Saturday, November 21, 2026

No Priests Left: The Erasure of Catholic Life in Russian-Occupied Ukraine

No Priests Left
Faith & WarOccupied Ukraine

Religious freedom

No Priests Left: The Erasure of Catholic Life in Russian-Occupied Ukraine

Inside Russia, the Catholic Church survives by keeping its head down. In the Ukrainian lands Russia now controls, it has been banned, its clergy jailed or expelled, and its churches sealed.

November 21, 20268 min read

Catholics are a tiny minority in Russia, roughly half a percent of the population. The Church is legally registered there. It holds Mass openly, and it has learned to avoid anything that looks like recruiting Orthodox believers. That caution has bought it a fragile tolerance.

Across the front line, the story is completely different. In the parts of Ukraine that Russia has occupied since 2022, Catholic leaders say their church has effectively ceased to exist. This post traces how that happened and why.

The order nobody saw for a year

In December 2023, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) announced that it had just found an order dated December 26, 2022. In it, the Russian-installed authorities in occupied Zaporizhzhia region banned all of the church's activities in the territory they controlled.

The ban did not stop at the church. It also outlawed Caritas, the worldwide Catholic Church's humanitarian agency, and the Knights of Columbus, a Catholic fraternal and charitable order. The order also told local officials to:

What the Zaporizhzhia order required

  • Cancel the church's leases on buildings and land.
  • Refuse to register any Greek Catholic community under Russian law.
  • Transfer the church's property to the occupation administration.

The Greek Catholic Church was one of four religious groups banned by the region's Russian-installed governor that month. Forum 18, an independent religious-freedom monitor, reports that occupation officials refused to answer questions about the ban.

Russia's stated reasons

The order gave several justifications. It claimed that explosives and firearms had been stored in church buildings. It accused parishioners of joining riots and anti-Russian activity. It said UGCC communities took part in extremist organizations and spread "neo-Nazi" propaganda, echoing the Kremlin's justification for the invasion itself. It also alleged that the Knights of Columbus were linked to Western intelligence services.

The Church rejects all of these claims as fabricated. No independent body has confirmed any of them.

The priests of Berdyansk

The case that drew the most attention began before the ban was even signed. When Russia invaded in February 2022, two Redemptorist priests, Fr. Ivan Levytskyi and Fr. Bohdan Heleta, chose to stay with their parish in Berdyansk, a port city on the Sea of Azov. They served both Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic believers there.

On November 16, 2022, Russian forces arrested them. According to the Church, soldiers planted military items and extremist literature in their church. The priests were accused of "subversive" and "guerrilla" activity and of illegally possessing weapons. Church leaders said they had reports that both men were being tortured. After the arrests, the local Greek Catholic churches were forcibly closed.

For a long stretch, their families and their order knew almost nothing about where they were. Then, on June 28, 2024, after more than 19 months in custody, both priests were freed in a prisoner exchange the Vatican helped to arrange. Pope Francis gave thanks for their release, and Ukraine's president publicly thanked the Holy See.

"Liquidated"

The same month the Berdyansk priests came home, the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Major Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk, described the situation in stark terms. He said the church had been liquidated in the occupied territories.

"There is not a single Catholic priest in the occupied territories today." Major Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk, June 2024

That applies to Roman Catholic clergy as well as Greek Catholic. Priests who tried to stay were arrested, deported or driven out. Churches in cities such as Mariupol were destroyed in the fighting. A Greek Catholic bishop who oversees eastern Ukraine has said his exarchate no longer has any priests in the occupied areas. He describes the churches there as destroyed, or closed with believers barred from attending.

The pressure did not end with the clergy gone. In 2025, the Kyiv-based Institute for Religious Freedom reported that armed men calling themselves "Cossacks" had seized Greek Catholic churches and nearby property and were blocking believers from entering to pray.

Why this church?

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is easy to misunderstand from outside. Its liturgy looks Orthodox, but it is in full communion with the Pope in Rome. That double identity has long put it in Moscow's crosshairs.

In 1946, Stalin's government staged a church council in Lviv that dissolved the Greek Catholic Church and folded it into the Russian Orthodox Church. Its bishops were arrested. Most died in Soviet prisons or camps. For more than four decades, the church survived underground, with secret ordinations and Masses in private homes, until it was legalized again in 1989.

Today it is closely bound up with Ukrainian national identity, especially in western Ukraine. From the Kremlin's point of view, that makes it a political institution as much as a religious one. When Shevchuk welcomed the released Berdyansk priests, he explicitly linked them to the church's Soviet-era martyrs.

The "Third Rome" backdrop

Russian state ideology increasingly draws on the 16th-century idea of Moscow as the "Third Rome": the last true center of Christianity after Rome drifted into error and Constantinople fell. In 2025, Putin repeated the idea on state television. In this view, a Ukrainian church loyal to the Pope is a rival claim on territory that Moscow considers its own spiritual space.

Not only Catholics

Catholics are not the only target. Religious-freedom monitors have documented pressure on Protestant churches, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which split from the Moscow Patriarchate. The common thread is that groups seen as independent of Moscow, or tied to the Ukrainian state or the West, face bans, raids and property seizures. Several Catholic leaders in the United States have launched a petition urging an end to this persecution, and a short documentary series titled No Priests Left appeared in February 2026.

