Legal Analysis · Sullivan v. Division of Elections · 3AN-26-07485CI
Their Argument, Annotated — Why First & Fourteenth's 34-Page Brief Fails
Christopher O. Murray and Michael Francisco filed their brief on June 24, 2026. It is sophisticated, well-researched, and constitutionally wrong. Here is why, argument by argument.
On June 24, 2026 — the same day the brief was dated — First & Fourteenth PLLC filed a 34-page brief on behalf of the Alaska Division of Elections defending Carol Beecher's June 15 removal of Daniel J. Sullivan from the August 18 primary ballot. Christopher O. Murray and Michael Francisco, both partners at First & Fourteenth and both alumni of Judge Timothy Tymkovich's Tenth Circuit chambers, signed the brief alongside Acting Attorney General Cori Mills and Civil Division Director Rachel L. Witty.
The brief is the work of skilled appellate lawyers. Murray has argued before the U.S. Supreme Court. Francisco has briefed 19 cases there. The arguments they make are not frivolous. They are, however, constitutionally foreclosed. Here is each argument — and the answer to it.
The Governing Precedent — U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)
The Constitution sets three qualifications for United States Senate — age 30, nine years citizenship, inhabitancy in the state at time of election. These qualifications are exclusive. States cannot add to them. A restriction that functions as an additional qualification — regardless of whether it is labeled a "manner" regulation — violates the Qualifications Clause.
Daniel J. Sullivan meets all three constitutional qualifications. That is not disputed. The Division removed him anyway. Everything else in this brief is an attempt to justify that removal without triggering Thornton. Every attempt fails.
Their Argument
Sullivan knew the grounds for his challenge by June 15 — the date of the removal. He waited until June 22 to file — seven days. This delay consumed nearly half the compressed period before the June 30 ballot printing deadline. Courts should deny last-minute relief even on constitutional grounds. This is a self-created election emergency laches exists to prevent.
The Answer
Seven days is not unreasonable delay for a private individual who just had his candidacy removed by a state agency without statutory authority. Sullivan needed to find counsel, retain Ballard Spahr, assemble the factual record, and file a 34-page constitutional brief. He did all of that in seven days.
The Division created this emergency by removing a qualified candidate on June 15 — fifteen days before ballots print. The compressed timeline is of the Division's own making. The laches doctrine does not protect a party that creates the time pressure it then cites as prejudice.
The emergency motion was granted unopposed. The court found the timeline sufficient to proceed. The Division's own brief requests a ruling before noon June 30 — confirming the court has time to decide. Laches fails on its own terms.
Their Argument
Sullivan's declaration was not properly filed because he requested to appear on the ballot as "Sullivan, Dan" — identical to the incumbent — and subsequently asked to appear as "Dan S. Sullivan" — the incumbent's middle initial. His declaration did not suggest any practical means for the Division to differentiate him from Senator Sullivan. The declaration was filed in bad faith and is therefore not properly filed.
The Answer
The Declaration of Candidacy has two distinct parts. On the constitutional qualifications — age, citizenship, inhabitancy — the declaration is accurate and complete. Sullivan is who he says he is. Every constitutional requirement is met. On this basis alone Thornton forecloses removal.
On the ballot name request — Step 5 — the declaration was defective. Sullivan requested "Sullivan, Dan" — character for character identical to the incumbent's ballot name filed July 11, 2025. That defect is real. It gave the Division legitimate authority to initiate a cure process — which Beecher did on June 1. That is precisely where the Division's legitimate authority begins and ends.
The defective Step 5 was the entry point. The Division used it to open an intent investigation — gathering evidence of bad faith rather than requiring a corrected name submission. The "Dan S." email that followed was gathered through that investigation. The Division then used the results of the investigation it opened through the cure process to justify removal rather than cure. The defect justified rejection of the name request. It did not justify removal of the candidate. That is the constitutional line the Division crossed — and the precise point at which the cause and effect argument the Division builds fails legally even where it succeeds factually.
