower 48 special interests" in Alaska politics — while accepting the support of Majority Forward, a Washington D.C.-linked group spending mid-six figures in the state. She could, in theory, publicly ask Majority Forward to stand down. She has not done so.

The bottom line: dark money is legal, it's bipartisan, and in a race this competitive, neither side is likely to voluntarily give it up. The question for Alaska voters is whether they find that acceptable — and whether the candidates' positions on changing the system carry any weight when neither is willing to act on them unilaterally.

Sources: Axios · Alaska Public Media · Harvard Political Review · S2R Public Affairs · lastfrontieraction.com · Native News Online · Reporting from Alaska (Dermot Cole)

This post is for informational purposes. All facts drawn from publicly available reporting as of May 2026.

Thursday, May 21, 2026

Trump Didn't Drain the Swamp — He Drained the SPR. And Dan Sullivan Has Nothing to Say About It.

You remember the promise. It was the rallying cry of a movement, the chant that echoed through arenas from 2016 all the way through Trump's second inauguration: Drain the swamp.

Well, Donald Trump didn't drain the swamp. He drained something far more consequential — America's Strategic Petroleum Reserve. And the senator who spent years thundering that the SPR was a sacred national security asset, Alaska's own Dan Sullivan, has gone completely, utterly, inexplicably silent.

"We will fill our strategic reserves right to the top."
— Donald Trump, Inauguration Day, January 2026

The Promise

On his first day back in the White House, Donald Trump stood at the podium and declared a "national energy emergency." He promised to slash energy prices, supercharge domestic production, and — critically — fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve "right to the top." It was a direct shot at Joe Biden, who had drawn down the reserve during the Ukraine energy crisis. Trump's message was clear: Biden left us exposed. I will fix it.

The Department of Energy issued a formal Secretarial Order making "Refill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve" an official department-level priority. By December 2025, the White House was still touting its efforts, calling Biden's drawdown "irresponsible" and claiming they were "gradually" refilling it.

Gradually. That word would age very badly, very fast.


Then Came the War

On February 28, 2026, Trump launched Operation Epic Fury — coordinated U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran. Within days, Iran shut down traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, triggering what the International Energy Agency called the largest oil supply disruption in the history of global energy markets. Oil prices rocketed from the $70s to over $114 a barrel in weeks.

By March 2026 — just two weeks into the war — the Strategic Petroleum Reserve was still less than 60% full. The promise to fill it "right to the top" had gone nowhere. And then it got dramatically worse.

172 million barrels Released by Trump from the U.S. SPR alone — part of a record 400-million-barrel coordinated international drawdown through the IEA, the largest emergency reserve release in world history. The previous record was 182 million barrels across all IEA nations combined during the 2022 Ukraine crisis. The U.S. share this time exceeds that entire global response.
9.9 million barrels in one week The largest single-week SPR drawdown ever recorded — confirmed by the U.S. Energy Information Administration for the week ending May 15, 2026. The prior week saw 8.6 million barrels drained. Back-to-back record weekly draws.
45.2 million barrels in one month The Department of Energy's first contract batch alone — awarded March 20 — covered 45.2 million barrels. Combined with accelerating weekly draws, the Iran war has produced the largest monthly SPR drawdown in the reserve's 50-year history.
Under 375 million barrels — and falling Current SPR inventory, approaching what commodity analysts at Standard Chartered warn are "operational stress limits." The statutory minimum is 150 million barrels. The reserve is now 44% below its 2009 peak of 727 million barrels.
238 million barrels Projected SPR level by 2028 — a 66% collapse from the 695 million barrels held in 2017, and dangerously close to the statutory operational floor.

Trump ordered the release of 172 million barrels as part of a coordinated 400-million-barrel international drawdown through the International Energy Agency — the largest emergency reserve release in the history of global energy markets, more than double the response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Experts warned it would not fix the underlying problem. "The war is driving up prices on the world market," said one Cornell professor who studies the economic impact of wars, "and there isn't an easy way out."

Morgan Stanley estimated global oil stockpiles dropped by about 4.8 million barrels a day between March 1 and April 25 — far exceeding the previous peak for any quarterly drawdown in IEA history. The administration is now so desperate to replenish the reserve that it is reportedly exploring drilling for oil beneath U.S. military bases. The swamp remains. The SPR does not.


What Sullivan Said Then

To understand how remarkable Sullivan's silence is today, you have to understand how loud he was before.

When Biden tapped the SPR in 2022, Sullivan didn't just criticize — he made it his signature issue. He called Biden's drawdown "political window dressing." He called it "a desperate political maneuver." He said Biden had "depleted the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to a level we haven't seen in 35 years." He introduced the ROAR Act — the Replenishing Our American Reserves Act — and declared on the Senate floor:

"The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is meant to support our nation through major security crises — not to bail out a President's catastrophic energy policies."

He introduced companion bills to stop SPR oil from being sold to China. He co-sponsored legislation with Ted Cruz and Joe Manchin. He issued press release after press release. He held hearings. He gave interviews. He ROARed.

Sullivan's own words defined the standard clearly: the SPR is for major security crises — and draining it for political reasons is a national disgrace.


What Sullivan Has Said Since

Nothing.

As of this writing, Senator Dan Sullivan has not issued a single public statement addressing the historic collapse of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve during the Iran war. Not one press release. Not one floor speech. Not one tweet. Not one interview.

