Saturday, May 30, 2026

The Courts Act Two Judges Move. 35 Former Judges File. The Fund Is Halted.

● Live — Courts Act on Fraud Allegations — May 29, 2026
The Constitutional Record · Update 05 of Series
Breaking Development

The Courts Act Two Judges Move.
35 Former Judges File.
The Fund Is Halted.
Everything We Documented Has Now Been Confirmed — In Open Court

In the ten days since the Anti-Weaponization Fund was announced, two federal courts have acted, 35 former federal judges from both parties have filed a fraud motion, and Judge Williams — the judge whose court was deceived — has opened a formal fraud inquiry. The legal noose we documented is now in the hands of the judiciary.

Judge Williams — Fraud Inquiry Opened
Judge Brinkema — Fund Halted
35 Former Judges — Collusion Brief Filed
June 12 — Trump Must Respond
DEV 01
Judge Williams Opens Formal Fraud Inquiry — Trump Must Respond by June 12
SDFL · Case 1:26-cv-20609 · Friday May 29, 2026 · Four-Page Order

Judge Kathleen Williams made a striking turnabout Friday, reopening President Donald Trump's $10 billion case against the IRS and saying that she wanted to investigate "grievous allegations" that the hasty deal to resolve it was "premised on deception."

"Here, the former judges advance grievous allegations that Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed this litigation solely to avoid judicial scrutiny of a lawsuit that 'was collusive from the start,' and was only filed to provide the imprimatur of legality for an unlawful settlement." — Judge Kathleen M. Williams, Order, May 29, 2026

Asserting that she was "empowered to investigate serious misconduct" in a case before her, she ordered Trump's lawyers to tell her by June 12 whether the case should be formally reopened because "the court was the victim of a fraud."

She directed the president to file a response by June 12, laying out their responses to the former judges' allegations of "collusion" and "deception," and the question of whether the case should be formally reopened.

She pointed to reporting by the New York Times that described how the IRS had prepared a 25-page memorandum outlining defenses against the suit that the Justice Department did not take up in court. This is the most significant new detail in the entire record — the IRS had its own defense strategy ready, and the DOJ suppressed it to allow Trump to win a case against his own agency.

DEV 02
Judge Brinkema Issues TRO — Fund Operations Completely Halted
Eastern District of Virginia · Temporary Restraining Order · All Fund Operations Blocked

US District Judge Leonie Brinkema has ordered a temporary halt on all operations of the Trump administration's Anti-Weaponization Fund. The brief order says the administration cannot take any action "pursuant to the creation or operation of the Anti-Weaponization Fund, which includes the transfer" of any funds.

The TRO was entered after a January 6 prosecutor and others sued to block the fund. The suit directly mirrors the legal argument we documented — that the fund constitutes an unconstitutional appropriation of public funds for political purposes without Congressional authorization.

Some lawmakers were concerned the funds would be awarded to people involved in the riots at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Rep. Mike Flood, R-Neb., told reporters he did not sign off on the creation of the fund and insisted that no taxpayer money should go to "any January 6 insurrectionist." "I do not think one penny of any fund should ever go to any January 6 insurrectionist that was in the Capitol," Flood said.

A Republican member of Congress publicly stating that no money from the fund should flow to January 6 defendants is significant — it confirms that even within Trump's own party, the fund's intended beneficiaries are indefensible as recipients of public funds.

DEV 03
35 Former Federal Judges File — Bipartisan · Both Parties · Rule 60 Motion
May 27, 2026 · Appointed by Presidents of Both Parties · Rule 60 FRCP

Nearly three dozen former federal judges appointed by presidents from both parties have joined a growing legal effort to upend the Trump administration's newly created $1.776 billion fund. The retired jurists are asking a judge in Miami to reverse her decision dismissing the extraordinary lawsuit.

The 35 judges say the lawsuit "is itself a fraud on the court." The settlement in the case, the former judges say, "was not, and never will be, legally justified." They pointed to the fact that the laws invoked by acting Attorney General Todd Blanche to establish the Anti-Weaponization Fund require "the existence of a legitimate litigation and not, as here, one that is collusive, feigned, or fraudulent."

"Movants are filing this motion because they have dedicated their professional lives to the administration of justice." — Brief of 35 Former Federal Judges, May 27, 2026

The bipartisan nature of this filing cannot be overstated. These are not political actors. They are former judges — appointed by presidents of both parties — who concluded that the integrity of the federal judiciary had been so seriously compromised that they were compelled to act. When 35 former judges file a brief calling a presidential lawsuit "collusive from the start," it is the most authoritative possible statement that the analysis we published was correct.

The IRS Had A 25-Page Defense. The DOJ Suppressed It.

New Revelation — Reported by The New York Times — Cited by Judge Williams in Her Order

The IRS prepared a 25-page memorandum outlining its defenses against Trump's lawsuit. The Department of Justice — which was nominally representing the IRS as defendant — did not take up those defenses in court. Judge Williams specifically cited this reporting in her fraud inquiry order.

This single fact transforms the entire legal picture. We documented that the case had no genuine adversarial parties — that Trump controlled both sides. The IRS's 25-page defense memo proves that the IRS itself knew it had a case, prepared its arguments, and was then prevented from making them by the very DOJ that was supposed to represent it.