Accountability

Ukraine has begun to pursue individual officials. In October 2026, Ukrainian prosecutors served a notice of suspicion on a Russian occupation official, Artem Sharlai, over the forced expulsion of Greek Catholic priests from occupied Melitopol. He is not in Ukrainian custody. Cases like this are mostly symbolic for now, but they create a record that could matter in any future reckoning.

Two churches, one policy

Set side by side, the two situations reveal a consistent logic. Inside Russia, a small, foreign-led Catholic Church that stays quiet and avoids converting Orthodox Russians poses no threat, so it is tolerated. In occupied Ukraine, a Catholic Church rooted in Ukrainian identity is treated as an enemy institution, so it is erased. The difference is not about theology. It is about whose side a church is seen to be on.

For the Catholics still living under occupation, the result is a faith practiced without priests, much as their grandparents practiced it under Stalin.

Sources

  1. Russian occupation authorities ban UGCC activities in the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia region, Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church
  2. Russia bans Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Catholic ministries in occupied region of Ukraine, National Catholic Reporter
  3. Occupied Ukraine: Zaporizhzhia priests still "disappeared", 4 churches banned, Forum 18 via Eurasia Review
  4. Russia is persecuting Christian churches in occupied Ukraine, Hudson Institute
  5. Zelensky thanks Holy See for its help in the release of two priests, Vatican News
  6. Pope praises release of two Ukrainian priests from Russian captivity, Catholic News Service
  7. "Not a single Catholic priest" left in Russian-occupied Ukraine, National Catholic Reporter
  8. Russian occupation forces close more Catholic churches in Ukraine, Catholic Review
  9. Russian forces are liquidating the Catholic Church in occupied Ukraine, National Catholic Register
  10. Russia's war on Ukraine means "No Priests Left," documentary shows, OSV News
  11. Russian occupation official suspected of persecuting Ukrainian Greek Catholic priests, Ukrainska Pravda
  12. Putin claims Moscow is the Third Rome, SPZh
Based on reporting by Catholic, Ukrainian and independent religious-freedom sources. Russian occupation authorities have largely declined to comment.

Friday, November 20, 2026

The Ballots Were Already in the Box

The Justice Department now says its lawsuit over Alaska's U.S. Senate race is moot. Its reason: on Election Day, ballots were commingled in the ballot box, and nothing on them shows who cast them. But Alaskans had been commingling ballots that way since early voting opened on October 19. The Justice Department filed its lawsuit three days later.

The timeline

  • June 15, 2026: The Division of Elections finds that Daniel J. Sullivan's candidacy was meant to confuse voters.
  • June 29: The Alaska Supreme Court allows him on the ballot.
  • October 19: Early voting opens across Alaska. Early ballots go into ballot boxes and tabulators, with nothing tying them to the voter.
  • October 22: The Justice Department sues to stop certification if Senator Dan Sullivan loses, "pending an investigation" into whether votes for Daniel J. Sullivan were meant for the senator.
  • November 1: Chief Judge Sharon L. Gleason dismisses the case for lack of standing. The same day, the Justice Department appeals. It does not ask the Ninth Circuit for emergency relief or a faster schedule.
  • November 3: Election Day.
  • November 17: The Associated Press projects that Mary Peltola has won.
  • November 19: The Justice Department tells the Ninth Circuit that the case is moot and asks the court to vacate Judge Gleason's ruling.

What page 6 says

In its November 19 brief, the Justice Department explains why the case is moot. Because ballots were "comingled [sic] in the ballot box," it wrote, "[t]hose ballots cast for Daniel J. Sullivan therefore bear no information or documentation identifying who cast which votes." It "reluctantly acknowledges that there no longer exists any means" of determining whether those votes were meant for Senator Sullivan.

That is true. It was also true on October 22. Ballots cast during the first three days of early voting were already in the box, untraceable to any voter, before the lawsuit was filed. By the Justice Department's own reasoning on page 6, part of the injury it sued over was beyond any remedy the day the suit began.

Yet three pages later, the same brief says the relief it wanted "would have redressed the claimed injury at the time this lawsuit . . . [was] filed." Both statements cannot be true for ballots that were already in the box.

Why it matters

Mootness and standing sound similar, but they lead to different places. A case is moot when it was alive at the start and later events ended it. When that happens by chance, appeals courts usually vacate the lower court's ruling so that it carries no weight. A case without standing was never properly in court at all. The Ninth Circuit measures standing "as of the commencement of litigation," and there is no ruling to erase because of later events.

Judge Gleason held that the Justice Department lacked standing because no court could order an inquiry into what voters meant without breaking the secrecy of the ballot. The early-voting timeline shows that the problem was not created by Election Day. It existed the day the lawsuit was filed, and it is the same problem the Justice Department now calls mootness.

The timing of the appeal points the same way. The government had 60 days to appeal and took none of them. It appealed the day of dismissal, two days before the election, and then asked for nothing that could have kept ballots separate. It raised mootness for the first time only after the race was called.

The Justice Department's only reason for asking the court to erase Judge Gleason's ruling is its statement on page 6 that commingled ballots can never be traced. That statement does not support vacatur. It confirms the ruling. The same untraceable ballots were in the box the day the suit was filed.