His colleague Senator Tom Cotton — no friend of Democrats — was firing off letters to the Energy Secretary as recently as March 2026, demanding accountability for Biden's 2022 drawdown even as Trump's war was actively making things worse. Cotton at least had the consistency to stay on the issue.

Sullivan? Gone. Silent. Missing in action on the very issue he built his energy brand around.

The reserve he spent years vowing to protect is now draining toward a 40-year low — because of a war he voted seven times to keep going.

We're Draining the Reserve and Exporting the Oil

Here is the detail that should make every Alaskan's blood boil.

While the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is being drained to historic lows, and while Alaskans are paying $5-plus at the pump and rural villages face fuel prices approaching $20 a gallon — the United States is simultaneously exporting oil abroad at record levels.

That is not a typo.

With Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz cutting off roughly 20% of global oil supplies, the world turned to America as the supplier of last resort. And the Trump administration answered — by opening the export taps wider than they have ever been opened in American history.

6 million barrels per day U.S. crude oil exports hit a record high during the Iran war — up from 3.9 million bpd before the conflict began. A 30%+ surge.

The Port of Corpus Christi in Texas — previously the third-largest oil export terminal in the world — became the busiest port on earth as tankers from Europe, Asia, and beyond lined up to load American crude. March 2026 was its busiest month ever. The first quarter was its busiest quarter ever.

Meanwhile, American domestic crude stocks dropped for four straight weeks to below historical averages. U.S. distillate stockpiles hit their lowest point since 2005. Gasoline stockpiles fell to their lowest seasonal levels since 2014. And the SPR — the emergency reserve built specifically to protect American consumers from exactly this kind of crisis — was drained at the fastest pace in its history.

The picture this paints is stark: American oil is being pumped out and shipped overseas at record rates, American consumers are paying record prices at the pump, and America's emergency reserve is being hollowed out — all at the same time, all because of the same war.

We are exporting oil to the world while Alaskans can't afford to fill their tanks.

This is Trump's "energy dominance" agenda in action. And it is costing Alaskans dearly. Rural communities are staring down $17-20 a gallon. An Anchorage driver's tank costs $100 to fill. A Wasilla man spends $150 a week on fuel just to commute.

Where is Dan Sullivan on any of this? The senator who built his brand on Alaska energy, American energy independence, and protecting the SPR — the senator who introduced the ROAR Act and roared about every barrel Biden released — has said nothing about record oil exports draining domestic supplies while his own constituents can't afford to heat their homes.

Nothing.


The Math Sullivan Won't Do in Public

Let's do it for him.

Biden drew down roughly 180 million barrels from the SPR in 2022 — during a genuine global energy crisis triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Sullivan called it a disgrace, introduced legislation, and made it a centerpiece of his political identity.

Trump has now released 172 million barrels from the SPR — during a war Trump himself started, without congressional authorization, that Sullivan voted seven times to continue. The SPR is now on a trajectory toward 238 million barrels by 2028 — a level that would leave America dangerously exposed to the next shock, whether that's a hurricane, a Chinese move on Taiwan, or a new conflict in the Middle East.

By Sullivan's own stated standard, this is a catastrophe. A national security emergency. Exactly the kind of reckless political decision-making he spent years warning Alaskans about.

But it's Trump doing it. So Sullivan says nothing.


Drain the Swamp. Fill the Reserve. Pick One.

Trump's "drain the swamp" slogan was always more metaphor than policy. But the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is not a metaphor. It is 695 million barrels of salt caverns along the Gulf Coast, built after the 1973 oil embargo, designed specifically so that America would never again be held hostage by a foreign power's control over energy supplies.

Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz was exactly the scenario the SPR was built for. And instead of meeting that moment with a full reserve — as Trump promised — the country went in with a tank that was already less than 60% full, thanks in part to the fact that Congress, including Sullivan, never funded or passed a serious refill plan.

The ROAR Act died in committee. Twice. Sullivan ROARed and got nothing done. And now the reserve is heading toward its worst level in decades, Alaskans are paying $5-plus at the pump, rural villages face a survival scenario at $17-20 a gallon — and Sullivan is sending fundraising emails asking Alaskans for gas money.

Trump didn't drain the swamp.

He drained the SPR.

And the senator who said that was the one thing he'd never let happen hasn't said a word.

Alaska deserves a senator who ROARs for them — not one who only ROARs at the other party.

The Bottom Line

Dan Sullivan built a political brand on protecting America's emergency oil reserve. He named legislation after it. He gave it a battle cry. He made it a test of patriotism and national security seriousness.

Then his party started a war that drained that reserve to historic lows. And he went silent.

That silence has a cost. It is measured in dollars at the pump in Anchorage. It is measured in gallons at $17 in Bethel. It is measured in 13 flag-draped coffins coming home from a war nobody voted to authorize. And it is measured in a Strategic Petroleum Reserve that, by 2028, may hold barely a third of what it held a decade ago.

Sullivan says Alaska needs you.

Alaska needs a senator who shows up — even when it's his own party doing the damage.

Sources: 24/7 Wall St., Fortune, Fox News, Alaska's News Source, Alaska Beacon, Congressional Research Service, International Energy Agency, Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S. Senator Dan Sullivan official press releases, National Taxpayers Union Foundation.

Dan Sullivan Backed a War That's Burning Alaskans at the Pump — Then Asked Them for Gas Money

Dan Sullivan has a message for Alaskans: he needs gas money.