Their Argument
The Elections Clause grants states broad authority to regulate the "Manner" of congressional elections. Thornton itself acknowledges that permissible manner regulations include anti-confusion and ballot-integrity measures. The Supreme Court has upheld signature requirements, filing fees, party-disaffiliation laws, and preliminary support requirements as permissible manner regulations. Sullivan's removal was an anti-confusion ballot integrity measure — not a qualification — and falls squarely within permissible manner regulation authority.
The Answer
This is Murray and Francisco's strongest argument and it fails for one precise reason: the distinction between a manner regulation and a qualification is not about the label — it is about the effect. Thornton makes this explicit. A restriction that functions as an additional qualification — that bars a constitutionally qualified candidate from the ballot — is an impermissible qualification regardless of what it is called.
Every permissible manner regulation First & Fourteenth cites regulates HOW elections are conducted — not WHETHER a qualified candidate may appear. Signature requirements, filing fees, petition requirements — all of these regulate the process by which a candidate gains ballot access. None of them remove a constitutionally qualified candidate who has already satisfied the process.
Sullivan paid the filing fee. He submitted the required declaration. He satisfied every procedural requirement Alaska law imposes at the point of filing. But the defective Step 5 created the process that ultimately removed him. Sullivan filed an identical name — that defect triggered the cure process. He then failed the cure process twice — not answering on June 3, asking for the incumbent's initial on June 8. The Division removed him because of a failed process Sullivan himself created through the defective Step 5 and compounded through his responses to the cure inquiry.
But the remedy for a failed cure process is assignment of a distinguishing name format — not removal from the ballot entirely. The Division had authority to say: your name will appear as "Daniel J. Sullivan." Full stop. It did not need Sullivan's cooperation to exercise that authority. Removing him entirely — rather than assigning a distinguishing format — crossed from ballot design authority into candidate removal. That is the constitutional line. Thornton forecloses it.
The anti-confusion cases First & Fourteenth cites — American Party of Texas, Jenness — address ballot design and voter information, not candidate removal. A state may regulate how candidates appear on a ballot to reduce confusion. It may not remove candidates entirely on the theory that their presence is confusing. One is manner regulation. The other is qualification.
Their Argument
Section D of the brief argues that requiring candidates to file in good faith does not add to constitutional qualifications because good faith is a process regulation — not a substantive requirement based on a candidate's traits, statuses, prior conduct, or political positions. It is a requirement about HOW a candidate files, not WHO may file.
The Answer
This argument proves too much. Under the Division's theory any requirement framed as a process regulation — however substantive its effect — would escape Thornton scrutiny. A state could require candidates to demonstrate "genuine commitment to serving" as a filing process requirement. It could require candidates to show "sincere intent to campaign" as a ballot design regulation. The label does not determine the constitutional analysis. The effect does.
The effect of the good faith requirement here is that a constitutionally qualified candidate was removed from the ballot. That is the addition of a fourth qualification by any functional analysis. Thornton does not permit it — regardless of whether the Division calls it a qualification, a manner regulation, or a process requirement.
Critically — the good faith requirement the Division applied does not exist in Alaska statute. It does not exist in 6 AAC 25.212. It does not exist in any Alaska regulation. The Alaska Legislative Counsel's June 17 memo concluded the removal was "likely not legally justified" in part because "the legislature has not imposed such a good faith requirement anywhere." A requirement that does not exist in law cannot be a permissible manner regulation.
Their Argument
Courts in Nebraska (1930), Florida (2006), and Louisiana (1979) have upheld removal of candidates whose actions were designed to mislead voters. Sullivan's situation is analogous — a candidate who by all appearances deliberately sought to confuse voters rather than affirmatively seek office.
The Answer
Each of these cases is distinguishable from Sullivan's situation on its critical facts.
Candidate impersonated another candidate — using a name that was not his own legal name — to deceive voters about his identity.