The voters' groups defending the election have asked the Ninth Circuit to find the appeal frivolous. Under the court's own standard, which the Justice Department quotes, an appeal is frivolous "when the result is obvious, or the appellant's arguments of error are wholly without merit." An appeal that concedes no court can grant the relief it seeks, while insisting that relief was possible all along, shows how little the case ever had to stand on.

The secret ballot did its job

No ballot in Alaska tells anyone who cast it. That is by design. The Alaska Constitution guarantees secrecy in voting (art. V, § 3), and the vote is read from the ballot itself, as the voter marked it. Whether the ballots were cast on October 19 or on November 3, no court could ask Alaskans afterward what they meant.

The voters' groups that defended the election will reply to the Justice Department by November 27, and then the Ninth Circuit will decide. However it rules, the record already shows that the ballots were in the box before the lawsuit was filed.

Friday, November 13, 2026

Peltola Overperforms, Sullivan Underperforms Relative to 2024 Presidential Baseline

Peltola Overperforms, Sullivan Underperforms Relative to 2024 Presidential Baseline

Unofficial first-choice results from the Alaska Division of Elections (November 12, 2026 update). Data sourced directly from the official Statement of Votes Cast and Election Summary Report.

In the 2026 U.S. Senate race, Democrat Mary Peltola has run well ahead of Kamala Harris’s 2024 presidential performance across Alaska, while Republican incumbent Dan Sullivan has fallen short of Donald Trump’s 2024 share. This pattern is visible both statewide and in solidly conservative districts such as House District 25 (Palmer/Butte area).

House District 25 — A Conservative Benchmark

House District 25 is one of Alaska’s more Republican districts. In the 2024 presidential election it voted for Trump by a wide margin.

Candidate / Race Votes Share
2024 President — Donald Trump (R) 6,891 65.9%
2024 President — Kamala Harris (D) 3,172 30.3%
Margin: Trump +35.6 points
2026 Senate — Dan S. Sullivan (R) 5,137 57.82%
2026 Senate — Mary Peltola (D) 3,336 37.55%
Margin: Sullivan +20.3 points

Performance comparison in HD25:

  • Peltola: +7.25 points relative to Harris (37.55% vs. 30.3%)
  • Sullivan: –8.1 points relative to Trump (57.82% vs. 65.9%)

Statewide First-Choice Results

Candidate Votes Share
Mary Peltola (DEM) 125,157 49.2%
Dan S. Sullivan (REP) 119,357 47.0%
Gerald L. Heikes (REP) 5,490 2.2%
Daniel J. Sullivan Jr. 4,199 1.7%

Source: Alaska Division of Elections Election Summary Report, November 12, 2026 (unofficial).

Compared with the 2024 presidential election (Trump 54.5%, Harris 41.4%):

  • Peltola is running approximately +7.8 points ahead of Harris’s statewide share.
  • Sullivan is running approximately –7.5 points behind Trump’s statewide share.

Summary

Using the official first-choice totals released by the Alaska Division of Elections, Mary Peltola has consistently outperformed the 2024 Democratic presidential baseline, while Dan Sullivan has underperformed the 2024 Republican presidential baseline. This relative shift is evident even in a strongly conservative district such as HD25, where Peltola still trails but by a substantially narrower margin than Harris did two years earlier.

All figures above are unofficial Round 1 (first-choice) results as of the November 12, 2026 update from the Alaska Division of Elections.

Thursday, November 12, 2026

Alaska House 2026: Begich Lead Narrows as Hafner Draws Heavy Support

Alaska House 2026: Begich Lead Narrows as Hafner Draws Heavy Support

Alaska House 2026: Begich Lead Narrows as Hafner Draws Heavy Support

Unofficial first-choice results – race will go to ranked-choice voting

Election Day only: Begich led by roughly 9.5–10 points (~49.6–50.1% to Hill’s ~40%)
After major post-Election Day drops: Lead has narrowed to 7.4 points

Current totals (11/12 report):

Nick Begich (R): 123,241 votes – 48.55%

Bill Hill (I): 104,460 votes – 41.15%

Eric Hafner (D): 19,032 votes – 7.50%

Jim McDermott (L): 6,726 votes – 2.65%

Key trend: Early and absentee ballots counted since Election Day have been relatively better for Hill than the Election Day vote. The largest single drop went only 46% Begich to 42.6% Hill, cutting the lead by roughly 2–3 points overall.
Hafner’s share: Eric Hafner, running from federal prison in New York, has taken 19,032 first-choice votes (7.50%). That is a notably high total for a candidate who has never lived in Alaska and is not actively campaigning in the state. Those ballots will be redistributed in the ranked-choice tabulation.
Race will go to RCV: With Begich at 48.55% of first-choice votes, he remains short of the 50% majority needed to win outright. The race will go to ranked-choice voting on November 18 to decide the final tally. Hafner’s and McDermott’s second choices will determine the outcome.
Unofficial analysis based on Alaska Division of Elections data. Informational only.
Alaska Senate 2026: Peltola’s Share of Each Vote Drop

Alaska Senate 2026: Peltola’s Share of Each Vote Drop

Unofficial first-choice results – updated 11/12/2026

Mary Peltola started behind on Election Day. She moved ahead as early and absentee ballots were counted. Her share of each major drop shows how the race changed.

