Thursday, June 03, 2010

How To Kill a Polish President and Use Bad Weather as an Accomplice (CVR Transcripts)

This is a continuation of an earlier thread with the same title.

In the previous thread I pointed out to photos that indicated that there was a mobile radar unit at Smolensk that had air traffic control capabilities (ATC). I also pointed out how the runway the president's plane landed on was not the main runway at Smolensk.

The thread was posted prior to the release of the transcripts of the voice recordings between the crew on the president's plane and other individuals who had spoken to the crew.

It is interesting to see how the press is still focused on how the "pilot ignored comments that the weather was bad" or the pilot ignored warnings that the aircraft was too low.

I would say it is embarrasing to see how the media was duped by the Russians.

In the previous thread before the transcripts were released, I had stated:

In addition to the GPWS alarm going off 30 seconds from when the plane hit the first tree that was 1200 meters from the runway, Russian officials stated that they told the pilot he was below the glide slope.

The Russian ATC told the pilot he was below his glide slope 1500 meters from the runway, well after the GPWS alarm sounded and just a few seconds before the pilot hit the trees 1200 meters from the runway.

So why would the GPWS warning go off 30 seconds before hitting tree tops at 1200 meters before the end of Runway 26?

Did the pilot have the wrong barometric pressure given to him by the Russian ATC which caused him to think he was higher than he actually was?

Or was the GPWS being disrupted by signals?

And it is from the previous thread I will show through the transcripts, the tragic crash was not pilot error.

The transcripts are linked here.

KVS: Temperature and air pressure, please.
044: We greet you warmly. You know what, speaking honestly, it's a bitch down here. Visibility is about 400 metres and in our view the bases are below 50 metres, thick.
D: The temperature (incomp.), air pressure 7-45. 7-4-5, the landing conditions are nonexistent.
KVS: Thank you, if it's possible we'll try to approach, but if not, if the weather's bad, we'll circle around.
2P: Have you landed yet?
044: Yeah, we managed to land at the last minute. But speaking frankly, you can definitely try. There are two APMs, they made a gate, so you can try, but... If you're unable by the second attempt, I advise you to try, for example Moscow, or somewhere [else].

In the transcripts, 044 is the crew that flew the Yak-40 and landed about one hour before the president's plane crashed.

The crew from the Yak-40 tells the crew on the president's plane the weather is bad, but after stating this, they tell the crew they managed to land and then tell them they can definitely try.

They did not warn them to not try, they told them they could definitely try. Now in the previous thread, there is a story linked where the crew on the Yak-40 had stated that they had problems with Runway 26 and the radio beacon being disrupted:

The radio tower at Smolensk airport may have been dysfunctional on the fateful morning of April 10, and contributed to the Polish presidential airplane disaster.

Signals from the radio tower were problematic to the Polish crew of a Yak-40, which landed in Smolensk about an hour before the presidential Tu-154. It was the last airplane to successfully land at the airport that day.

Just minutes prior to the crash, a Russian Il-76 diverted to Moscow after it was unable to stabilize its approach to landing. The Yak's Polish crew saw it veer to the left of the runway, a mistake that should not occur when a constant radio signal is present, according to sources close to Rzeczpospolita.

I find it odd that the crew on the Yak-40 would tell the crew on the president's plane that they could definitely try to land given that the crew on the Yak-40 had problems with the radio tower. That information was never told to the president's crew.

Instead they made it seem that the APM's would help them.

KVS: Ask Artur, if the clouds are thick.
2P: I don't know if they'll be there, that... If they're still there.
2P: Ok, I'll transfer.
2P: Artur, are you there?
A: (incomprehensible)
044: I'm Remek.
2P: Oh, RemuĊ›, ask Artur, whether... Or maybe you know, are those clouds thick?
A: (incomprehensible)
A: (incomprehensible)
2P: How many?
KVS: 9-9, hold.
2P: 9-9.
A: (incomprehensible)
044: About 400-500 metres.
ST: Stay on course?
KVS: No.
ST: About 400-500 metres.
2P: But is that the thickness?
A: Visible.
044: Are you there?
2P: But is the thickness of the clouds 400-500 metres??
044: As far as I remember, at 500 metres we were still above the clouds.
2P: Ah... At 500 metres [you were] above the clouds... Good, good, thanks.
044: Ah... One more thing... The APMs are about 200 metres from the edge of the runway.
2P: Thanks.
2P: The APMs are there.
2P: 200 metres from the edge of the runway.
KVS: Ask if the Russians have landed yet.
2P: Have the Russians landed yet?
A: (incomprehensible)
022: They approached twice and I think they flew somewhere else.
2P: Ok, I understand, thanks.
2P: Did you hear that?
KVS: Great.

