"I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straight forward and trustworthy and we had a very good dialogue.President Bush like many of us want to believe the best in people, hence his comments towards then president Putin.
"I was able to get a sense of his soul.
However, as the years past things changed. Bush had the opportunity to get a second look at Putin's soul:
Mr. Putin has proved to be even more autocratic at home, and more bullying abroad, than those experts had warned. Acquiescence is no longer his style. In recent months, he has accused the United States of imperialism and warned that he may retarget Russia’s nuclear weapons at Europe if Mr. Bush goes ahead with plans to build parts of the still notional missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.What a difference six years made. And that difference in Putin has shown up in the lies he has pushed with regard to the tragic death of Polish president Lech Kaczynski.
Mr. Bush’s wooing slacked off after the A.B.M. announcement and his advisers say the president is a lot more skeptical of his former soul mate. Still, on the same day that Mr. Bush criticized Russia for derailing democratic reforms, he volunteered to reporters that he still calls Mr. Putin “Vladimir” and hoped to explain to Vladimir that he shouldn’t fear a missile defense system.
Mr. Putin is well aware of how people want to see the good in people and Putin plays off that emotional trust very well.
But what doesn't play well is when you lie to people when they offer their blind trust.
Moreover, the blind trust that Putin played off of, was done with an enabling international press who never did their job in seeking the truth. Instead, they willingly sold the Putin lie to the masses on an international scale.
When the Polish president crashed, it was Putin who was going to head up the investigation.
Russia's president Dmitry Medvedev said that Putin would head a special commission to investigate Kaczynski's death and the circumstances of the crash.On the day of the crash, Putin was have to said that a mobile radar unit was sent to Smolensk on April 5th.
April 7, when the airfield came Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Poland's Donald Tusk, the airfield had been brought special mobile radar stations, which helped make the landing of their ship. In addition, on April 7 was a good sunny weather, in contrast to today's dense fog.(google translated)
Later, it was affirmed that a radar unit was sent to Smolensk.
MOSCOW, May 19. (Игорь Соловей - УКРИНФОРМ ). (Igor Solovey - Ukrinform ). The equipment at the airfield in Smolensk was the same as for Vladimir Putin, and for Lech Kaczynski. This is today's press conference in Moscow said the chairman of IAC Tatiana Anodina, commenting on rumors that the front of the Arrivals Polish Prime Minister Tusk and the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin at the airport had installed additional equipment and after their departure it was filmed, Ukrinform reported correspondent in Russia.
"The equipment at the airport of Smolensk, which was before the arrival of Prime Minister of Poland and Russia, and after arrival, there was a positive one and the same. This information has been verified," - said the chairman of the MAC.
However, the approach plates at Smolesnk North tell a different tale.
РМС or РСП + ОСП
There are two types of approach systems that fall under that category of a precision approach at Smolensk North and according to Russian officials, the approach plates that are dated before 2010, are the only current approach plates for Smolensk North.
There was a radar system at Smolensk for sometime because it is listed as РСП + ОСП and there is an ILS system as it is listed as РМС.
According the official line that was reported, the official visibility at Smolensk North was 400 meters and is verified in the cockpit voice recorder.
10:14:06,5:In the beginning in a briefing it was stated:
D: Polish Air Force 1-0-1, for information at 06:11 Smolensk visibility 400 meters fog.
KVS: Not looking good, there's fog, it's unknown whether we'll land.
B/P: Yeah? (incomprehensible)
A: And if we don't land, then what?
KVS: We'll leave.
A: What information do we have (incomprehensible) to Warsaw?
A: Around 7.
A: How much fuel?
2P: We have about 13-12.5 tonnes.
2P: We'll make it!
D: PLPH-2-0-1, there is fog at Korsaż, visibility 400 metres.
D: There is fog at Korsaż, visibility 400 metres.
KVS: Temperature and air pressure, please.
044: We greet you warmly. You know what, speaking honestly, it's a bitch down here. Visibility is about 400 metres and in our view the bases are below 50 metres, thick.