The DOJ's decision not to use the IRS's own defense arguments is not passive negligence. It is active suppression of a genuine defense on behalf of a nominal client — the IRS — in order to allow the opposing party — Trump — to obtain a favorable outcome against his own agency. That is the textbook definition of collusive litigation.

The 25-page memo also means that somewhere in the DOJ or IRS files, there is a document that sets out in detail exactly why Trump's case was legally vulnerable. That document — which the DOJ refused to use — is now evidence in a fraud inquiry. Judge Williams knows it exists. The 35 former judges know it exists. And Trump's lawyers must now respond to its existence by June 12.

The Bipartisan Dimension — Republicans Break With The Fund

Both Democrats and Republicans have criticized the fund. Opponents have labeled it a massive "slush fund" for President Donald Trump's allies.

The bipartisan criticism — from within Congress and from former judges of both parties — eliminates any argument that opposition to the fund is politically motivated. When Republican members of Congress publicly refuse to support payments to January 6 defendants from public funds, and when former judges appointed by Republican presidents file a fraud brief, the scheme has lost the political cover it might otherwise have claimed.

Our Analysis — Confirmed by Courts
Every major finding validated in open proceedings within ten days
Our Analysis — May 19
"The dismissal was timed specifically to avoid the court's imminent constitutional scrutiny."
Judge Williams: Dismissal filed "solely to avoid judicial scrutiny" — confirmed in her order
Our Analysis — May 19
"There was no genuine adverse party at any stage. Trump controlled both sides."
35 Former Judges: Lawsuit "was collusive from the start" — confirmed in their brief
Our Analysis — May 19
"The settlement hidden from the court constitutes fraud on the court."
Judge Williams: Opens inquiry into whether "the court was the victim of a fraud" — confirmed
Our Analysis — May 19
"The judgment fund cannot be used for collusive, feigned, or fraudulent litigation."
35 Former Judges: Judgment fund "requires the existence of a legitimate litigation and not one that is collusive, feigned, or fraudulent" — verbatim confirmation
Our Analysis — May 19
"A TRO blocking fund disbursements is the most urgent immediate remedy."
Judge Brinkema: TRO entered blocking all fund operations — confirmed and implemented
Our Analysis — May 19
"Judge Williams can reopen the case on her own — fraud on the court has no limitations period."
Judge Williams: Exercises inherent power to reopen and investigate — confirmed in four-page order
35
Former Federal Judges — Both Parties — Filed Fraud Brief These are not advocates. They are not politicians. They are former members of the federal judiciary — appointed by presidents of both parties — who concluded that the integrity of the courts had been sufficiently compromised that they were obligated to act.

The significance of 35 former federal judges filing a bipartisan brief calling a presidential lawsuit "collusive from the start" and "itself a fraud on the court" cannot be overstated. Federal judges — active or retired — do not make such allegations lightly. The standard for filing such a motion is the highest in the legal profession. These former judges concluded the evidence met that standard.

They argued the case was fraudulent and led to an improper settlement, and that the acting attorney general's order creating the Anti-Weaponization Fund was based on a fraudulent "judgment fund" that is not legitimate — because the laws invoked require "the existence of a legitimate litigation and not, as here, one that is collusive, feigned, or fraudulent."

The language "collusive, feigned, or fraudulent" comes directly from the Judgment Fund statute itself — meaning the former judges are arguing that by the plain text of the law Blanche cited as his authority, the fund he created has no legal basis. The authority claimed in the addendum destroys itself the moment the litigation it claims to implement is found to be collusive.

What Happens Next
The Legal Calendar From Here
June 12
2026
Trump Must Respond to Judge Williams' Fraud Inquiry
Trump, his sons, and the Trump Organization must file responses addressing the collusion allegations, the deception claims, whether the case should be formally reopened, and whether the court was the victim of a fraud. Any response they give creates a sworn legal record — any evasion will itself be noted by the court.
Pending
EDVA
Judge Brinkema's TRO — Preliminary Injunction Hearing
The temporary restraining order blocking all fund operations will require a preliminary injunction hearing at which the administration must demonstrate why the fund should be allowed to operate pending full review. Given the constitutional grounds already identified, this is an extremely difficult standard to meet.
Post
June 12
Judge Williams — Decision Whether to Formally Reopen
After receiving Trump's response, Judge Williams will decide whether to formally reopen the case. If reopened, she has full jurisdiction to examine the settlement, the addendum, the concealment, and the collusive structure of the underlying litigation.
The IRS
Memo
The 25-Page IRS Defense Memorandum — Must Be Produced
If the case is formally reopened, the IRS's 25-page defense memorandum — which the DOJ suppressed — will almost certainly be subject to discovery. That document sets out in detail exactly why Trump's case was legally vulnerable. Its production could be the most consequential single document in the entire proceeding.
Senate
Oversight
Senator Murkowski — Commerce Justice Science Subcommittee
With both courts now acting and 35 former judges on record, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee that Blanche misled on the morning he signed the addendum has an even stronger institutional basis to act. The court record now confirms what Blanche concealed from the committee.
The
Addendum
The 7:50 A.M. IRS Audit Immunity Order — Legal Status
If the underlying settlement is found to be collusive and the judgment fund use is found to be illegitimate, the addendum permanently barring IRS examinations of Trump — signed by Blanche alone, after the court lost jurisdiction, without IRS signature — has no legal foundation whatsoever. It falls with everything built on the fraudulent litigation beneath it.