Election Day only
Peltola share: ~47%
Sullivan led by +8,153
Early Voting added (~65,000–70,000 ballots)
Peltola share: ~55–56%
Race flipped — Peltola took the lead by +1,265
Nov 9 drop (~4,900–5,000 ballots)
Peltola share: ~61%
Lead grew to +2,517
Nov 10–11 large drop (~24,300 ballots)
Peltola share: ~52%
Lead grew to +4,250
Nov 11 later drop (~5,600 ballots)
Peltola share: ~46%
Lead narrowed to +3,975 (heavier Mat-Su / conservative areas)
Latest drop – 11/12 (~5,685 ballots)
Peltola share: 64.6%
+3,670 for Peltola / +1,845 for Sullivan
Lead expanded to +5,800

Current totals (after latest drop)

  • Mary Peltola: 125,157 (49.08%)
  • Dan S. Sullivan: 119,357 (46.80%)
  • Lead: +5,800
All numbers are unofficial first-choice totals from the Alaska Division of Elections. Alaska uses ranked-choice voting. Final certified results and any RCV tabulation will decide the race. Remaining ballots are still mostly absentee.
Unofficial analysis of vote-drop shares. Informational only.

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

Alaska Early Voting 2026: Older Voters Dominated the Lines — and the Numbers

Alaska Early Voting 2026: Older Voters Dominated the Lines — and the Numbers

Alaska Early Voting 2026: Older Voters Dominated the Lines — and the Numbers

Unofficial Senate update + age-group observations – 11/11/2026

On the first day of early voting at the Menard Sports Center, the line was mostly people 55 and older. Younger voters were sparse. That on-the-ground picture matches the statewide voter-file data on who actually showed up for early and absentee voting.

Age Composition of Early and Absentee Voters

L2 Data snapshots of Alaskans who had voted early or absentee (not candidate results):

  • As of 10/29 (~61,000 ballots):
    65+ = 44.0%  |  55–64 = 17.5%  |  45–54 = 10.4%  |  35–44 = 7.7%  |  under 35 = under 3%
  • As of 11/2 (~90,000 ballots):
    65+ = 41.1%  |  55–64 = 17.4%  |  45–54 = 10.9%  |  35–44 = 8.2%  |  under 35 still very small

Voters 55 and older made up the clear majority of early/absentee participation. The 65+ group alone was the single largest age bracket.

Party registration among those early/absentee voters was roughly Republican 27–28%, Democratic 18–19%, Nonpartisan ~19%, Unknown ~33–34%. Age, not just party, was the standout feature.

How That Lines Up with the Senate Race

Election Day only

Dan S. Sullivan: 78,394
Mary Peltola: 70,241

Sullivan led by ~8,153 votes.

After Early Voting was added

Mary Peltola: 107,848
Dan S. Sullivan: 106,583

Peltola took the lead by ~1,265 votes.

Current full count

Mary Peltola: 121,487 (~48.9%)
Dan S. Sullivan: 117,512 (~47.3%)

Peltola currently leads by ~3,975 votes.

The ballots that flipped the race — Early Voting and Absentee — are the same ballots that were heavily older. Peltola gained ~51,246 votes from those categories; Sullivan gained ~39,118. The age skew of early/absentee participation is part of the context for how the lead changed.

Remaining Ballots (Model Projection)

Definite remaining: ~36,682 (mostly absentee)

  • Current lead: Peltola +3,975
  • Projected final lead: ~+12,800 (Peltola 131,326 – Sullivan 118,503)

The model expects the outstanding absentee (concentrated in districts where counted absentee has favored Peltola) to continue the pattern. Whether the remaining ballots have the same age profile as the early ones is not known from the public data.

All candidate numbers are unofficial. Alaska uses ranked-choice voting. Final certified results and RCV will decide the race. Age data comes from third-party voter-file analysis (L2), not the Division of Elections result files.

Summary

  • Early and absentee voting in Alaska was dominated by older voters (55+, especially 65+).
  • That matched what was visible in line on the first day of early voting at the Menard Sports Center.
  • Those same ballot types flipped the Senate race from a Sullivan Election Day lead to a Peltola lead.
  • The remaining-ballot model projects the lead growing further before RCV.

Check the Alaska Division of Elections for certified totals.

Unofficial analysis and personal observation. Informational only.

Alaska U.S. Senate 2026 Unofficial Update

Alaska U.S. Senate 2026 Unofficial Update

Alaska U.S. Senate 2026: From Sullivan Lead to Peltola Edge

Unofficial – 11/11/2026 evening update

These figures are unofficial. Alaska uses ranked-choice voting. Remaining ballots and final RCV tabulation will decide the outcome.

Race Progression

Election Day Only

Dan S. Sullivan: 78,394
Mary Peltola: 70,241
Gerald L. Heikes: 4,350
Daniel J. Jr. Sullivan: 2,806

Sullivan led by ~8,153 votes.

After Early Voting Added

Mary Peltola: 107,848
Dan S. Sullivan: 106,583
Gerald L. Heikes: 5,032
Daniel J. Jr. Sullivan: 3,734

Peltola took the lead by ~1,265 votes.