In a recent fundraising email with the subject line "Alaska needs you!!", Alaska's senior U.S. Senator asked his constituents to open their wallets and help fund his reelection campaign. The ask might seem routine — politicians fundraise constantly — except for one rather glaring detail: Sullivan has spent the last several months voting, again and again, to keep the United States in an unauthorized war with Iran, the same war that has driven gas prices past $5 a gallon across Alaska and pushed rural communities to the brink of a survival crisis.

Beggars can't be choosers, Senator. But Alaskans deserve answers.

How We Got Here

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated military strikes on Iran — Operation Epic Fury — killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and targeting Iran's nuclear and military infrastructure. Within hours, Sullivan voiced his full-throated support, calling Iranian leaders "less world leaders than terrorists."

That support never wavered. As Senate Democrats and even a handful of Republicans argued that only Congress has the constitutional authority to declare war, Sullivan doubled down. At an Armed Services Committee hearing, he lectured his colleagues:

"To my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, wake up. This country's been at war with us for almost a half century, and they've killed thousands and wounded thousands of our best and brightest."

What Sullivan never explained was what that meant for the people back home — the Alaskans filling up their trucks, heating their homes, and trying to survive in some of the most remote communities in America.


The Human Cost Sullivan Isn't Talking About

Thirteen American service members have been killed in Operation Epic Fury. Another 381 were wounded in the first 40 days of fighting alone. By the time a ceasefire took hold, the total U.S. dead and wounded stood at 385 — and in a troubling sign of the times, the Pentagon was caught quietly scrubbing 15 wounded troops from its official casualty count.

These aren't abstractions. They are sons and daughters, parents and spouses, coming home in flag-draped coffins or with wounds that will last a lifetime.

Sullivan voted against War Powers resolutions to rein in the conflict — not once, not twice, but seven times. A bipartisan effort to invoke the War Powers Act and end U.S. military action failed 49-50, with Sullivan casting the deciding vote, even as his own colleague Senator Lisa Murkowski broke with her party and voted to halt the war.


$29 Billion in Equipment — And Counting

The human toll is only part of the ledger. A Congressional Research Service report found that at least 42 American military aircraft were lost or damaged during the 40-day air campaign. Total costs for Operation Epic Fury have climbed to nearly $29 billion.

The losses read like a Pentagon nightmare:

  • One or two THAAD missile defense radar systems destroyed, worth between $485 million and $970 million
  • A $700 million E-3 AWACS airborne command aircraft obliterated at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia
  • Three F-15E fighter jets shot down — by friendly fire
  • The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford damaged by fire, currently undergoing repairs in Greece
  • More than two dozen MQ-9 Reaper drones destroyed, worth nearly $1 billion and representing 20% of the Pentagon's prewar inventory

The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated the war was costing the United States roughly half a billion dollars every day. The Pentagon is now seeking an additional $200 billion from Congress to cover the tab — a tab that Sullivan helped run up with every vote against ending the conflict.


What It's Costing Alaskans at Home

While Sullivan was voting to keep the war going in Washington, Alaskans were getting crushed at the pump.

Gas prices in Alaska jumped a full dollar a gallon in a single month. One Anchorage resident told reporters her tank went from $70 to fill up to $100. A Wasilla man said he was spending around $150 a week just on fuel.

"We can't take it all on at one time. Groceries, the cost of living, space notes going up, everything has gone up."
— Anchorage resident

In rural Alaska, the situation is not merely painful — it is potentially catastrophic. Even before the war, gas was $6.72 a gallon in Bethel and $17.50 a gallon in some Northwest Alaska villages. Bulk fuel vendors are now warning those prices could rise another 50% due to the war-driven supply crunch. Ingemar Mathiasson, energy manager for the Northwest Arctic Borough, put it bluntly:

"We're looking at, maybe, a survival scenario for rural Alaska. At those prices, I would imagine that people are going to try to move into Anchorage. I don't know if you can heat your house at over $20 a gallon."

Policymakers say they are "tracking the problem." No concrete steps have been announced.


He ROARed. Now He's Begging for Gas.

Here is where Sullivan's record becomes not just ironic, but jaw-dropping.

For years, Sullivan made the Strategic Petroleum Reserve — the SPR — a signature political issue. When President Biden tapped the reserve in 2022 to ease soaring gas prices, Sullivan was furious. He called it "political window dressing" that would "do little to counteract the Biden administration's own destructive policies." He thundered that Biden had "depleted the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to a level we haven't seen in 35 years" and called it "a desperate political maneuver."

So Sullivan did what senators do — he introduced a bill. He called it the ROAR Act: the Replenishing Our American Reserves Act. He declared that "the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is meant to support our nation through major security crises — not to bail out a President's catastrophic energy policies." He introduced companion legislation to prohibit SPR oil from being sold to China. He gave speeches, issued press releases, held hearings, and built an entire political brand around protecting and refilling the emergency reserve.

He even said it himself, on the record: the SPR is for major security crises.

There is just one problem. The ROAR Act never passed. Sullivan introduced it, reintroduced it, gave it a catchy name — and couldn't get it out of committee. It died in the Senate. Twice. The legislation was, in Sullivan's own words about Biden, political window dressing.

Then came the Iran war — the actual major security crisis Sullivan had been warning about for years. And what happened to the reserve he had spent years vowing to protect?

President Trump ordered the release of 172 million barrels from the SPR as part of a coordinated 400-million-barrel international drawdown through the International Energy Agency. The SPR then saw its largest single-week drain in recorded history: nearly 10 million barrels gone in one week, leaving stockpiles under 375 million barrels while oil spiked to $114 a barrel. The reserve is now poised to reach its lowest level since 1982 — worse than anything Biden ever did. Trump, who had also campaigned on filling the reserve "right to the top," is now so desperate to replenish it that his administration is reportedly exploring drilling for oil beneath U.S. military bases.