Sullivan is filing under his actual legal name. Daniel J. Sullivan is who he is. He is not impersonating anyone. He shares a name with the incumbent through coincidence of birth — not fabrication.
Juan E. "J.P." Planas filed to challenge incumbent Juan Carlos "J.C." Planas for Florida House District 115. The appellees were J.C. Planas, the Miami-Dade Supervisor of Elections, and the Florida Secretary of State. The court upheld disqualification on three Florida common law grounds — not statute, not federal constitutional law.
Common Law Right to Names: J.P. Planas had never used that name in private or official affairs. Under common law a name is only legally recognized if actually used in daily life and business. He had no common law right to use it.
Good Faith Exception: Common law prohibits adopting a name for fraudulent purpose or to intentionally deceive. The court held "J.P." was engineered as a stratagem to confuse voters.
Tipsy Coachman Doctrine: The appellate court upheld disqualification on different grounds than the trial court — a common law appellate doctrine allowing affirmance on any correct legal basis even when the lower court's reasoning was wrong. The trial court's own reasoning was rejected.
This citation fails on every level. First — Sullivan's legal name is Daniel J. Sullivan. He has always used it. He transacts business under it. The common law name doctrine that doomed Planas does not apply — Sullivan had every common law right to use his own legal name in the original filing. The "Dan S." request in the cure process is where the Planas parallel narrows — but that request was made after filing, not in it.
Second — Planas was decided entirely on Florida common law. Three doctrines. No statute — Florida later had to pass legislation to codify what Planas established by common law. Alaska has adopted none of these Florida common law standards. The Alaska Legislative Counsel confirmed nothing in Alaska law regulates candidate name intent. Murray and Francisco are importing Florida common law into Alaska through a case citation — without any Alaska authority adopting those standards.
Third — the incumbent J.C. Planas was a named appellee with direct electoral standing. Senator Dan S. Sullivan has filed nothing. He is not a party. The standing that supported Planas does not exist here — and the citation itself highlights that absence.
Fourth — and most important — Planas never addressed Thornton. The federal constitutional qualifications framework was never analyzed. A Florida common law decision on Florida state ballot access cannot override binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent on constitutional qualifications for federal office.
Finally — J.C. Planas, the incumbent whose victory this citation protects, was subsequently ordered by a Miami-Dade court to pay legal expenses for filing a frivolous ethics complaint against a political rival — sanctioned for using the legal process for improper means. The precedent Murray and Francisco rely on was created by a litigant a Florida court later found acted in bad faith himself.
Candidate changed his name specifically and deliberately to create confusion — admitted he had "no hope of being a serious candidate" and his sole purpose was to promote a voting option.
Sullivan did not change his name. He did not admit his purpose was confusion. He has maintained throughout that he is a genuine candidate who meets every constitutional requirement. His own admissions do not mirror Knox's. The cases are not analogous.
The Dispositive Distinction
The Nebraska and Louisiana cases are easily distinguished — both involved candidates who fabricated names or changed their names specifically to create confusion. Sullivan filed under his actual legal name. Those cases are not analogous.
Planas is the harder case. Sullivan's "Dan S. Sullivan" request — made during the cure process — mirrors Planas conduct closely. He requested a designation that was not his in order to appear more like the incumbent. The distinction is that Sullivan's underlying legal name is genuine — Daniel J. Sullivan — and the fabrication occurred in the cure process response rather than the original filing. That distinction narrows the Planas gap but does not close it entirely.
What closes it is Thornton. Planas was decided on state law grounds. It did not address the federal constitutional qualifications framework. None of these state court decisions — Nebraska 1930, Planas 2006, None of the Above 1979 — addressed U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton. A state court applying state law cannot override binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent on constitutional qualifications for federal office. However compelling the Planas parallel — and it is compelling — Thornton is the governing authority. It forecloses removal of a constitutionally qualified candidate regardless of the factual record.
The Document That Defines The Case
The Declaration of Candidacy has two distinct parts that must be evaluated separately.
