Alaska Policy Commentary  ·  June 7, 2026

The Cost Nobody Put in the Estimate: What Alaska LNG Construction Will Do to the Dalton Highway — and Who Pays

Glenfarne's $44.5–$54.5 billion cost estimate covers the pipeline. It does not cover the public road infrastructure Alaska must upgrade to make construction physically possible. Sen. Myers drives the Dalton Highway. He told us in January it's already falling apart under current traffic. He hasn't told us who pays to fix it for Alaska LNG.

By Tom Lamb  ·  HB 381 · Special Session 2026

In January 2026, Sen. Robert Myers stood before the Alaska Legislature and described the Dalton Highway in terms that every Alaskan who has driven it would recognize. "Trucks are going up that road, things are getting beat up because of all of the potholes and the washboard and everything that we're dealing with," he said. "Freight gets damaged. That means you're either having to fix it on site or order replacements. That increases costs. It delays projects. It could delay the gas line."

Sen. Myers was right. He drives that highway. He knows what it looks like under current commercial traffic — 60% heavy trucks, year-round, on a gravel road with failing embankments, substandard geometry, and permafrost thawing beneath it at accelerating rates.

What Sen. Myers did not say in January — and has not said in his commentary published today supporting HB 381 — is who pays to upgrade the Dalton Highway to support Alaska LNG construction. That cost does not appear in Glenfarne's $44.5–$54.5 billion estimate. It never has. And it falls on Alaska.

"Glenfarne's estimate covers the pipeline. It does not cover the road Alaska must build to get there."

What the Dalton Highway Looks Like Today

The Dalton Highway is a 415-mile gravel road — one of the most remote highways in North America — running from Livengood north of Fairbanks to Deadhorse at Prudhoe Bay. It was built by Alyeska in 1974 specifically to support TAPS construction, at a cost of approximately $125 million — roughly $750 million in today's dollars. Alyeska built it, owned it, and maintained it for the pipeline. The state took ownership in 1978.

Today Alaska DOT&PF spends approximately $16.5 million annually just on maintenance — before any Alaska LNG construction begins. Over the past five years, the state has invested $160 million in capital improvements north of Atigun Pass alone, with another $175 million planned over the next five years. These investments are catching up with decades of deferred maintenance on a road that was never designed for the traffic volumes it now carries.

Permafrost thaw is accelerating the problem. Projections show thaw depths reaching six meters in some sections by 2033, driving per-mile stabilization costs up to $150,000 annually. The highway has steep grades, sharp horizontal curves, and failing embankment sections that DOT&PF describes as a safety and performance problem — under current traffic conditions, before Alaska LNG construction adds anything.

The Dalton Highway Today — Before Alaska LNG Construction

Annual maintenance cost: $16.5 million — one-third federally funded

Capital investment past 5 years: $160 million north of Atigun Pass alone

Planned capital investment next 5 years: $175 million

Current condition: Substandard geometry, failing embankments, permafrost thaw accelerating — rated "fair" by the state

Current traffic: 60% heavy commercial trucks — already degrading the road year-round

What Alaska LNG Construction Would Require

The Alaska LNG pipeline route crosses approximately 230 miles of federal lands, mostly in the Dalton Highway and Trans-Alaska Pipeline corridor. The Dalton is the primary overland construction access route for the northern portion of the 807-mile pipeline. There is no alternative.

TAPS construction required shipping approximately 550,000 tons of pipe alone — in addition to millions of tons of equipment, materials, fuel, and supplies. Alaska LNG would require a comparable volume of heavy haul over a road that is already strained by current North Slope oil field traffic.

Pipeline construction requires oversized loads — pipe sections, compressors, heavy equipment — that exceed the current weight and width limits on significant sections of the Dalton. Bridge reinforcements or replacements would be required. Embankment stabilization at failing sections would need to precede construction traffic. Permafrost mitigation along the corridor would need to be accelerated ahead of schedule.

None of this appears in Glenfarne's $44.5–$54.5 billion estimate. These are state infrastructure costs — not project costs. They fall on Alaska DOT&PF's budget, funded by Alaska's taxpayers, not by Glenfarne's investors.