Current Full Count (ED + Early + Absentee + Questioned)

Mary Peltola: 121,487 (~48.9%)
Dan S. Sullivan: 117,512 (~47.3%)
Gerald L. Heikes: 5,426 (~2.2%)
Daniel J. Jr. Sullivan: 4,100 (~1.6%)
Total: 248,525

Peltola currently leads by ~3,975 votes.

Ballot Type Breakdown

  • Election Day: Sullivan 78,394 – Peltola 70,241 (Sullivan leads)
  • Early Voting: Peltola 37,607 – Sullivan 28,189 (Peltola leads)
  • Absentee: Peltola 13,195 – Sullivan 10,021 (Peltola leads)
  • Questioned: Sullivan 908 – Peltola 444 (small volume)

Remaining Ballots & Projection

Definite remaining: ~36,682 ballots
(28,838 Absentee + 2,357 Early + 5,487 Questioned)

Model projection using observed Early/Absentee patterns:

  • Current counted lead: Peltola +3,975
  • Projected final: Peltola 131,326 – Sullivan 118,503
  • Projected lead: ~+12,800
  • Projected shares: Peltola 50.53% – Sullivan 45.60%

Outstanding ballots are projected to add roughly +8,800 net votes for Peltola before RCV.

Projection is a model estimate only. Actual remaining ballots may differ. RCV will reallocate votes from the minor candidates.

Highest-Volume Remaining Districts

  • HD-2: 3,519 remaining → net +1,266 for Peltola (proj. lead +1,991)
  • HD-3: 2,989 remaining → net +1,614 for Peltola (proj. lead +3,297)
  • HD-1: 2,245 remaining → net +444 for Peltola (proj. lead +73)
  • HD-6: 2,316 remaining → net +651 for Peltola (proj. lead +359)
  • HD-5: 2,090 remaining → net +627 for Peltola (proj. lead +833)
  • HD-36: 1,955 remaining → nearly neutral

Districts 7–8 and 25–30 have almost no remaining ballots, so large Sullivan leads there stay locked in.

Summary

  • Sullivan led by ~8,150 after Election Day.
  • Early Voting flipped the race

The Ukrainian Biolabs Narrative Was Used as a Post-Invasion Justification, Not the Reason Russia Invaded

The Ukrainian Biolabs Narrative Was Used as a Post-Invasion Justification, Not the Reason Russia Invaded

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 was publicly justified by the Kremlin on the grounds of “denazification,” protection of Russian speakers in the Donbas, and preventing further NATO expansion. The claim that U.S.-funded biological laboratories in Ukraine were producing bioweapons was not among those primary stated reasons in the run-up to the invasion. It was amplified afterward, becoming one of the wartime information-operation themes used to reinforce the military operation already underway.

That distinction matters for understanding the documented overlap between the real U.S. Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), the disinformation campaign linked to GRU Unit 29155 and John Mark Dougan (BadVolf), and later public statements by Tulsi Gabbard.

The Invasion and the Labs Narrative

The BTRP has supported Ukrainian laboratories, diagnostic sites, and biosafety work since 2005 (roughly $200 million for approximately 46 facilities). These are Ukrainian-owned facilities focused on pathogen detection, surveillance, and secure storage of legacy collections—not offensive bioweapons development. The Pentagon and U.S. officials have consistently described the program in those terms. (See the March 11, 2022 Pentagon BTRP fact sheet.)

Versions of the “U.S. bioweapons labs in Ukraine” story had circulated for years, including through Unit 29155-linked channels since at least 2018 and Dougan’s 2021 investigation. Dougan posted videos promoting the claims in early February 2022, in the weeks before the invasion. Once Russian forces crossed the border, the narrative was rapidly elevated:

  • March 6–7, 2022: Russian Ministry of Defense briefings alleged a U.S.-funded military-biological program and claimed Ukrainian forces were destroying pathogens to conceal it. Elements closely tracked Dougan’s earlier material.
  • Russian state media and officials framed the labs as a threat the “special military operation” was addressing.

In other words, the invasion supplied the wartime setting; the labs story was then deployed as supporting justification and hybrid-warfare messaging. It was not the original public casus belli.

Key Timeline (with Invasion as Inflection Point)

Date Event
2021 Dougan (BadVolf) publishes investigation alleging U.S. bioweapons activity in Ukrainian labs.
Early Feb 2022 Dougan posts videos promoting the claims and advertising tours of the facilities.
24 Feb 2022 Russia launches full-scale invasion. Primary stated reasons: denazification, Donbas, NATO. Biolabs narrative not central in pre-invasion messaging.
6–7 Mar 2022 Russian MoD elevates biolabs claims in formal briefings; alleges pathogen destruction to conceal program.
8 Mar 2022 Victoria Nuland testifies that Ukraine has biological research facilities; U.S. concerned Russian forces may seize them. Rejects bioweapons plotting claims. (C-SPAN clip)
11 Mar 2022 Pentagon BTRP fact sheet: ~$200 million since 2005 supporting 46 Ukrainian labs/health facilities for detection and diagnostics.
13 Mar 2022 Tulsi Gabbard video cites 25–30 U.S.-funded “bio labs” researching dangerous pathogens; calls for ceasefire around facilities until secured and pathogens destroyed. Sources: Nuland testimony, Pentagon fact sheet, contemporaneous reporting. (Video)
Mid-Mar 2022 Gabbard clarifies she is not alleging bioweapons labs.
May 2022 Hacked messages show GRU Unit 29155 officer asking Dougan to post specific biolabs material; he complies.
12 Jun 2026 As DNI, Gabbard releases declassified material on U.S. funding for 120+ biolabs in 30+ countries (including dozens in Ukraine). Notes hazardous pathogens, some gain-of-function work, limited oversight, and prior vulnerability assessments. Does not substantiate offensive weapons program. (ODNI release)
13 Jun 2026 Dougan messages FSB handler: “You see Tulsi Gabbard confirmed my biolabs findings?”