Igor Levitin: Right after we received word of the incident, I contacted the Polish Transport Minister and we pledged to work together.The minima for Smolensk is 100x1000.
The technical commission of the Russian Defence Ministry and the Intergovernmental Aviation Committee will work with their Polish counterparts to get the investigation underway. They have just arrived. And now we will work with them on-site.
We have found two flight data recorders - one recording instrument readouts and the other recording audio. But we did not touch anything before our colleagues arrived at the site. As soon as we co-ordinate with them, that we have started work on-site, we plan to bring - again in cooperation with them - the recorders to Moscow, to our institute, where they will jointly study and listen to all the exchanges between the pilots and dispatchers.
The weather conditions were bad - the fog cover was near complete. Visibility was estimated 400 metres, while the norm is 1000.
Vladimir Putin: The norm is 1000?
Igor Levitin: 1000 metres.
Vladimir Putin: And visibility was 400?
Igor Levitin: Yes, and the pilot was warned about the bad weather condition. The conversation was in Russian. We now want to confirm all of this on the recorders - as it all happened. But he was notified of the bad weather conditions.
Vladimir Putin: The pilot made the decision to proceed?
Igor Levitin: The pilot made the decision to proceed independently, even though the dispatcher, who knew the conditions, warned him and informed him of data on the fog that was available from the radar.
The two type of approaches that qualify for the 100x1000 minima is an ILS (РМС) or military precision approach (РСП + ОСП) as is shown on the approach plate for Smolensk.
As for the ceiling?
There was no official ceiling called out by the Russian ATC and it was found that the Russian ATC lied about the visibility.
In a previous post, I asked why did the Russian controller lie to the pilot.
Just recently, in a news article found here in the Polish press, it is now stated that the Russian controller lied to the crew on PLF 101.Through investigations, it was found that the visibility was 800 meters, not the 400 meters told to the crew on PLF101.
Inspectors falsified data on the visibility of the Smolensk airport and they then gave false information to the crew Polish Tupolev. As prosecutors and testified against the Russians, would thus discourage the Poles to land. The fact came to the content of these testimonies. They are shocking. Because they show that people who should give the parameters necessary for the safe planting machine at the airport runway, in its sole discretion ming them.
Russian investigators and Victor Paul Pliusnin Ryzenko prosecutors testified that, although the visibility at the airport Siewiernyj was then 800 meters, they deliberately gave the Polish pilots, another value - 400 meters, which, moreover, was recorded on the recording of black boxes.
Since the time of the previous posts, one of the crew members on the Yak-40 stated in an interview that ATC had told the pilot on the president's plane he could descend to 50 meters, well below the minima of 100x1000 for Smolensk North.
So the idea that the ATC told the president that the visibility was less than the estimated 800 meters visibility to discourage the president from landing, is illogical in that the ATC told the pilot he could descend to 50 meters.
Keep in mind, ATC also stated there was no ceiling.
In another briefing it was reported:
While investigators began their work, Lieutenant General Alexander Alyoshin, deputy head of the Russian air force, revealed that the pilots of the ill-fated airliner had repeatedly ignored instructions from air traffic controllers.This was another lie as the transcripts point to the Russian ATC never telling the crew to go to another airport.
Wreckage -- including the engines and a large chunk of mud-caked tailfin -- was scattered across a forest. While sections burned for more than an hour, the black-box flight recorders were found, news agencies reported.
Some 1.5 kilometres (one mile) from the airport, air traffic controllers noticed the Tupolev -- overhauled in December 2009, according to manufacturers Aviakor -- was below its appropriate glide path, Alyoshin said.
"The head of the (air traffic control) group ordered the crew to return to horizontal flight, and when the crew did not fulfil the instruction, ordered them several times to land at another airport," he said. "Nonetheless the crew continued to descend. Unfortunately this ended tragically."