No mention of problems with the radio tower. Why? Now enter the director of the Russian ATC and the barometric pressure given to the president's pilot.

KVS: Temperature and air pressure, please.
044: We greet you warmly. You know what, speaking honestly, it's a bitch
down here. Visibility is about 400 metres and in our view the bases are below 50
metres, thick.
D: The temperature (incomp.), air pressure 7-45.
, the landing conditions are nonexistent.
KVS: Thank you, if
it's possible we'll try to approach, but if not, if the weather's bad, we'll
circle around.

(emphasis added)

The pressure given to the pilots was 745mm Hg, and accordingly the pressure would be 29.33inches Hg. The actual observation at Smolensk for the time was 30.29 inches.

Moreover, considering this is a transcript of a copy of the original recording, I find it odd that there is no pilot readback because in an actual leaked recording that is posted on the previous thread, the pilot gives a readback of a visibility of 8km haze and a barometric pressure of 744mm Hg, which is 29.29 inches Hg.

That actual recording is missing from these transcripts. Moreover, it is not known if the barometric pressure was given in QFE or QNH. And there are problems with this information if it is not known.

Some airports around the world still operate under the practice of atmospheric pressure at field elevation (QFE). At QFE airports, Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) or a similar outputted system outputs a barometric pressure setting value. This value is one that when an aircraft is positioned on the ground at the airport the barometric altimeter reading in the aircraft will read zero regardless of the altitude of the airport. Therefore, as shown in FIG. 1, if an aircraft is flying to a QFE airport that is at the elevation of 1000 feet, the barometric altimeter indicates that the aircraft is 1000 feet lower than it actually is. This does not become a problem if the aircrew informs all systems within the aircraft that use barometric pressure that it is based on a QFE setting. However, if the aircrew fails to make sure the other aircraft systems understand that the barometric altimeter is based on QFE operation, then the other aircraft systems will produce false alerts. For example, as the aircraft is descending towards the airport, a Terrain Awareness System (TAWS) produces caution and warning alerts as the aircraft is on approach to the airport because the TAWS believes that the aircraft is 1000 feet closer than it actually is to the ground. Since the aircraft is actually flying 1000 feet higher, this alert is a nuisance alert. Because of the number of tasks performed on an approach to landing, the flight crew may be overloaded and not want to bother with figuring out the cause of the alert and thus just deactivate the TAWS. Deactivation of the TAWS leaves the aircraft vulnerable to controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)

Here again, the incorrect barometric reading is given out by the Russian ATC.

KVS: Korsaz, Polish 101, holding 1500.
D: Ahh... Polish 1-0-1, according to pressure 7-4-5, descend 500.
KVS: According to pressure 7-4-5, descending 500.
There is the question if the TAWS was set to that barometric pressure reading given by the ATC.

Now as the pilot descends to 500 meters, an odd exchange takes place between ATC and the crew.

Signal at F=500 Hz.
A: 6.
D: PLF (incomp.) 500 copy?
KVS: We've descended 500 metres.
D: 500 metres, have you landed at a military airport before?KVS: Flaps 15.
A: Lit.
KVS: Yes, of course.
D: Lights on the left, on the right, at the start of the runway.
KVS: Understood.
B/P: Captain, board ready for landing.
KVS: Thank you.

The director asks the pilot if he has landed at a military airport before.

The pilot landed at Smolensk three days prior.

Moreover, as pointed out in photos in the previous thread, the approach runway lights on Runway 26 were faulty and didn't work, but the director states, "lights on the left, on the right, at the start of the runway."

The comments made by the Russian ATC to the crew should be investigated.

Throughout the news cycle, the stories published by the news media stated how the Russian ATC warned the pilot on not to land and to divert.