Dougan, Unit 29155, and the Amplification

Dougan fled to Russia in 2016 after legal issues in Florida. Under the BadVolf persona he has operated networks mixing reporting with disinformation and has documented contacts with officers linked to GRU Unit 29155 (the unit tied to sabotage, assassination attempts, and hybrid operations) and FSB handlers. Independent reporting based on hacked correspondence (notably The Insider) shows Unit 29155 involvement in promoting the biolabs conspiracy from 2018 onward, with Dougan’s 2021 work and early-2022 activity feeding into the post-invasion Russian MoD briefings. The May 2022 request from a Unit 29155-linked officer for specific posts further ties the effort to military-intelligence channels.

Gabbard’s Statements

Gabbard’s March 13, 2022 video—issued about two and a half weeks after the invasion began—focused on the risk of pathogen release from research facilities in an active war zone. She drew from then-current U.S. official statements (Nuland and the Pentagon fact sheet) rather than from Dougan’s material. She did not assert that the labs were producing biological weapons. Critics accused her of amplifying Russian propaganda; the factual core she cited (existence of U.S.-funded pathogen-research facilities) had already been confirmed by U.S. officials. The 2026 DNI release added detail on scale and holdings of the same long-running program but did not convert it into evidence of an offensive bioweapons effort.

Overlaps Without Coordination

The overlaps are chronological and narrative:

  • Pre-invasion material from Dougan and Unit 29155-linked channels existed.
  • The invasion created the wartime context.
  • Russian official channels then used the labs as a reinforcing justification.
  • Gabbard’s 2022 comments addressed documented U.S. program details and wartime security risks.
  • The 2026 declassification supplied additional transparency on the same BTRP network, which Dougan and Russian state media treated as validation of their broader narrative.

The documented U.S. program is a real biosafety and threat-reduction effort. The claim that it constituted bioweapons development has not been substantiated by the released U.S. materials. Pathogen security in a conflict zone and oversight of gain-of-function research remain legitimate issues; equating the BTRP labs with biological weapons production does not follow from the record.

Primary sources include the March 2022 Pentagon BTRP fact sheet, Nuland’s Senate testimony, Gabbard’s March 2022 video and clarifications, the June 2026 ODNI release, and reporting on Dougan’s correspondence. Additional unredacted assessments would allow finer evaluation of specific pathogen inventories and research protocols.

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

Did Russia need SpaceX's help to catch X36?

As of November 10, 2026

Bottom line: Russia's Cosmos 2612 approach to ICEYE-X36 on Oct 15–18, 2026 is real, and the U.S. has called it out at the UN. The claim that SpaceX enabled it is not supported: its key legal premise misreads the FCC license, and Russia set up the approach before the Starlink alert existed.

The report's thesis

The Pirrong / R.A.B. report argues that SpaceX posted a misleading 401 m Starlink collision alert on Oct 15. Under FCC "Condition 16," the authors say, that alert legally froze X36, letting Cosmos 2612 sprint in and hold within about 640 m for more than 40 hours. They tie this to the Oct 13–14 Starshield speed cap in Ukraine and a White House push for a deal with Putin.

What holds up: the close approach, the speed cap, Putin's Oct 28 "Mr. Musk" remark, Hegseth's "terms of service" comment, and the Oct 15 Ryazan refinery strike all happened. What doesn't: the causal chain linking them to SpaceX.

The decisive questions

1. Did Russia need SpaceX's help to catch X36?

Probably not. Russia began the approach before the alert, and X36's orbit is published in the public U.S. satellite catalog. A target that isn't dodging can be reached with public data.

Date (2026)Event
Sept 30Cosmos 2612 starts maneuvering toward X36 (Vantor)
Oct 12~27.9 m/s burn matches X36's altitude, inclination and plane (Defense News)
Oct 13Trailing X36 in the same orbit, ~475 km behind (Le Grand Continent)
Oct 15, 04:15 UTCStarlink 401 m collision alert against X36 (per the report)
Oct 16Final close-approach burn; holds within ~5 km, later closer

2. Did the Starlink alert legally freeze X36?

No. Condition 16 of FCC Order DA 23-797 requires ICEYE to assess collision risk and mitigate it if necessary: contact the other operator, share trajectory data, or modify its attitude or operations. Nothing bars maneuvering or puts ICEYE under SpaceX's control. This is the report's central error.

3. Was the 401 m alert abnormal?

Unknown. The claim that SpaceX's internal data showed a ~2 km miss is the authors' reconstruction, not independently confirmed. Alerts are routine and conservative: SpaceX logged about 164,000 potential collision events in six months, most not imminent (Aerospace Global News).