Moreover, just a few seconds before hitting the first tree, the Russian ATC told the crew on PLF101 to level out at 50 meters.
ST: 50.At this time, the plane was heading into the up-slope side of the ravine.
D: Horizon 101. (level)
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP. ST: 30.
D: Height control, horizon.
ST: 20. Signal at F=400 Hz. Autopilot disconnect. Signal at F=800 Hz.
Inner marker. Signal at F=400 Hz. Autothrottle disconnect
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
TAWS:Signal at F=400 Hz. ABSU.
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
TAWS:Sound of hitting trees.
2P: F*cking hell!
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL
D: Abort to second approach!
A: Screaming F*ckkkkkkkkkkkk.....
In another report it was stated:
In the interrogation, which led A. Aleshin, the dispatcher said that at a distance of 1.1 km (that the protocol has been fixed at 1.5 km) before issuing the order to suspend the Polish crew landed, he saw the Tu- 154 on the radar screen. In the second protocol Ryzhenko showed that at a distance of 1,5 - 1,7 km aircraft on the monitor he had not seen.At 1.5 km, the pilot was over the ravine and below the top of the rise of the ravine so the plane would have not been seen on radar. But through interrogations, it is found that the dispatcher lied to the officials when it was stated that he could see the plane at 1.5 km out.
Since this approach was a military precision approach (РСП + ОСП) the following are the guidelines on the approach used.
On Approval of Federal Aviation Regulations" Implementation of the Radiocommunication airspace of the Russian Federation "(registered in Ministry of Justice of Russia 06.12.2007 N 10627(google translated)
5.4.4. Approach on the radar (CPR, CPR + CAP) is performed under the guidance of Manager PSL to LMM crossing, and after BMB Manager PDP informs the crew to remove the Sun to the runway.
In cases where due to interference on the indicator PAR DMA controller can not see a mark on the Sun to the BMB, he tells the crew to remove all that to which you can run to pace the radar under the leadership of PDP Manager:
220.127.116.11. By reducing the glide path of guidance and information on sticking trajectory flight passed continuously with pauses between messages for the crew 's entry opportunities for communication.
After passing the entry point in the glide path (HRG) Instructions and information manager "landing" may be accepted without confirmation.
Guidance on the resolution (Ban) reduction and landing crew shall always be confirmed.
18.104.22.168. At preplant direct information about how to remove Sun from the beginning of WFP reported dispatcher "landing" of the crew of aircraft:
before the passage of the OMB - not less than 2 km;
after the passage of the OMB - not less than 1 km.
What this means is one, ATC is in control of the aircraft and is responsible for ensuring the course and glide-slope of the aircraft is maintained.
It also means that ATC is to notify the plane when it is off course or off the glide-slope or they are off the CRT screen.
The following is the transcript prior to impact.
10:40:32,4:As you can read, the Russian ATC never stated to the pilot it was off course, off it glide-slope or that they were no longer on the CRT screen.
KVS: Turned on.
D: 2 and on course, on glideslope.
TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
A: 100 metres.
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
TAWS:TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
(2P): In the norm.
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
2P: Go around.
Signal at F=400 Hz. (Decision height).
TAWS:PULL UP, PULL UP.
The lies continued.
The weather data that pertained to the barometric pressure and used by the Russian ATC was coming from an automated weather observing station at the civilian airfield 6km from Smolensk North.
Control Tower uses data from the remote station by up to 10 kilometers, in addition located at a different height. This means that Russian investigators had no accurate data about the weather, which prevailed on April 10 at the airport and handed Polish pilots inaccurate parameters.(google translated)
This fact that the barometric pressure was taken from a weather station over 6 nm from Smolensk North raises the topic of how the Russian ATC gave the barometric pressure to the pilot.
Because the aircraft was off its glide-slope, there is a question on if the pressure should have been given in QFE or QNH under a РСП + ОСП.
While Putin promised transparency in this investigation, this investigation by Putin has been nothing more than lies presented as truth and a willing press to print the lies as truth.