On the constitutional qualifications — the declaration is accurate, complete, and truthful in every respect. Sullivan is who he says he is. He is a United States citizen. He meets the age requirement. He is an inhabitant of Alaska — 439 Mitkof Highway, Petersburg, Alaska 99833. He paid the $100 filing fee. Every constitutional requirement is met. On this basis alone Thornton forecloses removal.
On the ballot name request — the declaration was defective. Step 5 requires the candidate to specify exactly how their name should appear on the ballot. Sullivan wrote: Sullivan, Dan. The incumbent's ballot name is: Sullivan, Dan. Character for character identical. Two candidates requesting the identical ballot name is a defect in Step 5 that the Division had legitimate authority to address.
The Step 5 Defect — Documented
Incumbent's Step 5 request — filed July 11, 2025: Sullivan, Dan
Challenger's Step 5 request — filed May 29, 2026: Sullivan, Dan
Identical. Not similar. Not close. Word for word the same. The Division had legitimate authority to reject this Step 5 as defective and require a corrected submission with a distinguishing name format.
The proper remedy for a defective Step 5 is rejection of that specific name request and an opportunity to cure — not removal of the candidate entirely. The Division had clear authority to reject "Sullivan, Dan" and require Sullivan to resubmit with a distinguishing format. Middle initial. Full legal name. City of residence. Any of these would have resolved the defect. The Division instead asked Sullivan how he wanted to appear. He failed that process twice. She removed him.
The defect was real. The remedy was available. The removal was not the remedy.
The Division Acknowledged The Defect — Then Used The Cure Process Against Sullivan
The Division's own conduct on June 1 implicitly acknowledged the Step 5 defect. By emailing both candidates asking how they wanted their names to appear — Beecher recognized the identical name problem and took the correct first step. Identify the defect. Seek a cure. That is exactly what the regulations contemplate for a defective Step 5 submission.
But something else happened on June 1. The NRSC letter arrived the same day. Beecher initiated the cure process and received a partisan demand for removal simultaneously. What followed was not a cure process. It was an investigation that used the cure inquiry as its vehicle — gathering evidence of intent rather than resolving the name defect.
The Division cannot have it both ways. Either the Step 5 defect was a curable deficiency — in which case Beecher acknowledged it as such on June 1 and Sullivan's failure to cure it required a corrected submission, not removal. Or the intent was the real issue all along — in which case the Step 5 defect was pretext and the removal was always about the NRSC's demand, not the ballot name request.
The timing makes Option B the more honest characterization. The cure process and the partisan pressure arrived on the same day. The Division initiated what looked like an administrative cure process while simultaneously receiving a demand for removal from the national party committee whose Senate incumbent was at stake. It then used Sullivan's responses to the cure inquiry as evidence of fraudulent intent — and removed him on that basis rather than completing the cure.
Initiated cure. Gathered evidence. Removed candidate. That sequence — on a timeline bookmarked by the NRSC letter — is the procedural story the July 20 document production needs to confirm. The retainer agreement for First & Fourteenth. The communications between the Division and the NRSC. The internal Division communications between June 1 and June 15. Those documents will show whether the cure process was ever intended to cure — or whether it was designed from the start to produce a record supporting removal.
The Division's Strongest Argument — Cause and Effect
The Division's most compelling factual argument is not any single act. It is a pattern across two separate submissions that it argues establishes intent beyond reasonable doubt.
Cause 1 — The Declaration. Sullivan filed Step 5 as "Sullivan, Dan" — character for character identical to the incumbent's ballot name. The Division identifies this as the first data point establishing a pattern of seeking name confusion.
Effect 1 — Division Initiates Cure. Beecher emails both candidates June 1 asking how they want their names to appear. The standard administrative response to an identical name problem. Sullivan is given a direct opportunity to provide a distinguishing format.
Cause 2 — The "Dan S." Response. When asked directly Sullivan asks to appear as "Dan S. Sullivan" — the incumbent's middle initial. Not his own initial "J." The incumbent's. On his second opportunity to distinguish himself he moved closer to the incumbent's identity — not further away.