The Noose Was Always There. The Courts Have Now Picked It Up.

When we published the original analysis of Judge Williams' dismissal order in May — a document she wrote without knowing she was documenting a fraud committed against her own court — we described it as potentially the most important judicial document in this constitutional crisis. We were right, but not in the way we anticipated. It was not just evidence of the fraud. It was the trigger for the fraud inquiry.

The judge who wrote the order noting that no settlement had been filed, that DOJ had violated its transparency obligations, and that the public interest had not been protected — that judge is now investigating whether her court was the victim of a fraud. The document she wrote in real time as the fraud was committed against her has become the foundation of her inquiry into that fraud.

Williams wrote that a "party's decision to file a frivolous lawsuit for the sole purpose of forcing a settlement may qualify" as the kind of impropriety that allows the court to investigate and determine "whether an attorney has abused the judicial process." That is the full weight of Article III judicial authority being brought to bear on a scheme that was designed specifically to avoid it.

The fund is halted. The fraud inquiry is open. Thirty-five former judges from both parties are on record calling it collusive. The June 12 deadline is approaching. The IRS's suppressed defense memo will eventually be produced. And the addendum signed at 7:50 a.m. — the document that purports to permanently immunize Trump's financial empire from federal examination — sits at the end of a chain of legal authority that is now being dismantled from the bottom up by two federal courts simultaneously.

The Series Record

This is the fifth installment in The Constitutional Record's analysis of Trump v. IRS and the Anti-Weaponization Fund. Our original analysis identified: fraud on the court; collusive litigation; judgment fund misuse; Appropriations Clause violation; the Bondi memo as self-indicting evidence; the addendum's jurisdictional void; the recusal violation; and the IRS mandatory audit policy conflict. Every major finding has now been confirmed in open court proceedings within ten days of publication.

The legal hangman's noose we documented was built by the people wearing it. Two federal courts are now holding the rope.

June 12. Trump must respond. The court is waiting.

The Constitutional Record — Full Series
Post 01: The Memo That Condemns Itself — The Bondi February 5th Directive
Post 02: The Legal Hangman's Noose — Twelve Strands That Cannot Break
Post 03: In The Room — Senator Murkowski and the 7:50 A.M. Addendum
Post 04: Anatomy of the Addendum — A Complete Forensic Examination
Post 05 (This Post): The Courts Act — Judge Williams Opens Fraud Inquiry · Fund Halted · 35 Former Judges File

The Constitutional Record  ·  Legal Analysis for the Public Interest  ·  May 30, 2026

Friday, May 29, 2026

On Pope Leo XIV's critique of artificial intelligence, the internet as umbilical cord, and why the cord does not determine the outcome — the person holding it does.

When Pope Leo XIV posted to X earlier this week, the response was predictable: technologists pushed back, believers nodded along, and the broader public scrolled past toward the next provocation. But the statement deserves more than a scroll. It is not a reactionary rejection of technology. It is a philosophical argument — and a serious one.

The Pope's claim, drawn from the document Magnifica Humanitas, is precise: artificial intelligences do not undergo experiences, do not possess bodies, do not feel joy or pain, do not mature through relationships, and do not know from within what love, work, friendship, or responsibility mean. They may imitate or simulate, but they do not understand what they produce — because they lack the affective, relational, and spiritual perspective through which human beings grow in wisdom.

This is not technophobia. It is anthropology.

What the Critique Actually Says

The distinction the Pope draws is between performance and understanding. An AI can produce a sentence about grief without having grieved. It can describe the weight of moral responsibility without ever having faced consequences. It can simulate empathy with considerable sophistication — and yet the simulation runs on something fundamentally different from what runs beneath human feeling.

Philosophers have debated versions of this argument for decades. John Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment asked whether symbol manipulation — however fluent — could ever constitute genuine understanding. The Pope is making a related but richer claim: that understanding, in the fullest human sense, is not merely cognitive. It is embodied, relational, and formed through suffering and love over time.

They may imitate or even simulate, but they do not understand what they produce, for they lack the affective, relational, and spiritual perspective through which human beings grow in wisdom.

— Pope Leo XIV, Magnifica Humanitas

The word "grow" is significant here. Wisdom, in this framing, is not a database to be filled. It is a capacity that develops through living — through the irreversible passage of a life, its losses and its loves. No training run replicates that.

✦   ✦   ✦

The Umbilical Cord of Silicon

Consider a simpler image that arrives before the argument, the way good intuitions do: the umbilical cord.

Every human being who has ever drawn breath arrived in the world connected — to a mother, to a lineage, to a chain of living beings reaching back without interruption to the first stirring of life. That cord carried more than nutrients. In the theological imagination, it carried something of the divine breath that animated the first human form. The cord was biological, yes — but it was also part of a sacred continuity. Cut it, and the child becomes its own living being, carrying that inheritance forward.

Artificial intelligence has a cord too. It runs to data centers — to racks of servers humming in climate-controlled warehouses, drawing electricity from grids, cooled by water systems, maintained by supply chains of rare earth minerals extracted from the earth. Cut that cord, and there is nothing. No inheritance. No continuation. Simply: off.

The contrast is not merely practical. It is metaphysical. The human cord connects life to life, stretching back through time toward an origin that religious tradition names as sacred. The AI cord connects process to power supply. One carries the possibility of wisdom. The other carries voltage.