The reserve Sullivan spent years claiming to protect is now in worse shape than ever — and it got that way because of a war Sullivan voted seven times to keep going without congressional authorization.

And Dan Sullivan? Silence. The senator who spent years ROARing about the sanctity of the SPR has not issued a single public statement addressing its historic collapse during the war he championed. Not one press release. Not one floor speech. Not one tweet.

He ROARed when Biden did it. Now he's begging Alaskans for gas money.

Trump Blinked. Sullivan Didn't.

On April 7, 2026 — less than two hours before his own deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz or face attacks on civilian infrastructure — President Trump blinked, agreeing to a two-week ceasefire mediated by Pakistan. Iranian state television immediately called it a "humiliating retreat." Trump later indefinitely extended the ceasefire, citing internal divisions within Iran. Peace talks have since stalled, with little overlap between U.S. and Iranian demands.

Let that sink in. Even Trump, who launched the war, eventually pulled back. Sullivan never did. He was more hawkish than the president whose war he was defending, voting against every attempt to restore congressional oversight, while his constituents paid the price at the pump, in the military, and in their savings accounts.


The Bottom Line

Sullivan wants Alaskans to send him gas money.

He wants their support to keep his Senate seat in a race he now faces against former Congresswoman Mary Peltola, who is running hard on the very issues this war has made unavoidable.

But before Alaskans reach into their wallets, they deserve to ask: what exactly has Dan Sullivan been doing for them?

He backed a war without a vote. He voted seven times to keep it going without congressional authorization. He watched gas prices soar past $5 a gallon in Anchorage and toward $20 in rural villages. He said nothing while the Strategic Petroleum Reserve — the emergency stockpile he spent years claiming to protect — was drained to a generational low by the very conflict he enabled. And 13 American service members came home in coffins.

The senator says Alaska needs you.

Alaska needs answers.

Sources: Alaska Public Media, Alaska Beacon, Alaska's News Source, The Independent, Bloomberg, Military Times, Congressional Research Service, Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Intercept, Time, 24/7 Wall St., U.S. Senator Dan Sullivan official press releases.

Wednesday, May 20, 2026

The Road Not Taken: AS 43.82 and the Statute Glenfarne Bypassed | Thomas Lamb
Notes on Alaska Energy & Public Policy
Thomas Lamb
Alaska LNG · AS 43.82 · Stranded Gas Development Act · Tax Certainty

The Road Not Taken

Alaska has a statute specifically designed for this moment — a structured, transparent pathway to negotiate tax certainty for a North Slope gas project. It has been on the books since 1998. Glenfarne bypassed it entirely. The road not taken has more protections for Alaska than the road Dunleavy chose.

In July 2006, I wrote about a statute most Alaskans had never heard of — the Alaska Stranded Gas Development Act, codified at AS 43.82. I was writing about Frank Murkowski's attempt to use it to negotiate a secret tax deal with BP, ExxonMobil, and ConocoPhillips. The legislature rejected that deal. Murkowski lost his primary. And Alaska moved on to AGIA, SB 138, and eventually to Glenfarne.

What nobody noticed in all of that transition is that AS 43.82 never went away. It was never repealed. It was never superseded. It sits in Alaska statute today — operative, available, and carrying more transparency and legislative oversight than anything the Dunleavy administration has proposed in the current special session.

The Stranded Gas Development Act was not the problem in 2006. The secret deal Murkowski made under it was the problem. The statute itself — its application process, its qualified project review, its cost evaluation requirements, its mandatory legislative ratification — was built precisely to prevent Alaska from giving away tax certainty without understanding what it was giving it away for.

Glenfarne bypassed it entirely. And in doing so, bypassed every protection it was designed to provide.

What AS 43.82 Actually Requires

The Alaska Stranded Gas Development Act was enacted in 1998 and amended several times since. Its purpose was specific: to create a formal, structured pathway for the state to negotiate tax certainty with the sponsor of a qualified North Slope gas project — including the ability to offer payment in lieu of one or more taxes — subject to rigorous review and legislative approval.

AS 43.82.100 — Qualified Project Standard

The commissioner may determine that a proposal is a qualified project only if it would produce at least 500 billion cubic feet of stranded gas within 20 years of commercial operations and is capable of making gas available to meet reasonably foreseeable in-state demand within economic proximity of the project. Crucially — this determination must be based on information available to the commissioner. Cost information is central to that determination.

AS 43.82.210 — Payment in Lieu of Taxes

If the commissioner approves an application and proposed project plan, the commissioner may develop proposed terms for periodic payment in lieu of one or more taxes — including oil and gas production taxes, property taxes, and income taxes — that would otherwise be imposed by the state or a municipality on the qualified sponsor as a consequence of participating in an approved qualified project.

AS 43.82.250 — Term Limits

The term of any contract developed under AS 43.82.020 may not exceed 35 years from the commencement of commercial operations of the approved qualified project.

Read those provisions together. AS 43.82 anticipated exactly the current situation — a major North Slope gas project seeking tax relief from the state and municipalities. It created a pathway for that relief. And it built in safeguards at every step: a formal application, a qualified project determination requiring cost information, proposed terms developed by the commissioner, and mandatory legislative ratification before any contract takes effect.