Effect 2 — Removal. The Division argues the sequential conduct — identical name format on filing, incumbent's middle initial on second chance — establishes a pattern that confirms deliberate intent. Not one mistake. Two separate choices. Both pointing toward the incumbent's identity.
That argument has genuine force. It is the strongest factual case the Division has. Two opportunities. Two choices. Both in the wrong direction. The cause and effect sequence is documented in the administrative record and it is difficult to explain innocently.
But it still fails constitutionally. And it fails precisely.
Thornton forecloses removal of a constitutionally qualified candidate regardless of intent. Intent is not a constitutional qualification. Age, citizenship, and inhabitancy are the exclusive qualifications. Sullivan meets all three. The cause and effect argument — however compelling factually — operates entirely within the ballot design space. It establishes that the Division had legitimate authority to reject both name requests and assign "Daniel J. Sullivan" as the ballot listing over Sullivan's objection. It does not establish authority to remove Sullivan from the ballot entirely.
The Division can control the name on the ballot. It cannot control whether the name appears. The cause and effect pattern proves the Step 5 defect was not accidental. It does not expand the Division's remedial authority beyond ballot design into candidate removal. Thornton keeps it there. That is the constitutional line the Division crossed — and the line the court must draw.
The requirement the Division applied simply does not exist. Nothing in Alaska law regulates in any way the private motivations that draw individuals to declare or campaign for office.
— Sullivan v. Division of Elections, Appellant's Brief, Page 10
What The Acting AG's Signature Means
The brief is signed by Acting Attorney General Cori Mills alongside First & Fourteenth's Murray and Francisco. The AG's office is now formally on record defending the removal. That raises the billing and retainer questions with new urgency. When was First & Fourteenth retained? By whom? Who authorized that retention? Who is paying their fees — the state or the RNC? The retainer agreement and billing records are public documents under AS 40.25.220(3) if paid with state funds. A public records request filed today should produce that answer.
The AG's presence also means the standard explanation for First & Fourteenth's involvement — that the AG declined to defend and the Division went outside — no longer holds. Both are here. The question of who initiated the First & Fourteenth relationship and on whose authority remains unanswered. July 20 is when those documents are due.
The Remedy The Division Already Had
The Division's entire argument rests on the premise that "Sullivan, Dan" created an unresolvable confusion problem requiring removal. Alaska's own regulatory framework disproves that premise.
The remedy was always available within the Division's own authority. Middle initials. Full legal names. City of residence. These are standard ballot design tools. The Division had every one of them before the NRSC letter arrived on June 1. It chose not to apply them.
More striking — 6 AAC 25.214(c) explicitly permits nicknames commonly known in the community to appear on the ballot. The NRSC adopted "Decoy Dan Sullivan" as their official label in their June 9 FEC complaint. Beecher used it in her own removal letter. It appeared in every outlet that covered this story — locally, statewide, and nationally. The standard under 6 AAC 25.214(c) is satisfied by the public record alone.
The Division removed Sullivan citing name confusion. The NRSC — whose letter triggered the removal — amplified "Decoy Dan Sullivan" into the most recognizable label in this race. That label satisfies Alaska's own nickname regulation. The Division built the remedy it refused to apply — through the very process it used to remove him.
Sullivan, Dan — the Division called confusing. Decoy Dan Sullivan — commonly known, legally eligible under Alaska regulation, unambiguous to any voter. The confusion argument was never the real issue. The name was always solvable. The remedy was always available. The removal was always something else.
The Question Sullivan Must Answer
Credibility requires acknowledging the strongest argument against Sullivan's own conduct. It is this: he had two documented chances to resolve the name question — and didn't.
On June 1 Director Beecher emailed Sullivan directly asking how he wanted his name to appear on the ballot. Sullivan responded June 3 arguing he met all legal requirements for filing. He did not answer the name question.