The TAPS Lesson Nobody Is Applying

When Alyeska built TAPS, it also built the road. The haul road was a project cost — owned, funded, and maintained by the pipeline builder until the state took over. Alyeska bore the full infrastructure cost of accessing the construction corridor because it was in Alyeska's direct financial interest to do so. Getting oil to market was worth any road cost.

Sen. Myers correctly points out that Alaska LNG is different — Glenfarne makes money from pipeline tolls, not from the commodity value of the gas. That difference in business model is precisely why Glenfarne has no incentive to fund Dalton Highway upgrades. The road benefits the state. The state owns it. The state pays for it.

But here is what follows from that: if the state must upgrade the Dalton Highway to make Alaska LNG construction physically possible, that upgrade cost is a public subsidy to the project — one that never appears in any cost comparison, never appears in the DOR financial modeling, and never appears in the legislative debate over HB 381.

Hidden Public Costs Not in Glenfarne's Estimate

Dalton Highway upgrades: Bridge reinforcements, embankment stabilization, geometry improvements required to handle Alaska LNG construction traffic. Cost: unquantified. Borne by: Alaska DOT&PF.

Accelerated permafrost mitigation: Construction traffic and climate warming will accelerate permafrost thaw along the corridor ahead of schedule. Cost: unquantified. Borne by: Alaska DOT&PF.

Ongoing maintenance surge: Construction-weight traffic will dramatically increase road degradation above the current $16.5 million annual baseline. Cost: unquantified. Borne by: Alaska DOT&PF.

Post-construction remediation: Road damage from multi-year heavy haul construction traffic will require significant remediation. Cost: unquantified. Borne by: Alaska DOT&PF — and ultimately Alaska's taxpayers.

Sen. Myers Knew This in January

This is not a new concern. In January 2026, Sen. Myers stood before the Legislature and said the Dalton Highway is already failing under current traffic — that freight is getting damaged, costs are increasing, and projects are being delayed. He said explicitly: "It could delay the gas line."

He was raising the alarm about a road that cannot currently support the construction traffic Alaska LNG would require — five months before voting on legislation that would permanently restructure Alaska's tax code for the project.

The DOT commissioner responded by noting that DOT&PF budgets had been slashed by the Legislature last session. The Legislature that is now being asked to give Glenfarne a permanent tax concession previously cut the budget of the agency responsible for maintaining the only road that makes Alaska LNG construction physically possible.

That is the full picture the Legislature needs to see before voting on HB 381: a project whose costs are self-estimated, whose independent cost analysis has been withheld, whose profitability cliff is within the range of its own cost uncertainty — and whose construction depends on a public road that Alaska's own senator described as failing, maintained by an agency whose budget Alaska's own Legislature cut.

The Question That Should Be on the Floor Today

Before the Legislature votes on HB 381, it should require answers to three questions about the Dalton Highway alone:

Three Questions the Legislature Should Answer Before Voting

1. What is the estimated cost of Dalton Highway upgrades required to support Alaska LNG construction traffic — and who pays for them?

2. Does Glenfarne's definitive agreement with AGDC include any obligation to fund Dalton Highway improvements — and if not, why not?

3. When the Department of Revenue modeled Alaska's total financial position under HB 381, did that model include the public infrastructure costs Alaska must bear to make construction physically possible?

Sen. Myers drives the Dalton Highway. He knows what it looks like. He told the Legislature in January that it is already inadequate for current traffic and could delay the gas line. Today he published an article supporting HB 381 without mentioning that the state — not Glenfarne — will bear the cost of making that road construction-ready.

The cost Glenfarne didn't put in the estimate is the cost Alaska already owns. It is the cost of the road that makes the project possible. It is one more item in a growing list of public commitments made to a private developer — along with $1 billion in transferred assets, a 25% equity stake with no governance transparency, and now a proposed permanent tax concession — that have never been totaled up and presented to Alaska's citizens as a single number.

That number — the true total cost of Alaska's commitment to this project — is the one figure nobody has calculated. And it is the one figure the Legislature most needs before it votes.

Tom Lamb  ·  June 7, 2026  ·  Alaska Policy Commentary