The Process Glenfarne Never Went Through

The Dunleavy administration did not file an application under AS 43.82. It did not seek a qualified project determination from the commissioner. It did not go through the structured cost review that a qualified project determination requires. It introduced a standalone property tax bill in the legislature — bypassing the entire framework the Stranded Gas Development Act created for exactly this purpose.

The AS 43.82 Process — Steps Glenfarne Never Took
1
Application filed with commissioner. Project sponsor submits formal application including project plan with cost and economic information sufficient for the commissioner to evaluate the project's viability and tax impact.
2
Qualified project determination. Commissioner evaluates whether the project meets the statutory standard — including production capacity and in-state supply obligations. Cost information is central to this determination. This step cannot be completed without verified project costs.
3
Tax terms proposed by commissioner. Commissioner develops proposed payment-in-lieu terms for legislative consideration — grounded in the cost and economic information from the application. The terms are derived from verified numbers, not negotiated in the abstract.
4
Municipal interests accommodated. The statute explicitly requires that any tax contract accommodate the interests of affected municipalities — the North Slope and Kenai Peninsula boroughs whose property tax revenues are at stake.
5
Legislative ratification. No tax certainty contract takes effect without legislative approval. The legislature votes on terms it has been able to evaluate — because the application process produced the information needed to evaluate them.
6
Reporting and audit requirements. AS 43.82.630 requires ongoing reports and audits after a contract is in place — ensuring the state can verify the project is performing as represented and the tax terms remain appropriate.

That process was never initiated. Instead the governor introduced a property tax bill, applied pressure through a special session, and asked the legislature to ratify terms derived from cost information nobody has been allowed to see.

The Irony That History Demands We Notice

In 2006, the legislature rejected Frank Murkowski's deal made under AS 43.82. The lesson Alaska drew was that the process needed more transparency and more legislative oversight — which is exactly what AGIA and SB 138 added. The Stranded Gas Development Act itself, with its application process and legislative ratification requirement, was not the problem. It was the secret negotiation that preceded the formal process that the legislature found unacceptable.

The legislature rejected Murkowski's deal because it was negotiated in secret. It did not reject AS 43.82. Twenty years later, Glenfarne bypassed AS 43.82 entirely — producing a result with less transparency than what the legislature rejected in 2006.

The current property tax bill asks the legislature to provide tax certainty — including payment in lieu of property taxes — without a formal application, without a qualified project determination, without commissioner-developed terms grounded in verified costs, and without the municipal accommodation requirement that AS 43.82 explicitly mandates.

The borough property tax dispute — which has consumed weeks of legislative debate and nearly killed the bill repeatedly — exists precisely because AS 43.82's municipal accommodation requirement was bypassed. That requirement was written into the statute after decades of experience with exactly this conflict. Glenfarne's route around AS 43.82 walked directly into the problem the statute was designed to prevent.

What the Producers Know

The North Slope producers — ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Hilcorp — negotiated under AS 43.82 with Murkowski in 2003 and 2004. They know this statute. They know what a properly structured tax certainty contract looks like and what process produces one that survives legislative scrutiny.

They also know what happens when that process is shortcut. They watched Murkowski's deal collapse. They watched the legislature reject it. They watched AGIA replace it with a more transparent framework. And they have watched that framework gradually erode — through SB 138, through the AGDC-Glenfarne confidentiality agreement, and now through a standalone property tax bill that bypasses AS 43.82 entirely.

Their precedent agreements are structured as safety nets — conditional on FID, conditional on tax certainty, conditional on every prior commitment being properly completed. A properly completed tax certainty commitment, in the producers' institutional memory, looks like AS 43.82. It has an application. It has verified costs. It has legislative ratification. It has municipal accommodation. It has ongoing reporting and audit rights.

What is currently before the special session does not look like that. Which is precisely why the producers signed precedent agreements rather than binding supply contracts.

A Direct Comparison

AS 43.82 Process vs. Current Dunleavy Approach
AS 43.82 — The Road Not Taken
Current Property Tax Bill — The Road Chosen
Formal application with project plan and cost information
No formal application. No cost information provided.
Commissioner qualified project determination based on verified economics
No qualified project determination. No economic review.
Tax terms developed by commissioner from verified cost data
Tax terms proposed by Glenfarne. Cost data withheld.
Municipal interests explicitly accommodated in statute
Borough dispute nearly collapsed the bill. No statutory accommodation.
Legislative ratification of terms derived from verified information
Legislature asked to ratify terms it cannot independently verify.
Ongoing reporting and audit requirements under AS 43.82.630
No equivalent ongoing transparency requirements proposed.
35-year maximum contract term
30-year supply agreements plus open-ended tax structure.

Every protection AS 43.82 built into the tax certainty process has been bypassed in the current approach. Every conflict that has consumed the special session — the borough dispute, the lack of cost information, the absence of independent economic review — was anticipated and addressed in the statute that was never used.

The Question Nobody Has Asked

Why didn't Glenfarne pursue the AS 43.82 pathway?

The answer the statute itself suggests is uncomfortable. AS 43.82 requires a formal application with cost and economic information sufficient for the commissioner to evaluate the project. That evaluation cannot be completed without verified project costs. And Glenfarne has acknowledged those verified costs won't exist until mid-2027.

A developer who cannot complete a qualified project determination under AS 43.82 because it lacks verified cost information cannot honestly seek tax certainty through any process that requires those costs to be known. The Dunleavy administration's decision to bypass AS 43.82 and introduce a standalone tax bill was not a choice between two equivalent pathways. It was a choice to avoid the pathway that would have required Glenfarne to open its books.