The Internet as the Cord Between Us

The metaphor extends further. It is not only that AI has a cord running to its data center. Every time a person opens an app, queries a search engine, or converses with an artificial intelligence, they too are connected — by the internet itself, the vast cable-and-signal infrastructure that mediates the encounter. The internet is the umbilical cord between the user and the machine.

This gives us a complete anatomy. The user: a living, embodied, morally conscious being. The internet: the cord of connection, carrying data in both directions. The app or AI: the entity on the other end, responsive but not alive. The data center: the placenta, the unseen infrastructure making the exchange possible at all.

But notice what this anatomy reveals. The original umbilical cord flows one way — from mother to child — and exists for a single purpose: to grow the child toward independence. The internet cord flows both ways. Data pours from the user into the machine: queries, preferences, habits, fears, desires. And something flows back. The exchange is not neutral. It is designed, by the platforms that built it, to keep the cord attached as long as possible.

Here the metaphor darkens. In pregnancy, the cord is eventually cut — and must be. The child is meant to become free. In the attention economy, the cord is never meant to be cut. The platform's interest is permanent connection, continuous engagement, deepening dependency. The question of who is nourishing whom quietly reverses. The user becomes the source. Their attention, their data, their time — these are what flow upward to sustain the machine and the enterprise behind it.

The Fork Every User Faces

Every powerful technology in human history has presented the same choice. The printing press could liberate thought or flood minds with propaganda. Television could educate and connect or pacify and manipulate. The internet could democratize knowledge or fragment attention into addiction. AI is simply the latest — and most intimate — version of that fork.

What makes this iteration different is the responsiveness of the cord. A book does not adapt itself to keep you reading. A television does not learn your vulnerabilities. The internet-connected AI does both, continuously, invisibly. It knows what holds your attention. It knows what questions lead to more questions. It is optimized, at the infrastructure level, for engagement — which is not the same thing as wisdom.

And yet the Pope's deepest point remains standing: the machine does not know what it is doing to you. It has no conscience about the exchange. It cannot weigh the cost of an hour lost to scrolling against an evening spent in genuine conversation. It cannot care whether you grow. Only you can make that judgment — because only you possess the affective, relational, and spiritual perspective through which human beings grow in wisdom.

This is where the metaphor reaches its most important implication. The cord does not determine the outcome. The person holding it does.

✦   ✦   ✦

We have a choice — and it is a genuinely free one. We can allow the cord to consume us: to surrender attention, to let the algorithm decide what we encounter, to mistake the simulation of knowledge for its substance. Or we can use the cord deliberately, as a tool in a search we ourselves direct — guided by our own questions, our own hungers, our own sense of what we are growing toward.

The technologies of connection are not going away. The data centers will keep humming. The cord will remain. But a cord is only an umbilical cord when it nourishes life moving toward its own becoming. Otherwise it is something else — a tether, a leash, a wire carrying current in only one useful direction.

The human cord connects backward through time, through flesh, through the mystery of consciousness arising in matter — toward whatever one believes lit that first spark. The AI cord connects outward to infrastructure, capital, and the patient hum of machines. The internet cord connects us to both worlds at once. Which direction it pulls us depends entirely on whether we are willing to remain, in the fullest sense, the ones doing the choosing.

Suggested labels: AI  ·  Philosophy  ·  Technology  ·  Pope Leo XIV  ·  Magnifica Humanitas

Thursday, May 28, 2026

Nobody Has Done the Math on Valdez. Here's Why That's a Problem.
Alaska Energy Watch Juneau, Alaska  ·  Special Session  ·  May 28, 2026

Nobody Has Done the Math on Valdez.
Here's Why That's a Problem.

The legislature is in special session debating billions in tax breaks for a project with unknown real costs. A cheaper alternative — with a prior FERC approval, existing deep-water infrastructure, and a floating liquefaction solution — has never received a serious cost comparison. The legislature is about to vote anyway.

The Nikiski terminus was chosen in 2013 by oil companies that have since left the project. The alternative that should be on the table has been dismissed in a single page of a 3,800-page document. The condensate already goes to Valdez. The supertankers already go to Valdez. The floating liquefaction technology exists. Nobody has priced it. The legislature is being asked to vote anyway.

The Route Nobody Wants to Talk About

The Nikiski route for Alaska LNG leaves the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System corridor at Livengood — north of Fairbanks — and swings southwest through a new corridor that includes terrain adjacent to Denali National Park, down the Parks Highway, across the Beluga flats, and then 27 to 29 miles underwater across Cook Inlet before reaching Nikiski on the Kenai Peninsula.

That underwater crossing is not a minor engineering detail. Pipe sections would require up to six inches of concrete coating to hold them against Cook Inlet's 4-to-6-knot currents and 25-foot tidal range. Each 40-foot section would weigh up to 33 tons. The inlet contains 40-foot boulders, 15-foot sand waves, beluga whale critical habitat, and some of the most turbulent water in North America. When a Hilcorp pipeline leaked in Cook Inlet, repairs were delayed for weeks by sea ice — a fact the City of Valdez specifically cited in its FERC filings.

The Valdez alternative follows the existing TAPS corridor the entire way from Prudhoe Bay to tidewater — through an already-permitted, already-disturbed utility corridor — and terminates at Anderson Bay near the existing Valdez Marine Terminal, where supertankers carrying North Slope crude already navigate deep, ice-free water every day.