On June 8 Beecher emailed again — specifically asking about ballot name display. Sullivan's response was to ask to appear as "Dan S. Sullivan" — the incumbent's middle initial. Not his own middle initial "J." The incumbent's.
Sullivan knew his middle initial was J. He was asked directly — twice — how he wanted to appear. The first time he didn't answer. The second time he asked for the wrong initial. The Division's brief calls that response "bewildering." That characterization is not unreasonable.
The constitutional argument does not require Sullivan to have acted in good faith. Thornton protects constitutionally qualified candidates regardless of their motivations — that is the entire point of an exclusive qualifications framework. But Sullivan's conduct on the name question gave the Division its strongest factual argument and complicated what should have been a straightforward constitutional case.
The remedy for a bad faith name display request is to reject that specific request — list him as "Dan J. Sullivan" or "Daniel J. Sullivan" — not remove him from the ballot entirely. That distinction is the constitutional line. Beecher had authority over the first. She did not have authority over the second. Sullivan's conduct made that line harder to hold publicly. The constitutional principle holds it anyway.
The Third Chance — What The Court May Do
Courts in administrative appeals have equitable remedial authority that goes beyond simply affirming or reversing the agency below. Rather than ruling on the full constitutional question — which carries significant national implications for every state's ability to regulate Senate ballot access — the judge may fashion a narrower remedy that resolves this case without deciding Thornton.
The court could remand to the Division with specific instructions — order Sullivan to appear and provide his correct middle initial "J" as his ballot name request before June 30. A third chance to cure the deficiency his own conduct created. The Division would then be required to place him on the ballot as "Dan J. Sullivan" or "Daniel J. Sullivan."
But there is a cleaner version of that remedy — one that removes Sullivan's ability to harm himself further. The Division has authority under Alaska ballot regulations to determine how names appear on the ballot. It does not need a candidate's permission to assign a distinguishing format. The judge could order the Division to simply assign Sullivan the ballot listing "Dan J. Sullivan" — unilaterally, without asking Sullivan to choose again.
That raises an uncomfortable question about the original process. Beecher asked Sullivan how he wanted his name to appear — giving him the choice rather than assigning a format. The Division had authority to assign "Dan J. Sullivan" without asking. By giving Sullivan the choice instead — and then using his answer as evidence of fraudulent intent — the Division created the factual record it needed for removal through a process it was not required to follow. It gave Sullivan rope. He used it. Then it removed him for using it.
A remand ordering the Division to assign the ballot name — rather than ask Sullivan to choose again — resolves the confusion problem within the Division's clear regulatory authority, gets Sullivan on the ballot, and avoids the constitutional question entirely. That remedy is attractive to a court under time pressure. It also implicitly acknowledges that the Division's choice to ask rather than assign was the procedural step that created this case.
The cleanest ruling is still the constitutional one. Thornton forecloses the removal. The manner/qualification line is drawn. The precedent is set. But courts under deadline pressure on election cases have historically preferred the narrowest available remedy. Watch for a remand with assignment instructions as the most likely outcome before June 30.
The Verdict
First & Fourteenth filed a sophisticated 34-page brief by two of the most accomplished conservative election lawyers in the country. The laches argument is thin — seven days is not unreasonable delay for a private citizen retaining counsel after an unconstitutional removal. The manner regulation argument fails because removing a constitutionally qualified candidate is not regulating the manner of elections — it is imposing a fifth qualification Thornton forecloses. The good faith argument fails because the requirement doesn't exist in Alaska law. The state court precedents fail because all three involve fabricated names — not a candidate's actual legal name.
The declaration had two parts. The constitutional qualifications — accurate, complete, met in every respect. The Step 5 ballot name request — defective. Identical to the incumbent's. The Division had legitimate authority to reject that Step 5 and require a corrected submission. It did not have authority to remove Sullivan from the ballot entirely. The defect was real. The remedy was rejection and cure — not removal. The ruling comes before June 30. Thirty-four pages from First & Fourteenth have not changed what the Legislative Counsel established on June 17.
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