The Statute Is Still There

AS 43.82 has been on the books since 1998. It survived AGIA. It survived SB 138. It survived every iteration of this project's development. It is available today.

The legislature does not need to invent new transparency requirements for the Alaska LNG project. It does not need to negotiate novel municipal accommodation provisions. It does not need to construct ad hoc audit rights from scratch. Alaska already has a statute that does all of those things — specifically for this type of project, specifically for this type of tax concession.

The path to durable, legally defensible tax certainty for Alaska LNG runs through AS 43.82. It requires a formal application. It requires verified project costs. It requires commissioner review. It requires municipal accommodation. It requires legislative ratification of terms Alaska can actually evaluate.

That is not obstruction. That is the road Alaska built twenty years ago — after learning the hard way what happens when tax certainty is negotiated without it. The legislature should insist on taking it.

Stranded Gas: The Safety Net the Producers Built | Thomas Lamb
Notes on Alaska Energy & Public Policy
Thomas Lamb
Alaska LNG · Stranded Gas · Producer Agreements · North Slope

Stranded Gas: The Safety Net the Producers Built

Glenfarne is presenting the producer supply agreements as proof of momentum. Read them more carefully. They are proof of fifty years of institutional memory about North Slope gas that has never moved south.

North Slope gas has been stranded since commercial oil production began at Prudhoe Bay in 1977. For nearly fifty years, the associated gas produced alongside Alaska's oil has been reinjected into the reservoir, maintaining pressure for oil recovery, because there was no economic route to market. Billions of cubic feet of natural gas. Decades of potential revenue. Stranded.

Every major energy company operating on the North Slope knows this history intimately. They have lived it across multiple corporate generations, multiple price cycles, and multiple failed attempts to build a gas pipeline south. ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, and Hilcorp did not arrive at the negotiating table with Glenfarne as naive parties. They arrived as the most experienced holders of stranded gas assets on the planet.

Which is precisely why the gas sales precedent agreements they signed should be read not as commitment — but as the safety net sophisticated parties build when they have been here before.

Fifty Years of Failed Attempts

The producers' institutional memory is long and specific. Every prior attempt to monetize North Slope gas has failed — not from lack of interest, but from the same recurring problem: costs that couldn't be financed, tax structures that couldn't be agreed, and project economics that didn't survive contact with reality.

North Slope Gas — A History of Stranding
1977
Prudhoe Bay oil production begins. Associated gas reinjected — no pipeline to market.
1980s
Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System authorized by Congress. Project collapses under cost escalation before construction begins.
2001–2006
Governor Murkowski negotiates secret fiscal contract with producers for overland pipeline. Legislature rejects it. Project dies.
2007–2013
AGIA framework under Palin. TransCanada/ExxonMobil pursue overland pipeline. Open season fails to attract producer commitment. Project stalls.
2014–2016
Project pivots to LNG export with producers as partners under SB 138. LNG price collapse. Producers withdraw. AGDC left as sole developer.
2025
Glenfarne takes 75% of 8 Star Alaska. Producers sign gas sales precedent agreements. Gas remains unmonetized pending FID.

The producers have watched this sequence play out across five decades and multiple attempts. They understand better than anyone that a gas pipeline from the North Slope is not inevitable simply because it is desirable. They have seen desirable projects die at every stage of development — from concept to permitting to financing to construction.

They structured their agreements accordingly.

What a Precedent Agreement Actually Is

Glenfarne announced with considerable fanfare that all major North Slope producers have signed gas sales precedent agreements — ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Hilcorp, and Great Bear Pantheon. The announcement was framed as a milestone demonstrating that the project has critical mass and producer support.

A gas sales precedent agreement is not a supply contract. It is a framework document establishing the commercial terms — price formula, volumes, delivery method — that a future binding supply contract would follow. It creates no obligation to deliver gas. It creates no obligation to proceed with the project. It is conditional on every prior commitment in the development chain being successfully completed.

Producer Agreements — What They Are and Are Not
ConocoPhillips
Gas sales precedent agreement — 30-year framework Conditional on: FID · Tax certainty · Verified costs · ROW conversion · Financing secured
ExxonMobil Alaska
Gas sales precedent agreement Conditional on: FID · Tax certainty · Verified costs · ROW conversion · Financing secured
Hilcorp Alaska
Gas sales precedent agreement Conditional on: FID · Tax certainty · Verified costs · ROW conversion · Financing secured
Great Bear Pantheon
Gas sales precedent agreement — up to 500 MMscfd Conditional on: FID · Tax certainty · Verified costs · ROW conversion · Financing secured

Every condition in that chain depends on the one before it. And the chain breaks at the right-of-way conversion — because a defensible public interest finding cannot be made before verified project costs exist, and Glenfarne has acknowledged those costs will not exist until mid-2027.

If the ROW conversion cannot proceed, FID cannot proceed. If FID cannot proceed, the precedent agreements never convert to binding supply contracts. If binding contracts are never signed, the gas stays in the ground. Stranded. Again.

The Safety Net in Plain Sight

The producers did not sign precedent agreements despite knowing this history. They signed precedent agreements because of it.

A precedent agreement gives a producer everything it needs to maintain a position at the table — without betting its balance sheet on a project that has failed repeatedly. If the project succeeds and FID is reached, the precedent agreement converts to a binding supply contract and the producer monetizes decades of stranded gas. If the project fails — as it has failed before — the precedent agreement expires with no loss, no liability, and no obligation.