That never happened till the end. And there is the question on why the pilot ignored the TAWS.

Here is why.

ATC was following the plane down on radar and was calling out the glideslope.

At 4km, the Russian ATC tells the pilot he is on course. However, the TAWS is indicating a potential problem.

Between 150 meters in height and 100 meters in height and 2 km from the approach end, the TAWS is sending out a warning, but the Russian ATC tells the pilot he is still on course with his glideslope.

The crew at the decision height aborts which is what they are supposed to do, but it is too late.

The pilot is lower than he thinks he is and he is in the shallow valley that is on the approach end of Runway 26.

Even when the Pull up Pull up warning is going off, the director is telling the pilot to level off.

The pilot was heading straight into the other side of the valley and this is why you see the plane getting closer to the ground.

The pilot didn't know the valley was there, because it is not on the approach plate for Smolensk.

And he had no chance to recover.

D: 4 and on course.
ST: 200.
KVS: Turned on.
ST: 150.
D: 2 and on course, on glideslope.
A: 100 metres.
ST: 100.
ST: 100.
(2P): In the norm.
ST: 90.
ST: 80.
2P: Go around.
Signal at F=400 Hz. (Decision height).
ST: 60.
ST: 50.
D: Horizon 101.
ST: 40.
ST: 30.
D: Height control, horizon.
ST: 20.
Signal at F=400 Hz. Autopilot disconnect.
Signal at F=800 Hz. Inner marker.
Signal at F=400 Hz. Autothrottle disconnect.
TAWS:Signal at F=400 Hz. ABSU.
TAWS:Sound of hitting trees.
2P: F*cking hell!
D: Abort to second approach!
A: Screaming F*ckkkkkkkkkkkk.....
Moreover, not one time did the Russian ATC warn the pilot it was too low until it was too late.

This was not pilot error. This was an accident designed by the Russians and there are certain Poles who participated in setting up the accident.

The Russian ATC gave out the wrong baro reading and was giving false information on the glideslope.

The Polish pilot did everything right for one approach, the Russian ATC was watching and driving that plane into the other side of the valley.


Anonymous said...

do you have a link for the barometric pressure that morning in Smolensk?

Also, what does that discrepency translate into in terms of altitude

Tom said...

the observed was 30.29inches Hg but the given baro reading is not known if QFE or QNH

There are two graphs that have been drawn up -- There is also a question about the RA and how accurate it was.

Tom said...

Charts and actual obs are in this thread.

Clotilde Frazier said...

War was declared on Poland - a different kind of war, one that uses Polish nationals who are at war with their president.

As well done, Tom, as one can expect, given the obvious obstruction and, I believe, intentional misinformation.

I am intrigued by the fact that the Polish president's plane, with most of the Polish government's leaders, was delayed in Poland, insuring that it would fly in at a time that fog was predicibly forming on the fateful runway, insuring that cloud (?) cover likely was low, and a state of mist/fog was rising. Something I see frequently from my windows.

The combination of the two atmospherics would have been deadly for a time because visiblity from aloft would be hampered.

THE DANGER WAS PREDICTABLE. So, why were events arranged in such a way by the obvious collusion of Russians and Poles to insure a dangerous landing for a most important flight, containing Poland's pro-West leaders?

I believe that plausibility lies with the fact that there was motive for Russian inspired operatives to murder the polish president and his goverment because of his pro-west stand.

The Polish PM, Tusk, is clearly in Russia's pocket and has been busily planting over a hundred operatives in key positions. The U.S.A. is undergoing the same process under Obama's authoritarian leadership.

The difference between the two countries is that one voted in their oppressor, the other (Poland) had to have their brave leader killed off.

Reportedly, the Polish president was no friend of communism or its useful and did not want them in key positions in his government.

- Odd, that the earlier Polish flight landed safely ON ANOTHER RUNWAY WHERE TERRAIN WAS DIFFERENT.
- Odd, that a Polish (communist)? pilot, along with a Russian ATC misled the incoming pilot with off/on again transmissions causing confusion.
- Odd, that this was not an unusual weather pattern and had the benefit of predictability, yet predictability worked only in favor of two other planes, but not the president's.

Tom, if there is justice, your article will be read by many who have the power to make a difference in Poland and the United States. I can only pray so....