Who can settle it: the U.S. Space Force's own warning for the pair, and SpaceX's and ICEYE's alert logs.

4. Did X36 deliberately hold still, and why?

Open — the decisive question. ICEYE has dodged before: after a pass within ~2.5 km on May 26, its CEO said it maneuvered (United24). For October, ICEYE said only that it was tracking the situation and that its constellation is built for resilience (Boston Globe).

There are innocent reasons not to dodge: X36 weighs about 90 kg, and escape burns spend scarce propellant and shorten its life (Scientific American). Only ICEYE can settle this.

5. Is there evidence SpaceX coordinated with Russia?

None public. Independent tracking documents the Russian maneuvers but not SpaceX involvement (Runtimewire). Putin's Oct 28 remark was a general comment about not interfering with each other in orbit, made while touring an exhibition (Euronews).

Who can settle it: congressional or Inspector General access to communications records.

6. Was X36 harmed, and what did Russia gain?

No physical harm seen; intelligence gain unknown. ICEYE says X36 remains productive (Aerospace Global News), and tracker Marco Langbroek saw no orbital disturbance (X). Jamming or signals collection would not show in orbital data (Diplomacy and Law). The U.S. told the UN First Committee the behavior was consistent with on-orbit weapons operations. The report's "radar fingerprint" theft is physically plausible but unverified.

7. Who ordered the Starshield speed cap, and is it linked?

Disputed; no link beyond timing. Reuters, citing U.S. officials, said the directive came from the White House; Musk said speed limits are a U.S. military and presidential decision (Tech Insider). Musk and Trump both deny ordering it (The Next Web). Hegseth pointed to Starlink's terms of service (Devdiscourse).

8. Is ICEYE-X37 next?

Partly corroborated. Analyst Greg Gillinger flagged Cosmos 2611 and 2613 moving toward X37's orbital plane (Diario Bitcoin). The report's precise lock-on figures are unverified.

What would close the case

One answer from ICEYE would decide most of it. If the alert played no role in its decision, the SpaceX thesis collapses; if it did, questions 3 and 5 become urgent.

  1. ICEYE states whether it received the Oct 15 alert and whether it held its orbit because of it.
  2. The Space Force releases its own conjunction warning for X36 and STARLINK-35856, to compare with SpaceX's 401 m figure.
  3. Investigators obtain any SpaceX–Russia contact records for October 2026.

Sources

Alaska Voters Know How to Vote

Alaska voters know how to mark a ballot, and the law trusts them to do it. That is the point the U.S. Justice Department's lawsuit over our Senate race tried to unsettle.

The Justice Department asked a federal judge to hold up certification of Alaska's U.S. Senate race. It wanted time to investigate whether votes cast for the candidate Daniel J. Sullivan were really "meant" for Senator Dan Sullivan. As its amended complaint put it, that relief was needed only if Senator Sullivan did not win.

What the court decided

On November 1, 2026, Chief Judge Sharon L. Gleason dismissed the case. She held that the United States lacked standing because it could not identify any lawful remedy for the injury it claimed.

The reason was simple. The only way to learn what a voter "meant" is to find out who cast a ballot and ask. The court found the government had offered "no explanation" of how ballot segregation and a court-ordered investigation by law enforcement into voters' intent "could be implemented while preserving the secrecy of the ballot." Relief like that would violate Alaskans' right to a secret ballot.

The decision is now cited as United States v. Alaska, 2026 WL 3271034 (D. Alaska Nov. 1, 2026). The dismissal was without prejudice, as the law requires when a court lacks jurisdiction.

Your ballot speaks for itself

A secret ballot means no one, including the government, gets to ask you afterward what you meant. The Alaska Constitution guarantees it (art. V, § 3). Alaska's rules of evidence let every voter refuse to say how they voted (Evid. R. 507). The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that the secret ballot exists to protect voters from intimidation and fraud.

Alaska reads a vote from the ballot itself:

  • The marks count. A mark counts if it is inside the oval or touching it so as to show the voter's choice clearly. When a ballot needs a closer look, it is set aside because of its marks, not because of who cast it.
  • Intent comes from the ballot. In the 2010 Senate race, the Alaska Supreme Court held that "a voter's intention is paramount," and it read that intention from the ballot, not from interviews.
  • Ranked choice carries your own choices. If your first choice is eliminated, your vote moves to the next candidate you ranked. A voter who ranked Daniel J. Sullivan first and Senator Sullivan second has that vote count for Senator Sullivan, with no investigation needed.

That last point matters. Any voter who truly wanted Senator Sullivan, and ranked him, will have that choice counted the way the ballot shows.

A lawsuit that doubts the voter

I believe this lawsuit was brought for political advantage, not to protect anyone's vote. The public record points that way. The relief was sought only if one candidate lost. And, as quoted in the voter groups' November 9 motion, President Trump said of the lawsuit: "I'm the one that said do it."

What troubles me most is the message it sends to voters. In an October 30 statement posted by the Justice Department, a federal official said law enforcement was working to make sure "your vote counts in a way that you meant and intended it to count." Read plainly, that assumes Alaskans cannot be trusted to mark their own ballots, and that the government should check.

Arguably, the lawsuit did more than doubt voters. It asked a court to set aside protections for the secret ballot that states adopted more than a century ago and that courts have upheld ever since. The remedy it sought, asking voters what they meant, would itself have injured the very voters the law protects.