Signing a precedent agreement is not confidence in Glenfarne. It is fifty years of institutional memory about stranded North Slope gas, expressed in contractual language.

ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, and Hilcorp are publicly traded companies. They carry fiduciary duties to their shareholders. They do not make binding commitments to $60-plus billion projects without verified cost estimates. They have not made such a commitment here. They have preserved optionality while protecting their balance sheets — precisely what sophisticated energy companies do when facing a high-reward, high-uncertainty development in difficult terrain with a long history of failure.

What the ROW Scenario Means for the Producers

If the conditional right-of-way leases on state land cannot convert — because a defensible public interest finding requires verified costs that Glenfarne won't produce until mid-2027 — the producers face a familiar outcome.

The pipeline route through state land is broken. Without that route, there is no path south for North Slope gas. The precedent agreements — carefully structured to avoid binding commitment — expire without ever becoming binding contracts. The associated gas on the North Slope continues to be reinjected. The monetization that has eluded these companies for fifty years continues to elude them.

This is not a catastrophic outcome for the producers. They structured their exposure to survive exactly this scenario. Their North Slope oil production continues regardless. Their balance sheets are protected. Their shareholders are not exposed to a stranded pipeline investment.

But it is a significant outcome for Alaska. Because the gas stays stranded. The revenue stays unrealized. The Cook Inlet supply crisis continues unaddressed. And the window of geopolitical demand — Middle East disruption driving Asian buyers toward Pacific suppliers — closes while Alaska argues over a cost estimate nobody will release.

The Irony Glenfarne Cannot Escape

Glenfarne has presented the producer agreements as the project's strongest evidence of commercial viability. But those agreements are structured specifically to survive the project's failure. Their very design reflects the producers' assessment that failure remains a live possibility — one they have experienced before and prepared for again.

The producers are not obstructing this project. They are participating in it on terms that protect them if it fails — as it has failed before. That is not pessimism. That is the rational behavior of companies that have held stranded gas assets on the North Slope for fifty years and know exactly what stranded looks like.

Glenfarne holds the one thing that could break the stranding cycle — a verified cost estimate that would allow the ROW conversion to proceed on solid legal footing, the tax structure to be set on defensible arithmetic, and the FID to be made on real numbers. It commissioned that estimate. It received it. It will not release it.

Until it does, the producers' safety net remains exactly that — a net designed to catch them when the project falls. And North Slope gas remains what it has been since 1977.

Stranded.

What Fifty Years Teaches

The North Slope producers have been here before. They know that good geology, strong demand, and political support are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a gas pipeline to be built. They know that cost is the variable that has killed every prior attempt — not at the concept stage, but at the moment when real numbers replaced projections.

They signed precedent agreements because they want this project to succeed. They structured those agreements as a safety net because they have learned not to assume it will.

The legislature, the DNR commissioner, and the people of Alaska deserve the same protection the producers built for themselves — the right to see the real number before making commitments that cannot be undone.

Release the Worley estimate. Convert the ROW leases on verified information. Let the producers convert their safety nets into binding contracts. That is the sequence that actually builds a pipeline.

The Lever Nobody Is Using | Thomas Lamb
Notes on Alaska Energy & Public Policy
Thomas Lamb
Alaska LNG · Right-of-Way · State Land Law · Public Interest

The Lever Nobody Is Using

While the legislature fights over the tax bill in special session, a quieter and more durable protection sits unused in Alaska land law. Construction cannot begin on state land until the state says so. The state hasn't said so yet. And Glenfarne just admitted it won't know what this project costs until mid-2027.

Everyone is watching the special session. The governor vetoed the pension bill. Lawmakers are being called back to Juneau. The pressure is intense and the timeline is brutal. In all of that noise, a critical legal fact about this project has gone completely unnoticed in the public debate.

Before one shovel of dirt moves on Alaska state land, Glenfarne needs the state's permission. Not the legislature's permission on a tax bill. The DNR commissioner's permission to convert conditional right-of-way leases into full construction leases. That conversion has not happened. It requires a public interest finding. And Glenfarne just acknowledged it won't have verified project costs until mid-2027.

Those two facts together create a legal problem that no amount of political pressure resolves. A public interest finding made before verified costs exist is a finding made on incomplete information. It is administratively and legally vulnerable on its face. And nobody in the public debate has said so yet.

What the Law Actually Requires

The Alaska LNG pipeline crosses 807 miles of terrain. Approximately 230 miles cross federal land — mostly along the existing Trans-Alaska Pipeline corridor. The remainder crosses state and private land. For state land, right-of-way leases are required under AS 38.35.

In April 2021, the state issued two conditional right-of-way leases for the pipeline and associated facilities on state-owned land. The word "conditional" is doing critical legal work here.

AS 38.35.100(b) — Conditional ROW Leases

Conditional right-of-way leases were issued April 13, 2021 for the pipelines under AS 38.35.100(b). These leases require conversion under AS 38.35.100(a) before construction may begin. These leases are only applicable on state-owned lands.

AS 38.35.100(a) — Conversion Requirement

Before a conditional ROW lease converts to a full construction lease, the commissioner must consider the public interest and issue written findings substantiating the decision to allow the conversion. The commissioner must also approve any transfer of control of the lessee — defined as transfer of 30% or more of ownership interest.

The conversion has not happened. Construction cannot legally begin on state land without it. The commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources must make a written public interest finding before Glenfarne can break ground on any state-owned portion of the 807-mile route.