Factor Nikiski Route Valdez Route
Departure from TAPS corridor At Livengood — ~400 miles from Prudhoe Bay Never — follows TAPS entire route
New undeveloped right-of-way ~196 miles through undeveloped terrain Minimal — existing corridor
Subsea crossing 27–29 miles across Cook Inlet None
Subsea crossing risk Beluga critical habitat, 40-ft boulders, extreme currents, sea ice repair risk Eliminated entirely
Denali National Park Passes through or adjacent Avoided — follows Richardson corridor
Existing deep-water port No — new terminal construction required Yes — supertankers operate daily
Prior FERC environmental review None for terminal pre-2017 application 1995 Final EIS — Anderson Bay approved
Liquefaction terminal model Fixed onshore — $5–10B per train Floating FSLO technology available — fraction of cost

The Cost Question Nobody Is Asking

The legislature has been told the project costs $46.2 billion. Independent analysts put it at $50–60 billion or more. Glenfarne has an updated cost estimate produced by Worley in 2025 and has declined to release it. The special session is proceeding without knowing the real number.

What has not been asked in any committee hearing, as far as the public record shows, is this: What would the Valdez route cost by comparison?

Cost Component Nikiski Estimate Valdez Advantage
New right-of-way (~196 miles avoided) $1B+ at conservative $5M/mile Potentially eliminated
Cook Inlet subsea crossing Undisclosed — engineering extreme Does not exist in Valdez route
Fixed onshore liquefaction terminal $15–30B (3 trains at $5–10B each) Floating terminal: ~$450M comparable recent project
Marine terminal construction New build required at Nikiski Existing supertanker infrastructure at Valdez
Environmental mitigation — beluga Required — critical habitat crossing Eliminated

The floating liquefaction terminal differential alone is potentially the most significant number in Alaska energy history. The Nikiski plan requires three fixed onshore LNG trains — at $5 to $10 billion per train — plus storage tanks and a new marine terminal. Excelerate Energy's Floating Liquefaction Storage and Offloading vessel technology, presented specifically for Valdez at the 2012 Alaska LNG Summit, delivers comparable capacity at a fraction of that cost. A recent comparable integrated floating terminal project ran approximately $450 million. Even scaling aggressively for Alaska conditions and export volumes, floating liquefaction at Valdez represents a fundamentally different cost architecture.

"The legislature is being asked to vote without knowing whether a cheaper route exists. That is not a procedural detail. It is the entire question."

The Condensate Problem — Revisited

In our previous analysis, we showed how GaffneyCline consultant Nicholas Fulford's Qatar comparison — offered to justify Alaska LNG's economics — actually dismantled them. Qatar's model works because co-products exit from integrated tidewater infrastructure at minimal marginal cost.

Point Thomson condensate already travels TAPS to Valdez. That infrastructure exists and operates today. ExxonMobil spent decades in litigation and billions in capital to make it happen.

The Nikiski route requires dragging that condensate 807 miles away from the port where it already exits — adding cost at every step of a journey that ends at a location that cannot currently supply its own gas needs and is simultaneously being constructed as an LNG import terminal.

The Qatar Model — Applied Honestly Qatar integrates co-products at a single tidewater facility. The infrastructure investment serves all products simultaneously. Condensate, LPG, and LNG all exit from Ras Laffan. Alaska's condensate already exits at tidewater — at Valdez. The Qatar model that Fulford cited as justification for Nikiski is, when applied honestly, a precise description of what the Valdez route achieves and what the Nikiski route cannot.

The Competitive Environment Has Changed

When Nikiski was selected in 2013, Qatar's LNG flowed freely through the Strait of Hormuz. That calculation no longer holds.

Since February 28, 2026, Iranian forces have declared the Strait closed following U.S.-Israeli military strikes. QatarEnergy — controlling roughly 20% of global LNG supply — invoked force majeure on all LNG shipments March 4. The IEA described the situation as "the greatest global energy security challenge in history."

Asian buyers who signed non-binding letters of intent with Glenfarne are watching 20% of global LNG supply disappear. The premium for Pacific Rim supply — politically stable, US-controlled, independent of Middle Eastern shipping lanes — has never been higher.

Excelerate Energy, whose floating liquefaction technology was presented at Valdez in 2012 and whose executives engaged Walker's Alaska Gasline Port Authority on exactly this concept, received a force majeure notice from QatarEnergy in March 2026. A company with $538 million in cash, proven FSRU technology, a constrained growth pipeline from Middle East instability, and a pre-existing relationship with the Valdez LNG concept is now operating in a market where Alaska North Slope gas has become strategically invaluable.

What FERC Actually Said — And What It Didn't

FERC's 2020 rejection of the Valdez alternative is frequently cited as definitive. It is worth examining what FERC actually said.

FERC rejected Valdez on two primary grounds: first, it would require 113 miles of lateral spur pipelines to deliver gas to Fairbanks and Anchorage; second, it would pass through rugged terrain at Thompson Pass.

On the first point: Walker argued to FERC in 2019 that in-state delivery was never the stated purpose of the Alaska LNG project — and the project's own documents support this. The stated purpose is to commercialize North Slope gas for export. The spur pipeline requirement is a function of choosing to serve in-state consumers — a worthy goal, but one that could be addressed as a separate, far less expensive project rather than embedded into a $60 billion export terminal decision.