I see it the other way. My choice is mine to make and mine to keep private. If a voter is confused, the answer is better information before the election, not an investigation after it.

The courts have long said that complaints about who is on the ballot belong at the ballot box, not in a lawsuit after the votes are in.

Where the case stands

The Justice Department appealed the same day the case was dismissed. The appeal is United States of America v. State of Alaska, et al., No. 26-7304, in the Ninth Circuit.

On November 9, the League of Women Voters of Alaska, Common Cause and two Alaska voters asked the Ninth Circuit to affirm the dismissal without full briefing. They also asked the court to consider sanctions for a frivolous appeal. The Justice Department's response is due in the coming days.

Meanwhile, the count continues. Alaska will run its ranked-choice tabulation once all ballots are in, and the state will certify the winner. Under the U.S. Constitution, the Senate is the final judge of its own members' elections (art. I, § 5).

Trust the voter

Alaskans studied their ballots, ranked their choices and cast them in secret. That is how it should be. Whoever wins, the result should come from what voters marked, counted under Alaska law, not from what investigators decide we must have meant.

If Mary Peltola wins, it will not be because Daniel J. Sullivan's name was on the ballot. It will be because a majority of the votes counted in the final ranked-choice round went to her, as the voters themselves marked them.

The ballot box, not the courthouse, is where voters settle elections.

Sources

  • United States v. Alaska, No. 3:26-cv-00376-SLG, 2026 WL 3271034 (D. Alaska Nov. 1, 2026) (order of dismissal, Dkt. 79)
  • United States of America v. State of Alaska, et al., No. 26-7304 (9th Cir.), docket
  • Appellees' Motion for Summary Affirmance, No. 26-7304, Dkt. 10 (Nov. 9, 2026), PDF
  • Alaska Const. art. V, § 3; Alaska R. Evid. 507; Alaska Stat. § 15.15.360
  • Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)
  • Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867 (Alaska 2010)
  • Kohlhaas v. State, 518 P.3d 1095 (Alaska 2022)
  • U.S. Const. art. I, § 5

Monday, November 09, 2026

Smolensk Plane Crash Revisited Using AI

Smolensk Tu-154: Callouts, Decision Height, and Radar Line-of-Sight

Scope. The following is limited to the radar callouts as transmitted, the geometry of the 100 m decision height relative to runway 26, the terrain profile on final, and the documented effect of that terrain and intervening trees on radar visibility. No investigator conclusions are restated.

1. Radar callouts as given

The landing-zone controller issued a sequence of distance-and-path reports, each in the form “[distance] on course, on glideslope”:

  • ~8 km — on course, on glideslope
  • ~6 km — on course, on glideslope
  • ~4 km — on course, on glideslope
  • ~3 km — on course, on glideslope
  • ~2 km — on course, on glideslope

No callout in that sequence indicated a course or glideslope deviation or directed a go-around. Under the protocol of a radar-assisted approach, “on course, on glideslope” means the aircraft is inside the allowable tolerance. The first non-affirmative instruction (“Horizon 101”) occurred only after the aircraft was already well below 100 m.

2. Position at 100 m decision height

On the published ~2°40'–3° glideslope, 100 m above runway elevation places an aircraft approximately 1.9–2.3 km from the threshold of runway 26. Both the recorded flight path and the controller’s “2 km” call place the aircraft near that distance when it reached 100 m. At that range, and with reported visibility of 200–400 m, neither the runway threshold nor the mobile APM projectors (sited ~200 m from the threshold) were within visual range.

3. Terrain relative to runway elevation

The approach crosses a depression before the threshold. Terrain elevation in that area is lower than the runway. The first tree strike occurred ~1,100 m from the threshold while the aircraft was already ~15 m below runway elevation. An aircraft reporting 100 m radio altitude over the depression is therefore lower relative to the runway surface than the same reading would indicate over flat ground.

4. Radar line-of-sight at low altitude

Trees along the final approach exceeded allowable obstacle-limitation heights in multiple segments between roughly 400 m and 900 m from the threshold (by 5–8 m in several places). Combined with the terrain depression, these trees reduced both optical and radar visibility of aircraft on final. Once an aircraft descended into the depression and below the height of the intervening trees, continuous radar contact was no longer assured. Contemporary technical assessments placed the practical end of reliable radar tracking in the last 1–1.5 km.

5. Callouts versus radar coverage

The final affirmative callout (“2 km on course, on glideslope”) was given as the aircraft entered the segment where terrain drop and intervening trees reduced or eliminated reliable radar contact. According to the content of the callouts, the aircraft was still being reported as on the correct path at that point. The first corrective instruction arrived only after the aircraft was well below 100 m and inside the zone where radar line-of-sight was compromised.

6. Recordings

The tower communications were transcribed, and those transcripts were published by both the Interstate Aviation Committee and the Polish side. The original physical tapes, however, were not released by Russia. Polish investigators worked from digital copies made under restricted field conditions in Russia. Requests for laboratory-quality copies of the original tapes were not fulfilled. That limitation applies to the entire tower record underlying the published transcripts.


Summary of callout content, decision-height geometry, terrain profile, and radar line-of-sight constraints only. No additional interpretation is added.