The Cost Problem That Makes the Finding Impossible

Here is what Glenfarne has told the world about its own project costs, in sequence:

Glenfarne's Shifting Cost Timeline
What Glenfarne Said
When
May 2025 Hired Worley to produce a final cost estimate "in sufficient detail to achieve FID." Work begins immediately. FID anticipated late 2025.
Implication Cost estimate would be complete and sufficient for a go/no-go decision by end of 2025.
Early 2026 Cost estimate exists but is confidential — cannot be shared because it could affect commercial negotiations.
Implication The number exists. Glenfarne has it. The legislature cannot see it.
May 2026 Developers acknowledge no overall cost estimate will be available before mid-2027. FID for pipeline targeted 2026, FID for export terminal early 2027.
Implication The legislature is being asked to pass tax certainty legislation — and the DNR commissioner is being asked to convert ROW leases — before verified costs exist.

Mid-2027. That is when Glenfarne says verified project costs will be available. Not late 2025 as originally promised. Not early 2026. Mid-2027 — a full eighteen months after Glenfarne took majority control of the project and nearly two years after Worley was hired to produce a final cost estimate for FID.

Why the ROW Conversion Cannot Proceed

The DNR commissioner's public interest finding is not a rubber stamp. It is a substantive administrative determination that construction proceeding on state land serves the public interest of Alaskans. That finding must be made in writing and is subject to legal challenge.

What would a defensible public interest finding require? At minimum:

Elements of a Defensible Public Interest Finding
1
Verified project costs. You cannot find that a project serves the public interest without knowing what it costs. Cost determines economic viability, tax revenue projections, energy price impacts, and risk to the state.
2
Verified financing structure. A project that cannot be financed does not serve the public interest regardless of its merits. Financing depends on verified costs.
3
Verified in-state gas pricing. The core public benefit claim — affordable gas for Alaskans — depends entirely on project economics. Those economics depend on verified costs.
4
Verified revenue to state and boroughs. The $26 billion revenue projection cited by the governor derives from cost assumptions. Without verified costs, that projection is arithmetic built on an unknown variable.

Every single element of a defensible public interest finding depends on verified project costs. Glenfarne says those costs won't be verified until mid-2027. A commissioner who signs a public interest finding before mid-2027 is signing a finding that cannot be substantiated by the information that exists at the time of signing.

A public interest finding made before verified costs exist is not a finding. It is a wish dressed up in administrative language. And wishes are not a legal basis for converting state land rights.

The Commitment Sequence Glenfarne Is Demanding

Step back and look at what Glenfarne is asking Alaska to commit to — and when — against the timeline of when costs will actually be known.

What Alaska Is Being Asked to Commit — Before Costs Are Known
1
Tax certainty legislation — now, special session May 2026. Generational restructuring of property tax based on a cost number that won't be verified until mid-2027.
2
ROW lease conversion on state land — before construction begins. A public interest finding certifying construction serves Alaskans — before the cost that determines whether it does is known.
3
Construction authorization — targeted late 2026. Breaking ground on an $11 billion Phase One pipeline before the $11 billion figure is verified.
4
Full project cost — mid-2027. The number that justifies every prior commitment. Available only after every prior commitment has been made.

The sequence is not accidental. Each commitment is extracted before the information that would allow Alaska to evaluate it arrives. By the time costs are verified in mid-2027, the tax structure will be locked in, the ROW leases will have converted, and construction will have begun. Alaska will have no leverage left at the only moment when it will finally know what it agreed to.

The Transfer That Also Requires Commissioner Approval

There is one more provision of AS 38.35.100 that deserves attention. The statute requires the commissioner to approve any transfer of 30% or more of ownership interest in the conditional ROW lessee.

When AGDC transferred 75% of 8 Star Alaska to Glenfarne in March 2025, that was a transfer of 75% of the entity holding the conditional ROW leases — well above the 30% threshold. The public record does not show a commissioner's written public interest finding approving that transfer. If that approval was not obtained, the transfer of the conditional leases to an entity majority-controlled by Glenfarne may not have been properly authorized under Alaska land law.

That is a question the legislature — or any interested Alaskan — has standing to ask the DNR commissioner to answer publicly.

The Lever

The legislature has spent this entire session fighting over the tax bill. That fight is real and important. But it is not the only fight available — and it may not be the most durable one.

The conditional ROW lease conversion is a separate, independent decision point that does not require a legislative majority. It requires one thing: a DNR commissioner willing to apply the public interest standard the statute requires, rather than treating the conversion as a formality to be completed on Glenfarne's schedule.

The commissioner cannot make a defensible written public interest finding before verified costs exist. Glenfarne has acknowledged those costs won't exist until mid-2027. Therefore the ROW conversion cannot defensibly proceed until mid-2027 at the earliest.

That is not obstruction. That is Alaska land law doing exactly what it was written to do — ensuring that before Alaska's public land is committed to a private developer's construction project, a substantive determination has been made that the commitment serves the public interest.

The Question for the Commissioner

Governor Dunleavy is calling the legislature back into special session to pass tax legislation this week. The same governor's DNR commissioner controls whether the conditional ROW leases on state land ever convert to construction leases.

The question is simple: On what verified information would the commissioner base a written finding that construction proceeding on state land serves the public interest of Alaskans — when Glenfarne has acknowledged that the verified cost of what is being built will not be known until mid-2027?

If the commissioner cannot answer that question, the conversion cannot proceed. And if the conversion cannot proceed, construction cannot begin on state land — regardless of what happens in special session.

The lever exists. It is grounded in statute. It has never been used. It should be.