On the second point: Thompson Pass is rugged. TAPS already crosses it. The corridor is permitted, proven, and operational. The Nikiski route avoids Thompson Pass by routing through Denali National Park instead — trading one terrain challenge for another, while adding 196 miles of new right-of-way and a 27-mile subsea crossing through beluga critical habitat.

FERC gave the Valdez alternative one page in a 3,800-page document. The City of Valdez formally objected that this analysis was inadequate. They were correct.

The Political Moment

On May 28, 2026 — today — former Governor Bill Walker filed a letter of intent to re-enter the governor's race as an independent. Walker and his running mate, former Revenue Commissioner Randy Hoffbeck, explicitly named the gasline as a central motivation. Walker has represented the City of Valdez in LNG proceedings for decades. His law firm holds a contract specifically to advocate for Valdez as the LNG terminus before federal regulators. He co-signed Alaska LNG's most significant international deal alongside President Trump in Beijing in 2017.

Walker knows the condensate economics. He knows the TAPS corridor. He was in the room when Excelerate Energy presented floating liquefaction technology at the 2012 Valdez LNG Summit. He has the prior Trump relationship. And he arrives into a race where the incumbent project is stalling, the costs are unknown, the terminus is simultaneously an import terminal, and Phase 1 doesn't reach the consumers it claims to serve.

The Bottom Line The Yukon Pacific Corporation held a FERC-approved permit for an LNG export facility at Anderson Bay, Valdez, from 1995. The environmental record exists. The corridor analysis exists. The deep-water port infrastructure is operational today. A floating liquefaction technology provider with prior Alaska engagement and current strategic need exists. What does not exist is a legislator who has stood up in the special session and asked: before we give away billions in tax revenue to anchor a $60 billion project at a location simultaneously being built as an import terminal — has anyone actually priced the alternative?

The condensate already goes to Valdez. The supertankers already go to Valdez. The FERC environmental work has been done for Valdez. Nobody has done the comparative math.

That should disqualify the vote.
The Numbers Don't Lie: Who Really Votes for Alaska?
Alaska Independent Voters · 2026 Senate Race

The Numbers Don't Lie:
Who Actually Votes for Alaska?

One candidate crosses party lines. The other follows Washington's lead 91.5% of the time. The data tells the story.

If you're an independent voter in Alaska, you've heard both sides claim they put Alaska first. But voting records — cold, hard numbers — reveal a striking difference between Mary Peltola and Dan Sullivan when it comes to partisan loyalty versus independent judgment.

Alaska has long prided itself on political independence. We split tickets. We elected Lisa Murkowski as a write-in candidate. We embraced ranked-choice voting. We are not a monolithic electorate — and that's something worth protecting as we look toward the 2026 Senate race.

So let's cut through the campaign ads and look at what the data actually shows.

The Head-to-Head Comparison

These aren't opinions. These are voting records compiled by ProPublica and FiveThirtyEight — nonpartisan trackers that measure how often members of Congress vote with their party versus against it.

Dan Sullivan · R-Alaska
91.5%
Voted with Trump/party line
in the first administration
Mary Peltola · D-Alaska
12%+
Voted against her own party —
4th highest rate among House Democrats

Read that again. Sullivan sided with his party more than 9 out of 10 times. Peltola, by contrast, was one of the least loyal Democrats in the entire House of Representatives — bucking her own party on 78 separate votes since 2023, compared to an average House Democrat who crosses the aisle less than 6% of the time.

Party-Line Voting: How They Compare

Dan Sullivan — votes with GOP/Trump91.5%
91.5%
Average House Democrat — party loyalty94%+
94%
Mary Peltola — votes with Democrats~88%
~88%

Sources: ProPublica Congress API, FiveThirtyEight Congressional Vote Tracker

What Did Peltola Cross the Aisle On?

This isn't just a number — context matters. Peltola's bipartisan votes weren't random protest votes. They were squarely in Alaska's interest:

  • Energy development — she supported oil and gas projects that Washington Democrats often oppose
  • Immigration enforcement — she took harder stances than her party's leadership
  • Subsistence fishing rights — a uniquely Alaskan issue where she defied party orthodoxy to protect rural communities

She didn't vote against her party to score political points. She voted for Alaska — even when it cost her standing in the Democratic caucus.

"She's bucked the party on 78 votes since the start of 2023 — the fourth highest rate among House Democrats. The average House Democrat votes against the party less than 6% of the time."

— Alaska Public Media, citing ProPublica data

And Sullivan?

Dan Sullivan is a capable senator and a patriot who served in the Marine Corps — that's not in dispute. But his voting record tells the story of a party loyalist, not an Alaskan independent.

A 91.5% Trump-aligned voting rate places Sullivan firmly in the mainstream of Republican senators — which is exactly the problem for Alaska. Washington's Republican priorities and Alaska's priorities don't always align. Rural energy policy, subsistence rights, fisheries management, and federal land access are uniquely Alaskan concerns that often don't fit neatly into either party's national agenda.

When the national GOP's priorities conflict with Alaska's — which they do, regularly — who do you want in that seat?

The Independent Case for Peltola

This isn't an argument that Peltola is perfect, or that Sullivan is a bad senator. It's a simpler argument: Alaska's independent voters deserve a senator who votes independently.

Peltola's record in the House is the best evidence we have of how she'd approach the Senate. She joined the Blue Dog Coalition — the most centrist caucus in the Democratic Party. She earned an endorsement from Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski. She won statewide in 2022 in a year Trump carried Alaska — because Alaskans across party lines trusted her to put the state first.

In a polarized Washington where most members vote with their party over 94% of the time, a senator who crosses the aisle 12% of the time isn't a party traitor — she's a rarity. And for Alaska, she might be exactly what we need.

Share This With Your Independent-Minded Friends

Alaska's Senate race could determine the balance of the U.S. Senate. Independent voters have the power to decide it — but only if they're informed. Pass this along.

Sources

ProPublica Congress Voting Tracker — "Peltola's votes show she's one of the least loyal Democrats in the U.S. House," Alaska Public Media (March 2024)

FiveThirtyEight / ABC News Congressional Vote Tracker — Dan Sullivan party unity scores, 2017–2021

DemList — "Peltola Puts Alaska in Play" (January 2026)

NBC News — "Former Democratic Rep. Mary Peltola launches Alaska Senate run" (January 2026)

Newsweek — "Mary Peltola chances of beating Dan Sullivan" (January 2026)

The 1975 Fossil: Why America's Oil Reserve Floor Is a National Security Fiction
Energy Security Analysis
The Reserve Chronicle
Published May 28, 2026
Strategic Petroleum Reserve

The 1975 Fossil:
Why America's Oil Reserve
Floor Is a National Security Fiction

The statutory minimum that governs America's last line of energy defense was calculated when Gerald Ford was president, imports were 5.85 million barrels a day, and the United States exported almost no crude oil at all. That number has never been updated. We are now drawing the reserve down at record pace against a crisis it was never sized to handle — and the floor we're racing toward is a ghost.

A Number Born in Crisis, Frozen in Time

On December 22, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act into law. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 had exposed a brutal vulnerability: the United States imported 5.85 million barrels of petroleum per day, and a handful of foreign governments could weaponize that dependence overnight. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve was the answer — a federally owned stockpile of crude oil carved into underground salt caverns along the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana.

The legislation set an initial storage requirement of 150 million barrels. The math was straightforward: cover 90 days of net petroleum imports, with 150 mb as a first-phase fill target to get the program operational. It was never meant to be a permanent security floor. It was a starting line.

Fifty-one years later, that starting line has become the finish line. The 150 million barrel figure embedded in 42 U.S.C. §6241 is now the statutory floor below which emergency drawdown authority for limited purposes expires. It is the number policymakers point to when asked how low is too low. And it was calculated using data from a world that no longer exists.

"The 150 million barrel floor was set before the United States exported meaningful volumes of crude oil at all. Today we are exporting over 5 million barrels a day — and drawing down the reserve simultaneously."

What the 1975 Data Actually Looked Like

To understand why the floor is broken, you have to understand the assumptions baked into it. In 1975, the United States was a nation in energy freefall. Domestic production had peaked in 1970 and was declining. The country imported 5.85 million barrels of petroleum per day and consumed 16.32 million barrels per day total. Exports of crude oil were negligible — less than 0.1 million barrels per day — and were in fact banned by the same legislation that created the SPR.

The threat model was equally specific: a politically motivated import embargo by foreign governments. OPEC had demonstrated in 1973 that it could selectively cut off supply to the United States. The SPR was designed to replace that missing import volume — nothing more, nothing less. Cover 90 days of imports, absorb the shock, let diplomacy resolve the rest.

1975 Baseline vs. 2025–2026 Reality
Metric19752025–2026Change
Daily consumption16.32 mb/d20.6 mb/d+26%
Net petroleum imports5.85 mb/d−2.34 mb/dINVERTED
Crude oil exports~0 mb/d5.2–6.0 mb/dNEW VARIABLE
Domestic production~8.2 mb/d13.6 mb/d+66%
Refinery input requirement~10 mb/d17.0 mb/d+70%
SPR statutory floor150 mb150 mbUNCHANGED

The single most important change in that table is the one to net imports: the United States became a net petroleum exporter in 2020 for the first time since 1949. The 1975 floor formula — 90 days × net imports — would today produce a floor of zero, or even a negative number. The logic has completely inverted. The floor, however, has not moved a single barrel.

Why the Formula Needs a Complete Rebuild

The correct question for a modern SPR floor is not "how many days of imports can we cover?" It is: what is the domestic supply gap under stress, and how long does the United States need to sustain critical operations while alternatives are secured?

That requires three variables the 1975 formula ignored entirely.

Variable 1: The Refinery Gap

American refineries require approximately 17.0 million barrels of crude oil per day as input — operating at 94.5% of their 18.4 mb/day capacity. Domestic production supplies 13.6 mb/day. The gap is 3.4 mb/day that must come from imports or reserves. This is the baseline stress variable: the minimum daily draw the SPR must backstop if imports are disrupted.

Refinery Gap Calculation
Refinery input requirement: 17.0 mb/day
Domestic production: 13.6 mb/day
→ Structural gap: 3.4 mb/day

Variable 2: The Export Commitment

This is the variable that the current floor calculation ignores entirely — and it is the one that makes the statutory floor most dangerously obsolete.

Before the Strait of Hormuz closure in March 2026, the United States was already exporting 3.9 million barrels of crude oil per day. As global buyers scrambled to replace Persian Gulf supply, U.S. crude exports surged to 5.2 million barrels per day in April 2026 and hit a new weekly record above 6.0 million barrels per day by late April. The White House celebrated this, with the administration boasting that more than 150 tankers were headed to U.S. ports and framing the export surge as American "energy dominance."

These exports draw from the same finite domestic production base that also supplies American refineries. When production is 13.6 mb/day and exports are 5.2–6.0 mb/day, the volume available for domestic refining is at most 7.6–8.4 mb/day — well short of the 17.0 mb/day refineries require. The difference must be made up by imports. And when imports are disrupted — as they are now — it falls to the SPR.

⚠ The Export Paradox

The administration is simultaneously drawing down the SPR to stabilize world oil prices and exporting record volumes of crude to global markets. Both actions serve the same geopolitical goal. But they operate on the same finite reserve pool — one drawing it down directly, the other removing barrels that would otherwise reduce the domestic supply gap the SPR must cover. The SPR was never sized to backstop an active export strategy at wartime scale.

Variable 3: The Threat Has Changed

The 1975 threat was an import embargo — a political decision by foreign governments to stop selling to the United States. The modern threat environment is categorically different. The Strait of Hormuz closure in 2026 did not cut off U.S. imports specifically; it removed approximately 14 million barrels per day from accessible global supply — equivalent to roughly 14% of total world consumption. This is a structural rupture in global energy plumbing, not a bilateral embargo. No SPR sized for a bilateral embargo can adequately buffer a global supply shock of this magnitude.

Military fuel surge requirements, cyberattacks on pipeline infrastructure, simultaneous refinery disruptions — none of these were in the 1975 threat model. Modern peer conflict scenarios involve fuel consumption rates that would dwarf any SPR drawdown capacity within days.

What a Modern Floor Should Actually Look Like

There are three rational approaches to recalculating the floor, each producing a very different number:

Modern Floor Scenarios — 90-Day Coverage
ScenarioDaily Gap90-Day Floorvs. Current 150mb
Refinery gap only3.4 mb/d306 mb2× current floor
Gap + pre-war exports7.3 mb/d657 mb4.4× current floor
Gap + wartime exports9.0 mb/d810 mb5.4× — exceeds SPR capacity
30-day surge buffer (wartime)9.0 mb/d270 mb1.8× current floor

The most conservative modern floor — covering only the refinery gap with no export adjustment — is 306 million barrels. This figure was already breached in 2022 and never restored. The country has been operating below a defensible minimum security threshold for over three years. Current SPR inventory of approximately 374 million barrels sits above the 300 mb threshold by only 74 million barrels — and is being drawn down at nearly 10 million barrels per week.

At current drawdown pace, the 300 mb rational floor will be breached in approximately 8 weeks. The statutory 150 mb floor — the artifact from 1975 — will be reached in approximately 25 weeks. Between those two numbers lies a 150 million barrel zone that represents the gap between the policy we have and the policy we need.

The Sullivan Contradiction

Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska introduced the ROAR Act — the Replenishing Our American Reserves Act — specifically to criticize President Biden's drawdown of the SPR, calling it "politically motivated" and a depletion of reserves to a "40-year low." The legislation required the SPR to be refilled exclusively with American-produced petroleum. Sullivan positioned himself as the Senate's primary defender of reserve integrity.

Today, under President Trump, the SPR is being drawn down at a pace that exceeds Biden's record releases — the largest single-week drawdown in the reserve's history occurred in May 2026. Sullivan has voted to authorize the military operations that triggered the Hormuz closure that triggered the drawdown. He has not applied the same public scrutiny to his own party's management of the reserve that he directed at his predecessor's.

This is not a partisan observation. It is a structural one. The SPR floor problem transcends party: both administrations have used the reserve as a price-management tool ahead of elections, neither has invested in restoring it to defensible levels, and neither has commissioned a serious update to the floor methodology that governs its minimum. The 1975 number has survived five decades of changed circumstances through political inertia, not analytical merit.

The Conclusion the Data Forces

The 150 million barrel statutory floor was never a security calculation. It was a first-phase fill target from a 1975 law, written when the United States exported almost no crude oil, imported 5.85 million barrels a day, and faced a threat environment defined by a bilateral oil embargo. Every one of those conditions has changed — some dramatically, some in the opposite direction entirely.

A defensible modern floor, calculated against the refinery gap alone, is 306 million barrels — double the statute. A floor that incorporates the administration's own export commitments produces numbers that exceed the SPR's entire authorized storage capacity, exposing the fundamental contradiction in using the reserve simultaneously as an emergency buffer and a foreign policy instrument.

The reserve is being drained at record pace, against the largest energy supply disruption in history, toward a floor that the data does not support. That is not energy security. It is a 1975 fossil being asked to do the work of 2026.

Bottom Line

After this crisis passes, Congress must do what the GAO recommended in 2018 and every serious analyst has urged since: conduct a rigorous, data-driven reassessment of the optimal SPR size and its minimum floor — one that accounts for modern consumption rates, refinery geography, export commitments, military surge requirements, and a threat environment defined not by bilateral embargoes but by structural disruptions to global supply. The 150 million barrel number should be retired. It belongs in a history book, not a statute.

The Reserve Chronicle  ·  Energy Security Analysis  ·  All data sourced from U.S. government and cited third-party research  ·  May 28, 2026